The Japanese Association for Religious Studies was established in 1930. With around two thousand members, it is Japan’s oldest and largest association bringing together scholars who are engaged in religious studies. Members approach their studies from a wide variety of perspectives, with research methodologies that include comparative studies of religion, sociological and psychological analyses, and historical and cultural anthropological approaches, among others. The objects of their studies likewise range broadly in both temporal and geographical terms, from ancient epochs to the contemporary age, with explorations of phenomena throughout the world.

Articles, essays, and other papers by association members appear in the quarterly Journal of Religious Studies (Shūkyō kenkyū), with one issue dedicated to the proceedings of the association’s Annual Convention. We have also created an online system whereby past articles scanned or saved to PDF format can be read on demand.

A large amount of research written in Japanese has seen the light of day through these various media. However, in recent years some members have also expressed an interest in seeing their work presented in English so that foreign scholars not proficient in Japanese can more easily learn about the current state of Japanese religious studies. Although some members have already published their articles in foreign journals in various languages, the association has come to believe that publishing the work of its members in English is important. A committee was formed more than a year ago to respond to this need, and the

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result of the views expressed in those discussions is the English-language digital journal you are now reading.

We are now in the age of digital publication, which has made it quite easy to publicize scholarly research. One of the most useful aspects of publishing in this manner is that scholars throughout the world are now able to easily get access to articles published this way. By publishing in English—which today functions as the *de facto* international language—we hope that foreign scholars will find it easier to more frequently approach religious studies in Japan.

We intend to continue publishing articles so as to shed light on what religious phenomena and research methodologies are the foci of present-day studies in Japan. As we continue our project, we expect to take our efforts in a more bilateral direction in the future and present works from scholars overseas aimed at an audience of their Japanese colleagues.

It is our hope that this journal serves to extend and deepen communications among scholars around the world.

Inoue Nobutaka

*President, Japanese Association for Religious Studies*
In the contemporary world there is a trend to restore a religious world view against the dominant secularist view. Three aspects can be observed: 1. a return to traditional religions; 2. the rise of spirituality; and 3. an increase in religiosity within the modern institutional sphere. In this article the main focus is on the rise of spirituality. The author examines the historical process through which a new spirituality, mainly in economically advanced countries, has emerged and spread. The author proposes that this phenomena is related to skepticism against people’s faith in salvation. In economically advanced countries, a contemporary transformation of the world view can be seen as “from religion to spirituality,” but it may be more appropriate to call this transformation “from salvation to spirituality.” There is continuity between “new spirituality,” which develops outside the traditional religions, and an emphasis on spirituality which develops within the traditional religions. In order to understand the relationship between religion and spirituality, provisional definitions of religion and spirituality are proposed. Although there is a tension between religion and new spirituality, from another viewpoint religion and new spirituality are complementary. The understanding of this complement proposed here reflects an East Asian perspective of religious history.

**KEYWORDS:** spirituality—salvation religion—religious resurgence—spiritual world—new spirituality

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In considering the trends in contemporary religions, the year 1978 has a symbolic significance to me. The Iranian Revolution occurred in this year, and the name of Ruh Allah Khomeyni became known to the world. The revolution gradually strengthened its Islamic inclinations, and the year will be remembered as a turning point when the drive of religiously-inspired political regimes gained strength against secular political regimes in an increasingly modernizing and globalizing world.1

Changes in the Contemporary World View

It was also in 1978 that a “spiritual world” (seishin sekai) section was set up in bookstores in Japan; this is an original Japanese term that had a close connection with “religion,” but it came into use with connotations to suit the sentiments of modern life, replacing the term “religion” which was becoming outmoded. Within a short space of time, the “spiritual world” section was installed next to the religion section in large bookstores, and young people have become more attracted to the “spiritual world” (SHIMAZONO 1996).2

The focus of young people’s interest, like my own, in the 1970s was more directed to religion rather than politics. Among young people a shift occurred, from participating in the anti-Vietnam War movement or anti-pollution movements, to being engaged in introspective activities to transform themselves through meditation, physical activity, and psychological therapy. In the United States, the counterculture period of the 1960s was replaced by the trend of seeking an alternative spirituality in the 1970s. A similar trend occurred in Japan a little later. What is called the “spiritual world” in Japan largely overlaps with the “New Age” in North America, and both are interactively related to some extent.3


2. Many research books on the New Age have been published in the West. Books which were published relatively earlier, and which have high academic value, include MELTON 1990; YORK 1995; and HEELAS 1996.

3. Sociologists in English-speaking countries often cite two definitions on religion, one substantive definition (faith in supernatural beings) and the other, a functional definition (relations

* This is an enlarged and revised version of my earlier article published in Japanese as Kyusai-kara supirituyaritto e: Gendai shukyo no hen’yo o higashi ajia kara tenbo suru 救済からスピリチュアリティへ―現代宗教の変容を東アジアから展望する― [From Salvation to Spirituality: Contemporary Transformation of Religions Viewed from East Asia], Shūkyō Kenkyū 365: 127–54 (2010).
The theory of secularization was dominant among religion scholars and religious sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s. They discussed that along with the progress in the process of modernization and rationalization, the influence of religions had declined and was bound to further decline in the future. Bryan Wilson, a leading British sociologist of religion in the 1960s and 1970s, and Peter Berger, one of the leading sociologists in the United States at that time, advocated the theory of secularization (Wilson 1966, 1982; Berger 1967). However, in the 1980s and 1990s, those favoring this theory decreased in number. More people considered that the influence of religions might have been weakened at a certain stage in the process of modernization, but that secularization would not proceed in a linear manner. The view that a return to the sacred would occur became stronger. Thus, terms such as “sacralization,” or “re-sacralization” came to be used (for example, Demerath 2007).

“Re-sacralization” can be observed from three aspects. The first aspect is the revival of traditional religions. In Islamic countries, the tendency to live in accordance with Islamic religious norms was strengthened, and in some countries such as Israel and Turkey there are political forces foisting the strict practice of Islamic teachings. The Iranian Revolution was the first expression of such a trend, which was followed by other countries in other regions. In India, Hindu nationalism gained strength and in Israel, the religious party came to have a stronger influence. In many cases, young people supported these parties. It can be said that to some extent in the United States, Evangelical (or Fundamentalist) Christianity caught the hearts of the youth, and gained stronger political strength, although this tendency was more remarkable in developing countries than in industrialized countries (Shimazono 2007a).

The second aspect is the rise of spirituality that was more notably observed in industrialized countries. An increasing number of people in these countries came to consider that their lifestyles and mindsets were led by their relation with something greater than themselves or a transcendent domain, rather than following secularism or rationalism. They do not like to use the term “religion” to explain their state of mind. They do not feel comfortable with organized religious groups that traditional religions and their pious followers tend to form. Instead of forming a communal society of followers of a leader, they prefer to develop spirituality individually as they like, and connect with like-minded people in a loose network. Many of them consider themselves to be “not religious, but spiritual.”

The third aspect is an increase in the number of people who realize there is a limit to secularism in the modern institutional domain in which secularism was
the norm and who find it necessary to bring religion and spirituality into their lives. Typically, they are people working in hospitals and schools, to which the knowledge and practice systems of medical care, nursing care, education, and psychology are related. In the modern assumption, these institutions have their own functions which are removed from religions and spirituality. However, they are, in fact, inseparable from religion and spirituality. For example, hospitals and other medical institutions which give medical and nursing care for terminally ill patients cannot avoid being faced with the spiritual suffering of patients whose time is drawing near. They find it necessary to offer spiritual care that is not necessarily based on a specific religion. If religious or spiritual experience is indispensable in a person’s life, institutions and fields which have considered secularism as their leading principle should incorporate a spiritual dimension in their services.

In Japan, and presumably in other areas of East Asia, I noticed that the trend in the second aspect was remarkable. In the 1970s, the trend toward the spiritual world became apparent, and young people were attracted to it. In the 1980s, the spiritual world became part of pop culture and achieved commercial success as a part of the culture of consumption. Around the turn of the decade, moving into the 1990s, I realized that this was more than a reflection of the overflowing hopes of young people, and that it was more than “cultural fashion.” For example, cases emerged whereby people suffering from social discrimination or people struggling with psychological suffering were involved in gaining spiritual knowledge and conducting spiritual practices together with others who also shared the same suffering. A good example of this is the self-help movement whereby people suffering from eating disorders formed a network aimed at healing, and for sharing spiritual experiences. It was around this time that networks spread among people who became overwhelmed with grief due to separation by death. These phenomena and the third aspect are closely connected.

By taking Japan as an example in considering the theme of re-sacralization, the rise of spirituality occurring mainly in industrialized countries has been discussed rather than religious revival on a worldwide scale. As the phenomena in the second and third aspects (the rise of spirituality; the limits to secularism remarkable in industrialized countries, we may see that the general trend of human spiritual history is directed toward the rise of spirituality. The process “from secularism to religion” is both a religious revival and re-sacralization, but as a shift “from religion to spirituality” is taking place, the general tendency can be defined as “from secularism to spirituality.”

However, the present situation cannot be accurately grasped with this view. For one thing, the phenomenon corresponding to “religious revival” also occurred in industrialized countries. The roles of religious traditions and religious organizations may be increasing, calling for peace, and promoting inter-
national cooperation; this is also true for the domain of bioethics, such as the question of whether to approve or disapprove euthanasia, and that of social welfare activities to help the socially disadvantaged (Shimazono 2000; 2008). These are cases that have the potential to activate the public arena. On the contrary, religious traditions and organizations may exert their influence to promote domestic or international conflicts and disputes. José Casanova noted that industrialized countries in Western Europe, which once separated politics and religions according to modern principles, were rediscovering the potential of religions to play a positive public function. He attempted to express this function with the term “public religion” (Casanova 1994). It is along the same perspective that Robert Bellah took note of the role of “Biblical tradition” in the contemporary public arena in the United States (Bellah et al., 1985). The activation of the public functions of traditional religions may contribute to the integration of society based on diversity, but on the other hand, may lead to social division and social exclusion. It is not easy to distinguish both aspects.

From the nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century, when nation states and modern institutions that were formed in the West rapidly developed and spread, secularism became the main trend on a worldwide level. Industrialization and the progress of modern sciences, and the extension of a modern universal education to support this, promoted the expansion of organizations and fields of activity in accordance with rationalism. A visible indicator for this is the increase in the number of professionals with a knowledge of specialized sciences. In addition, in the twentieth century, socialism became popular as a guiding principle for social change, giving impetus to the trend in secularism.

Nonetheless, in the late twentieth century, the negative sides of modern civilization became apparent: for example, no feasible solutions to the problems of environmental destruction and poverty, the endless expansion of material desire, and an increasing number of people living in solitude and having no real reason to live. Furthermore, the authority of secularism was weakened due partially to the decline of socialism both in developed and developing countries, and people’s minds were drawn to religion and spirituality. With the failure of their utopian expectations of secularism, there was a rise in the number of disillusioned people in both the western and eastern blocs. People came to realize that modern institutions had fundamental limits when establishing meaningful lifestyles. The authority of science was increasingly strengthened, and secularism remained the mainstream world view of industrial nations. However, the world views that were different from this could not be ignored.

From the above, two changes in ideological trends in the contemporary world can be seen, which is apparently inverting to secularization: 1. from secularization to religion, and 2. from religion to spirituality. In fact, spirituality is indispensable from religion. What I see among many people who are departing
From religions in today's world is that they are eschewing salvation religions. Therefore, the change from religion to spirituality can be more specifically stated as being a change “from salvation religions to spirituality;” seeing this, spiritual trends among contemporary people can be understood more clearly. In the following section, the connotations using the terms “religion,” “spirituality,” and “salvation religion” in this article will be explained.

**Religion, Spirituality, and Salvation Religions**

In order to understand the phenomena of religious revival and the rise of spirituality in the world, it is necessary to clarify the definition of terms such as “religion” and “spirituality,” which is by no means easy. “Religion” and “spirituality” have been used in Christian civilization and they connote meanings connected with Christianity (Asad 1993; 2003). Since the nineteenth century, the term “religion” has been used to express phenomena different from Christianity in different places in the world. There were cases where the application of the term was not easy. For example, “Are Islam and Judaism religions or social systems?”, or “Is Confucianism a religion or not?” In Japan and India respectively, there is a persistent resistance to call Shinto or Hinduism a religion. Human society has not reached the stage when the concept of religion developed in the West can be applied to various phenomena in the world.

Under such circumstances, there is no definition of religion widely accepted in academia. No matter what definition is applied, there are some phenomena which cannot be covered by the definition. It is very difficult to define what religion is. Fully understanding such a situation, religion is to be defined here as the “system relating with something sacred” (Wilson 1966, 1982; Berger 1967). What, then, is “something sacred”? First, it implies spiritual or supernatural beings, a power, or experiences that cannot be confirmed with the ordinary five senses. A spirit, a deity, the world of a different dimension (the other world), and something that can be felt through mystical experiences or spiritual enlightenment can be considered sacred. Something that gives deep meaning, that strongly influences people and continuously leads their thoughts and practices, is also sacred. In some cases, specific objects, words, and books can be sacred things. When people's day-to-day lives are structured upon a system relating to the sacred, or when a system relating to the sacred is incorporated in the communal life of people, such a system may be called a religion.

What, then, is “spirituality”? Spirituality is a term used to understand religion in accordance with a specific quality of humans that expresses human experience, a quality, or property that is associated with something sacred and beyond human control. In Japanese, the term *reisei*—originating in the Middle Ages—is the word with the closest meaning. In *Nihonteki Reisei*, SUZUKI
Daisetsu (1972) is strongly conscious of the term “spirituality.” While “religion” is an affair of individuals as well as a system outside them, spirituality has been considered as being found mainly inside individuals or something found through individuals. Both are closely related, and can be said to be the same but with a difference in emphasis, whether to give emphasis on the system or on individuals. In other words, where a religion existed, spirituality was always present. Where a stable religion was considered as a premise, and many people shared the same religion, the need for discussing spirituality was not felt. The term was only used, at best, as a term relating to a small number of people having strong spirituality.

In the twentieth century, and notably in the last quarter century, an understanding of spirituality as being independent from religion has been spreading. This new movement or cultural style can be called “new spirituality” (Shimazono 1996, fn. 2; 2004a; 2007a, fn. 6). The New Age in the United States, the spiritual world in Japan, and the spread of grief work meetings and self-help groups are examples of new spirituality. In new spirituality, spirituality is often considered to exist separate from religion, and that this is suitable to modern life. While some people expend much energy facing their own death, or in spiritual interaction with the deceased, they are not convinced of the teachings of salvation in the other world taught by traditional religions. Others consider that psychology and psychological therapy can help one more accurately grasp the experience in the depths of one’s consciousness, and take steps on a path to be above themselves. These people find it difficult to follow traditional religions, in particular salvation religions, but they have a strong interest in spirituality and consider themselves to be “not religious, but spiritual.”

It is not a new spirituality alone that is on the rise today. Even within traditional religions, spirituality is increasingly discussed. In the tradition of Christianity, the opposing concepts of “spirit” and “matter” were established from an earlier time. Along with this, the term “spiritual” has long been used, although it is not directly linked with the use of “spirituality” as a matter of individual concern. It is understood that the term was used in France in the seventeenth century and had much in common with mysticism (Carrette and King 2005; McGrath 1999). There, spirituality was typically found in monasteries. The use of this word to call upon some personal characteristics developed through undergoing special training such as that of monks under monastic life today. For example, an attempt to exchange training between Zen Buddhist monks in Japan and Catholic monks and nuns in the West has been implemented since 1979 in the name of an “East-West Spirituality Exchange.”

4. See Shimazono 2002 and 2007a, Chapter 3, part I, fn. 6. Wade Clark Roof has been conducting his research from this perspective; see Roof 1993, 1999.
Later, from before the Reformation, a time came inside Christian organizations when the development of spirituality was sought not only in the secluded life of monasteries but also as something deeply associated with the daily lives of lay followers. Spirituality came to be considered not as the concern of a limited number of religious people but as being related to the inner lives of all followers; presumably, this was a development in the 1950s and 1960s (Carrette and King 2005, fn. 15). Instead of considering that followers are unilaterally taught by clergymen, that they should abide by holy words in the Bible, or that they are passive beings with “faith,” followers should develop their spirituality themselves.

The meaning of the term “spirituality” was broadened based on this view. As a matter of fact, the training and development in the habitus of followers must have been carried out in the past without using the term “spirituality.” Such efforts were reorganized and further developed while respecting the diversity and voluntary practices of individual followers, and the term “spirituality” was applied to this process. Therefore, the process can be seen as the reorganization and reconceptualization of the spirituality of Christianity. There are increasing numbers of people who consider spirituality to be their own concern while maintaining their affiliation and faith with specific religious traditions. This phenomenon should be distinguished from “new spirituality,” but it is closely correlated with it. It constitutes a part of the rise of spirituality in the contemporary world.

As such, the relation between religion and spirituality is not simple, but neither are they independent of each other. Discourses on spirituality are increasing within Christianity, but it is a new spirituality outside the existing religious traditions and is more pronounced. Can spirituality be defined as something not religious? This would narrowly limit the term “religion” and close an avenue in the comparison of various forms of religion. Both terms concern “people’s relationship with the holy.” In religion, it is seen in terms of a system, while in spirituality it is seen from the aspect of individual experience, quality, and property. In the past, a “system” was more conspicuous, but now, “individuality” is gaining a stronger emphasis. Even with this change, both aspects are always seen, and there is spirituality where religion exists, and religion where spirituality exists. Therefore, a new spirituality can be embraced within religion in a broad sense. In other words, a new type of religion has become prevalent among people who are not in favor of defining it as “religion.”

In what aspects do participants in new spirituality consider their position to be different from religion? First, it is hard to indicate new spirituality as a firm system existing outside an individual. Those who are interested in new spiri-

5. Wuthnow (1998) and Fuller (2001) point out the inclination toward new spirituality based on rich resource materials.
tuality consider traditional religions, with their solid systems and organization, to have characteristics that are disagreeable to them. Such characteristics are 1. they require followers to be members in a religious organization, and to follow the norm of the organization; 2. they require followers to believe in a single and supreme being such as Jesus Christ and Sakyamuni Buddha or a divine superhuman being; 3. they have self-righteous and exclusive attitudes and believe that only the religion they believe in is right while other religions and ideologies have little or no value; and 4. they have a dichotomy by which they teach of an afterlife retribution by gods and superhuman beings and possible punishment for those who are non-believers in the teachings.

These characteristics of religion that connote negative meanings for the supporters of new spirituality do not apply to all religions. However, these are remarkably observed in the type of religions categorized as “salvation religions” in the theory of types of religions. 6 What are “salvation religions”? In order to understand the spirituality of today, an understanding of salvation religions will be of great help.

Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam are considered to be “world religions” as they have followers all over the world, but they can also be characterized as “salvation religions.” Salvation religions urge people to realize that humans have difficult limits to overcome, and teach that there is a way to overcome the difficult limits by appealing to a supreme being or power in a different dimension. To escape from a difficult situation means “salvation,” therefore, they are religions focusing on the reality of suffering as well as the concept of “salvation.”

In Christianity, as a child of God, the falsely charged Jesus Christ expiated the crime of humans by being crucified. By believing this, followers believe that they who are sinful would be relieved, and according to traditional faith, to be relieved means that followers would be near God in heaven after their death. The original meaning might be that their souls would be fully purified. In the most frequently cited prayer in Christianity, the Lord’s Prayer, there are the following clauses:

And forgive us our trespasses,  
As we forgive them that trespass against us.  
And lead us not into temptation,  
But deliver us from evil.

In Buddhism, a fundamental limit for humans is that they cannot save themselves from suffering. It is said that in his first sermon after attaining enlightenment,  

6. The term “salvation religion” was first used in Germany toward the end of the nineteenth century, and became a key term to be frequently used in religious sociology (Kippenberg 1997). It had an impact on the religious sociology of Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber.
Gautama Buddha explained this in terms of the Four Noble Truths. First, human life is full of suffering (truth of suffering); second, suffering is caused by endless attachment to the objects of desire (as the cause of suffering); third, one should seek enlightenment through ceasing these desirous attachments (the truth of quenching desire); and fourth, one should practice the eightfold path (that leads to the cessation of suffering). The goal (or salvation) in Buddhism is to overcome suffering. This state of mind is called “enlightenment” and the resultant nirvana (wherein the fires of desire are vanquished) is another expression of salvation.

Finally, Tenrikyo will be cited as an example of a salvation religion that originated in Japan.7 Tenrikyo was initiated in 1838 by Nakayama Miki, a housewife of a farming household in Yamato province (present-day Nara prefecture) who experienced divine possession, and it is called a new religion. Some new religions have not expanded outside their place of birth. Usually they are not categorized as world religions but are considered as salvation religions. Every morning and evening, Tenrikyo followers cite the words of the prayer mikagura-uta to a melody while gesturing with their hands. The standard prayer clause cited every morning and evening is Tenri-o-no-mikoto, “please save us by wiping away evil.” The “evil” resembles “sin” in Christianity. It means that a person soils one’s heart with evil thoughts, and that such evil conduct is accumulated in one’s heart, preventing the innate function of the heart. It is often likened to “dust.” When dust is wiped out and the heart is purified, followers can spend their days in happiness. This is called “relief.” The terms “relief” and “salvation” have almost the same meaning.

In salvation religions, “evil,” “suffering,” and “sin” are considered to be the limits of humans. Some evil and suffering may not have been caused by humans, but they come from nature and some invisible beings. The important elements here are that humans must confess, repent, and apologize to God, or must reflect on their sins and try to get rid of them. The first thing that comes to mind as evil or a sin that humans tend to commit is to cause others pain, and in most cases, this means violence. Salvation religions, therefore, can be defined as religions that are concerned with evil and suffering, and further, violence.

How can violence be overcome? Salvation religions preach that as human capacity is limited, followers should entrust it to the love or power of God, or the wisdom or mercy of the Buddha. They recommend praying, and looking at and calming one’s mind. On the other hand, they urge followers to take action in order to control violence or go beyond violence. They imply the observation of precepts, and the practice of love and mercy. In addition to the requirement of attaining a peaceful state of mind, they require followers to actually practice love and mercy in their social lives through their physical activities. The concept of

7. For an attempt to understand new religions in Japan as the modern form of salvation religions, see Shimazono 1992.
virtue recommended by salvation religions may vary widely, but keeping away from violence is the essential element.

According to the teachings of salvation religions, the path leading to salvation is open to everyone by having faith in the religion. Salvation religions urge individuals to make decisions independently. Every person stands before salvation religions—in a manner of speaking—at the same start line, implying a universalism and egalitarianism that does not discriminate against individuals by their birth (status, social class, or caste) or circumstances. Here, salvation religions have something in common with democracy and human rights ideology. However, a difference is emphasized between leaders—those who acquire deep understanding of the doctrine and faith after training (masters)—and those who are led by them (lay general followers). Individuals are encouraged to experience being leaders or general members based on their spiritual rank. Some organizations have a large gap between monks and lay members, which was also strong in premodern society. Around the beginning of modern times, the idea not to emphasize the difference between clergymen and lay members became strong, and universalism and egalitarianism in salvation religions became increasingly stronger.

As universalism does not discriminate against any person, it helps break the walls of a closed community. The chance to reconcile conflicts will increase among families and tribes by sharing faith in the same salvation religion. When people are conscious that all people are human beings, they can encourage cooperation between people both inside a family or a tribe, and people outside a family or a tribe. Furthermore, they can help interaction between people within a country and outside the country. Salvation religions are characterized by their power to remove the walls between people, and therefore they expand individual freedom and facilitate more open human relations.

However, salvation religions may be seen to potentially divide people. This is because they establish a system of discrimination between those who follow the “right” teachings and those who do not. Even though they may break down the walls of a communal society including family, tribe, and nation, they create a system of discrimination based on good and evil between people who have accepted the “right” truth and those who have not. Salvation religions regard people who do not accept the “truth” that a religion advocates, as belonging to an evil group, or to be lower-level people who have not yet understood the “right” teachings. It is impossible not to make a value judgment of another persons’ thoughts, attitudes, and behavior. The act of evaluating one’s own behavior and others’ behavior to be good or evil does not necessarily lead directly to discrimination. However, salvation religions tend to determine whether people are good or not, or to be friends or not, simply by the yardstick of whether they adhere to a specific faith or not.

Salvation religions sometimes cause or amplify violence as an aggressive expression of this characteristic, and often consider it good to expand their influ-
ence. In principle, it means that the number of people who are saved by obeying the teachings increase. In fact, it implies gaining greater communal interest by increasing the membership. Looking back in history, salvation religions were accepted by a wide range of people because their universalistic and expansionistic properties were appropriate to political governance by empires and large-area states after the ancient times. When colonialism spread in early modern times, Christian missionaries first landed in a country to lay the foundations for later militaristic and political domination.

Relatively well-off people in industrialized countries today are likely to have a sense of discomfort at the aspects of salvation religions as described above, and this is one reason for the alienation from religion among them. In this context, it may be most appropriate to understand the phenomenon of the transition “from religion to spirituality” to be an evolution—“from salvation religion to spirituality” or “from salvation to spirituality.”

The Future Direction of Salvation Religions

So far I have discussed that the trend in world views in the contemporary world contained dual movements from 1. secularism to religion, and 2. from religion to spirituality. Further, the movement “from religion to spirituality” could rightly be understood mainly as a trend “from salvation religion to spirituality.” One key to understanding these tendencies among people nowadays is to understand how the functions that the characteristics of salvation religions play have undergone change in present-day society, and what changes have occurred in the way people have accepted salvation religions.

Karl Jaspers named the the period between 700 and 200 BC the “age of axis,” a point in time that salvation religions began to occupy a central position in people’s world view. In this period, people in various societies around the world found that they had to face fundamental limits and began to strongly assert the existence of a dimension specific to the human spirit. These ideas can be seen in salvation religions such as Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, or Judaism before Christianity, Greek philosophy, and ancient Chinese thought (by scholars and ideologists in ancient China). Jaspers (1949) states that this thought offered philosophical principles to support the “civilization of axis” that would develop later.

Succeeding Jaspers’ concept that salvation religions played a great role in the most important spiritual revolutions in human history, Robert Bellah discussed how “historic religions” promoted decisive progress in religious history. The historic religions that Bellah cites are salvation religions that later became the

8. See Bellah 1964. My criticism against religious evolution theories by Talcott Parsons and Robert Bellah can be seen in Shimazono 2004b.
state religion of empires, or which came to be positioned at the core of the civilization that supported the empires. Jaspers and Bellah highly appreciate salvation religions in that they established a dualistic world view to distinguish this world from the transcendental world, gave a foundation for individuals’ autonomous morality, treated people as equal and mutually cooperative beings, and presented a perspective to criticize the political order based on power differences in this world. They considered that the resources achieved by this ideological breakthrough would be effective up until now.

On the other hand, there are some elements which can hardly be accepted in the contemporary world view. A feature of salvation religions that is remarkably observed in historical religions is the emphasis on the deep-rootedness of evil. They teach that an escape from suffering can be attained by entering into a dimension beyond this world. In Christianity, humans bear an original sin, and are finally emancipated from this burden after their death, in paradise. In Buddhism, humans cannot avoid having earthly desires, and therefore cannot escape from the chain of suffering in this world. Buddhism teaches that it is only at the time of nirvana, when the fire of earthly desires is finally extinguished, when life ends and humans reach far beyond the world of life and death, that they can escape suffering. The fact that Gautama Buddha left his family to live a priest’s life may be because he wanted to keep himself away from earthly desires and violence, which was difficult to overcome in life as a layman.

Why was the view to deny this world widely accepted? One factor may be that people felt it hard to overcome suffering caused by uncontrollable natural elements, such as disasters, pandemics, and famine. Before the modern era, humans had only limited scientific and technological means to control unfavorable natural phenomena. It was a matter of course that people felt that they were living cheek by jowl with unbearable suffering and death. Even so, aren’t suffering and evil overly emphasized? The excessive level of treating suffering and evil cannot be separated from the strong urge of people to choose the path for salvation. Is this not in exchange for submission by people who are far away from political power? Because the promise of salvation has an absolute value, evil and suffering must be emphasized as being unbearable. This is a matter concerning the authority of religion-related organizations.

Here the theory of authority, to which Marx and Nietzsche attached so much importance when looking at religions, must be referred to. Contrasting evil with salvation to emphasize the weight of both elements will help strengthen the dignity of religious organizations and their clergy and heighten their ruling power. Why do people admit the authority of religious power structures? It relates to the acceptance of political domination that is prevalent in society as a whole. How do these differences between people on the strong side—who exercise power over the rest, and who can satisfy more of their desires—and the people
who cannot do so become acceptable, if these differences occurred not simply by coercion? People who exercise power do not necessarily have high human qualities. This-worldly things have absolute limits and things that can be obtained through exercising power are, in fact, momentary. Far more important things exist in the dimension beyond this world. There is an aspect to this that by being taught like this, people may foster attitudes to accept political class domination.

From the perspective of the theory of power, the denial of this world or the excessive emphasis on evil and suffering in salvation religions can be understood as having significance to compensate for the imbalance of power in this world. Karl Marx looked through this when he stated that religions were like opium to people (1844). Religion acts to help people make up for defeat and/or inferior positions in their actual lives by imaginary or conceptual victories or superiority, to some extent subjectively or actually. Nietzsche expressed this resentment to mean a reactionary emotion containing jealousy to a fulfilling life (Nietzsche 1887). Love of one’s neighbors and the apparent egalitarianism in Christianity are meant to oppress and depress people’s intentions to fulfil their lives, and to submit to the authority of the clergy. Nietzsche’s criticism of salvation religions is sharp, but it is too severe to see a reactionary emotion behind love and egalitarianism. Nietzsche did not attempt to present a clear prescription on how to live for humans who can hardly escape from a ruling power or violence.

In the above, the reasons for denying this world in salvation religions have been examined. People today do not often see the denial of this world and its excessive emphasis on evil and suffering observed in historic salvation religions to be agreeable. This is endorsed by salvation religions that have developed since early modern times and which are often positive in nature about this world. Salvation religions that emerged in modern Japan are categorized as new religions, many of which are positive about this world (Shimazono 1992, fn.19). Tenrikyo, for example, teaches that gods created humans in order to enjoy seeing humans “living joyfully” in this world. After death, the souls of humans return to gods, but then are reborn in this world. Therefore, in Tenrikyo, death is regarded as “passing away for rebirth.” They believe in the attainment of salvation through life in this world.

Nevertheless, salvation religions that are affirmative about this world contain elements which are hardly accepted by people in the industrialized countries of today, the same as those salvation religions which are negative about this world. Even though they are positive about this world, salvation religions herald “salvation” which often involves teachings inconsistent with the commonly accepted world view. For example, they teach that the fate of individuals will definitely turn for the better through faith, or that society will dramatically change to bring about collective well-being. These teachings may be positively accepted as

the implication of possible alternatives to modern society. It is not only the difficulty of accepting what “salvation” ensures that prevents people nowadays from accepting salvation religions.

An important reason for people in industrialized countries to consider salvation religions to be unacceptable is that they will potentially divide people. Salvation religions draw a strong line of division between the followers and non-followers of the teachings. Although salvation religions break the walls of communities down, including families, tribes, and nations, they create discrimination between those who have accepted the “right” truth and those who have not. They often see those who do not accept what they advocate as belonging to an evil group, or a lower-class of people who cannot understand the right teachings. It is not necessarily wrong to make a value judgment of others’ thoughts, attitudes, and behavior. Value judgments may be necessary both for oneself and others if they are based on a proper yardstick of virtue. However, salvation religions tend to determine whether a person is good or a member of their group simply based on the yardstick of adhering to a specific faith or not.

When this is aggressively asserted, salvation religions may increase the possibility of causing and amplifying violence. Salvation religious groups tend to consider the expansion of their strength as a good thing because it means that the “truth” of salvation spreads in the world, and that the number of people to be saved will increase in number. As a matter of fact, it cannot be denied that salvation religions have been accepted broadly because they had expansionist features, which was convenient for imperial domination.

The Gospels according to Matthew and Luke convey the teachings of Jesus Christ, who said “A sword not peace.”

Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth;
I have not come to bring peace, but a sword.
For I have come to set a man against his father, and
a daughter against her mother, and
a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and
a man’s foes will be those of his own household.
He who loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he who
does not take his cross and follow me is not worthy of me.
He who finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it.

(Matt 10: 34–39).

The act of throwing away one’s life can be regarded as a beautiful deed, or a revered religious deed. But such a deed may result in threatening others’ lives without justified reason. People in industrialized countries today are becoming more aware of how salvation religions strengthen solidarity and unity among their followers on the one hand, and exclude or divide people on the other. As
mentioned at the end of the last section, this critical view is prevalent behind the alienation from salvation religions in many industrialized nations.

Where New Spirituality is heading

In the contemporary world, people who are skeptical about secularism are on the rise, and people’s minds are directed to religion in a broad sense. Even so, many people feel that salvation religions are unacceptable. New spirituality is attracting interest among these people. On the assumption of this observation, the trend in industrialized countries has been reviewed. So will the evolution “from religion to spirituality,” and in particular, “from salvation religion to spirituality,” be further accelerated? It may not necessarily develop that way because new spirituality has difficulties that prevent its development, and so it is difficult to predict a steady increase in supporters.

In comparison with salvation religions, new spirituality lacks, first, the ideological structure to squarely accept ultimate human limits such as evil and death (Shimazono 1992). Salvation religions preach that there is a dimension where evil is completely overcome and there is eternal life far beyond death. If one can believe in this, he or she would not keep asking questions like “Isn’t there nothing beyond death?”, “Why do people in difficult situations continue to bear suffering?”, or “Why can’t I escape from sin?” New spirituality does not always present clear answers to the questions of evil and death. Unless one believes in salvation, he/she would have to accept that the ultimate answer to evil and death cannot be provided. In the face of evil and death, humans may naturally require an ultimate response that salvation religions offer.

In comparison with salvation religions and other traditional religions, new spirituality is lacking other aspects—firmly established communities, and a system of educating followers. New spirituality has an individualistic inclination, and prefers loose networks to structured organizations or groups. It is in relation to this point that those who sympathize with new spirituality entertain a feeling of discomfort about traditional religions and new religious organizations. They are greatly interested in spiritual pursuits and their own growth, but they are not in favor of maintaining long-term relations with leaders, or going through hard training for these purposes. They see that these things will lead to the loss of their autonomy, to unwilling restraint, and to submission to authoritarianism.

How do people develop their interest in, acquire, and enhance spirituality? The media perform an important role here. Unilateral communication media, such as books, cartoons, movies, videos, and the Internet, are predominant. People obtain information through these media, and take part in seminars and lecture meetings. But sustainable communities or person-to-person relations are rarely developed.
Instead of forming communities, the initiation into spirituality, education, and training are often carried out in a commercial manner. If leaders do not hold professional positions in public institutions such as schools, hospitals, or care institutions, or do not serve as volunteer leaders while having the means for living, they should support their everyday lives by providing spiritual information and skills in exchange for monetary considerations. Actually, the number of people who are engaged in spirituality in such positions is increasing. Even when an organization is formed, it needs to be commercially successful by approaching interested people. The livelihood of leaders and the expenses of the management of the organization are supported by the proceeds of the sales of books, participation fees from organizing seminars, and other events. In such a commercial style, there is no means to rectify a consumers’ arbitrary understanding of spirituality, setting aside the question of the quality assurance of merchandise. This is somewhat like selling products without after-sale services.10

On the other hand, self-help groups maintain relatively sustainable communal relationships. Twelve-step groups11 originated by Alcoholics Anonymous, a self-help group of alcoholics, were introduced to Japan in the 1990s among people suffering from various problems, including eating disorders and psychological problems. Some of them partnered with feminist spiritual movements.

Twelve-step groups encourage followers to realize one’s limits, and to abandon oneself to entrust everything to a “god” or a being known as a higher power. At meetings, anonymous participants narrate their spiritual experiences. A meeting often closes with the citation of the “serenity prayer.”12 The group Adult Children was founded by the children of alcoholic patients, and later evolved into a movement of survivors of traumas of various causes. This movement was spread in the mid-1990s in Japan by psychiatrist Satoru Saito (Saito 1995).

Saito says that the self-help movement can form “a family of soul.” It is not a family by kin but one linked by the relationship through a problem. Using this term, a self-help group consists of people who share a specific difficult problem that they have to cope with, and because of this, want to form sustainable


12. The serenity prayer was written by Reinhold Niebuhr, a Protestant theologian, but it is widely used even outside the Christian context. The prayer is “O God, give us/serenity to accept what cannot be changed,/courage to change what should be changed,/and wisdom to distinguish the one from the other (know the difference).” In Japan, twelve-step groups cite this prayer in Japanese translation.
relations. In order to overcome the suffering that humans had in common, salvation religions addressed all human beings, and organizations of believers were formed. In contrast, in self-help groups, participating in communal organizations formed by salvation religions is not favored, and sustainable relations can hardly be formed unless a limited number of problems are faced by a limited number of people. New spirituality is spreading only in this context.

A weak point for new spirituality is the difficulty encountered in developing communal organizations and traditions, which are considered a natural prerequisite for salvation religions. Being unable to deepen or stably maintain their spiritual pursuits in thought and practice, people who are involved in new spirituality often harbor feelings of frustration. This is related to the inclination among seekers of new spirituality to have familiarity toward traditional religions, be it salvation religions, non-salvation religions such as Confucianism, or Hinduism, Taoism, and Shinto which embrace elements of salvation religions but which are not salvation religions as a whole. The New Age and spiritual world movements initiated by young people in the 1970s advocated the denial of religions. However, since the 1990s, the tendency to call for the denial of religions has declined. Rather, spirituality and religious traditions are considered as being complementary.

Such complementarity may take different forms depending on regions and religious traditions. In the West, a tense relationship tends to stand out between new spirituality and Christianity, the mainstream religious tradition. Books criticizing new spirituality from the standpoint of Christianity abound. Like the New Age and spiritual world, new spirituality evaluates religious traditions in Asia highly, and some new spirituality movements have introduced elements from them. In Japan, for example, new spirituality and the revival of animism have been actively advocated since the 1980s. Animism is considered the core of Shinto and traditional folk religions. A certain type of new spirituality was understood to be behind the revival of traditional religions. This corresponds with the global current of “religious revival.” Qigong, the traditional Chinese breathing exercise, continues to play a strong role in new spirituality. Spirituality and religious traditions were perceived as being innately affinitive.

The perception that traditional religions are affinitive and complementary with spirituality has been increasingly noted in Christianity. It is true, on the

13. En (a turn of fate, affinity, relation) is a term relating the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism and is associated with Buddhist spirituality.

14. Many research studies have been published on this issue. The result of my research is included in Shimazono 2007a.


16. Representative advocates of this are well-known cultural anthropologist Iwata Keiji and philosopher Umehara Takeshi. Shimazono (1996, fn.2; 2004a, fn. 13).
other hand, that a tense relationship remains between the concept of salvation and new spirituality. With the expansion of capitalism the individualization of society progresses, but at the same time, the shift “from salvation to spirituality” can be observed. However, new spirituality has its limits, and may be pushed back by the current of “religious revival.” Relations among salvation religions, non-salvation traditional religions, and new spirituality are complicated, and should be looked at carefully while paying attention to differences in religion and religious traditions.

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The theology of Simone Weil is part of the revival of the theology of the cross in the twentieth century. The theology of the cross argues that the main kerygma of Christianity is God’s compassion for suffering beings. God suffers with our suffering like He suffered with Jesus’s suffering on the cross. However, has God the infinite power to create the world? One suffers because of the boundaries of one’s power. Why does God suffer although His power is infinite? This is the logical contradiction. This article tries to resolve this contradiction by likening God to a topological space. General topology was constructed by Bourbaki whom André Weil, Simone’s brother, led. Although infinite, a topological space can be bounded. If God may be likened to a topological space, God is able to be infinite and bounded. If so, it is possible for God to have infinite power and suffer because of the boundaries of His power. There will be no contradiction.

**KEYWORDS:** Theology of the Cross—general topology—topological theology— infinite with bounds—metaphor

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The theology of Simone Weil is considered to be a part of the restoration of the “Theology of the Cross” that formed one of the major currents of twentieth-century theology. It goes without saying that the Theology of the Cross is a theology that sees the compassion of God himself in the passion of Jesus Christ’s suffering on the cross: a theology that considers that God suffers along with human suffering, and has largely been expounded from a Protestant point of view. We can see the twentieth century as the period when the Theology of the Cross was restored by Jürgen Moltmann and others, with Dietrich Bonhoeffer firing the first salvos. The theology of Simone Weil can be considered to be a rediscovery, contemporaneous to Bonhoeffer, in the Catholic tradition of the Theology of the Cross. This article will first consider the placement of the theology of Simone Weil as the Theology of the Cross.

The Theology of the Cross, including that of Simone Weil, exposes us to the fundamental question of why God, whose power is unbounded and omnipotent, would reach the limits of his power when he suffered and died on the cross, and of why an omnipotent God would suffer. Opinions are divided as to whether the Theology of the Cross can adequately answer this question. This article provides a response to the question of whether God can actually suffer through likening André Weil’s mathematics, and in particular the general topology of Bourbaki, which was led by Weil, to the theology of his younger sister Simone. By likening God to a topological space, we can see for the first time a theoretical consistency in the Theology of the Cross, that of the theology of God’s suffering.

However, what does it mean to liken God to a topological space? To discuss through likening, or comparing, is—if we break down its constituent factors—nothing more than to discuss through a metaphor. As a result, to liken God to a topological space is to consider topological space as a metaphor for God. So what then is a metaphor? A metaphor is an attempt to apply a predicate to something that normally would not be able to have a predicate applied to it, and thus discover a new meaning to something, or in other words, the hidden attributes of it. Put another way, a metaphor is nothing more than an attempt to find the attributes that belong to a category that is different from normal. This is the interpretation of Paul Ricoeur’s “living metaphor” (RICOEUR 1975).

* This paper is an English translation of my article “Jūjika no Shingaku to Ippan Isō (Theology of the Cross and General Topology),” Shūkyō Tetsugaku Kenkyū (Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) 27: 18-29, 2010.
This article uses the application of the predicate of a topological space to God, of which a predicate cannot normally be applied to, to not only discover a new meaning for topological space, but also to bring out the hidden attributes of God, the attribute of God's suffering. This is known as mathematical theology, or topological theology.

*The Theology of the Cross*

Simone Weil’s theology is without doubt the Theology of the Cross. The Theology of the Cross starts with the story of the Passion, the suffering and death of Jesus on the cross. The suffering of Jesus was a suffering that took on all human suffering. Humans are physical beings with boundaries, whether these relate to health, wealth, love, or hope. These boundaries are what oppress humans to illness and poverty, and they suffer a lack of love and the loss of hope. Bound, finite humans are not able to escape suffering.

God pities such humans and suffers along with those humans. When people see someone else suffering together with them, do they not see some form of salvation in that? God was hung on the cross along with Jesus, and shared the suffering and death of Jesus, and thus brought about a form of salvation for humans. Salvation through the compassion of God: this is nothing less than the fundamental gospel of Christianity as understood by the Theology of the Cross.

In 1943, the year Simone Weil died of malnutrition at the age of thirty-four, she wrote the following comment in her notebook:

> Christ on the cross encompassed compassion in his own suffering, as the suffering of humanity numinous within him. His cry of “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?” was from the mass of humanity numinous within him.  

*(Weil 2004, 365)*

The suffering of humans is so sad and painful it feels like abandonment by God. In 1942, when she had to leave her homeland of France due to the repression of the Jewish people by the puppet government in Vichy, Weil wrote in her notebook:

> In order to feel compassion in front of unfortunate people, the soul must be divided into two. The part that is perfectly protected from the various contagions of unhappiness, the risk of various contagions, and the part that is steeped fully in sympathy with the unfortunate person. It is the tension between these two parts that is passion, or in other words the sharing of passion, or compassion. The passion of Christ was this phenomena, created in God.  

*(Weil 2004, 124)*

There is no doubt that here we see the Theology of the Cross. Simone Weil was a theologian of the cross. However, was not sharing another’s suffering to truly
love that person? Is not to love people to make their suffering your own suffer-
ing, just as their joy is your joy? The passion of God in terms of the passion of
humans is nothing less than the love of God for humanity.

Weil wrote her final letter to Father Superior Perrin of the Dominican mon-
astery in Marseilles, where she lived for a time after she escaped from Nazi-
occupied Paris.

The pity of God shines within unhappiness. In the depths of suffering without
solace, it shines at the centre. If still persevering in our love, we fall to the point
where the soul cannot keep back the cry “My God, my God, why hast thou
forsaken me?” if we remain at this point without ceasing to love, we end by
touching something that is not affliction, not joy, something that is the central
essence, necessary and pure, something not of the senses, common to joy and
sorrow: the very love of God.

(Weil 1950, 69)

The love of God shines most brightly in suffering. The Christian teaching of
“love thy neighbor” is nothing less than a command to share in your neighbor’s
suffering—to have compassion. Weil wrote regarding the love of God, which she
entrusted to Friar Perrin, who was an abbot of Dominican monastery at Mont-
pellier:

Christ taught us that the supernatural love of our neighbour is the exchange
of compassion and gratitude which happens in a flash between two beings,
one possessing and the other deprived of human personality. One of the two
is only a little piece of flesh, naked, inert, and bleeding beside a ditch; he is
nameless; no one knows anything about him. Those who pass by this thing
scarcely notice it, and a few minutes afterward do not even know that they saw
it. Only one stops and turns his attention toward it. The actions that follow are
just the automatic effect of this moment of attention. The attention is creative.
But at the moment when it is engaged it is a renunciation. This is true, at least,
if it is pure. The man accepts he will be diminished by concentrating on an
expenditure of energy, which will not extend his own power but will only give
existence to a being other than himself, who will exist independently of him.
Still more, to desire the existence of the other is to transport himself into him
by sympathy, and, as a result, to have a share in the state of inert matter which
is his.

(Weil 1950, 133)

To take on another’s suffering as your own is the abandonment of the self. It is
this abandonment of the self that are the key words for the Theology of the Cross
because God is omnipotent enough to both create or not create this world, and
has infinite power, or puissance. Does this God suffer? Suffering is, after all, due
to a person having boundaries. Humans, who have boundaries to their physical
form, wealth, power, and knowledge, suffer illness, poverty, oppression, and
ignorance. Why does God, with infinite power, suffer? The idea of self-abandonment implies that God can abandon his own infinite power, limit himself, and suffer the same as finite humans. According to Weil, it is as follows:

Not even God has the puissance to make something that has once happened, not have happened. There can be no better proof that creation was an abandonment than this.

To God, is there an abandonment that can overcome time? We are abandoned in time.

God is not within time.

Creation and Original Sin are different for us, but they are nothing more than the two aspects of abandonment, the only act of God. God made flesh and compassion are each one aspect of this act.

God stripped himself of his godhood and became empty, and fulfilled us with false godhood. Let us strip off this false godhood and become empty. This very act is the ultimate purpose to creating us.

Now, at this instant, God maintains me in existence through the will of creation, so that I am able to abandon existence.

God is waiting patiently until the time that I finally agree to love him.

Ramrod straight, silent, waiting like a beggar in front of a man who might give him a crust of bread. Time is this anticipation.

Time is the anticipation of God, who begs for our love.

The constellations, the mountain slopes, the seas, and all else that can recall time pass on to us the supplication of God.

The humility of the waiting time likens us unto God.

God is only good. So God abides there, silent, waiting. Those that proceed, that talk, assert just the slightest power. But goodness that is only goodness merely continues to abide there.

A shamefaced beggar is the symbol of God. (Weil 2004, 184)

According to Weil, God’s creation of the world itself is already the self-abandonment of God. God, by creating the world and us in it, has abandoned part of himself. The reason is because we are not God; because God is the Other. God so loves us that he abandoned part of himself to ensure our existence. And God, moreover, underwent the passion on the cross to share our suffering with us. That too is the self-abandonment of God. God loves man so much he abandoned his own infinite power and set limits for himself so that he could suffer human suffering. God, according to Weil, “negated himself, became as a beggar, became the same as a man” (Phil. 2.7).

Should Prometheus and Zeus struggle with each other, all Zeus would have left is his puissance. Thus he must bring forth one who is more puissant than him. Puissance is the infinite we call “apeiron,” or in other words, something that can bring forth greater quantities without tiring. No matter how great a
puissance may be, there is always the chance that a greater puissance is above it. Only the enlightened wisdom of God limits his puissance. *Philebus*. “The various existences of the eternal are composed of the infinite and the finite.” Which is to say, they are composed of wisdom and puissance. Wisdom is love. God limits his puissance through his love. (Weil 2002, 251)

God limits his infinite puissance through love. Thus God can share the suffering of limited humans.

But is this in fact the case? On the one hand, God still has infinite puissance and infinite power, and on the other hand, he must breach the bounds of his power to suffer. In a previous Theology of the Cross, this contradiction was explained away as being thought of as God limiting his infinite power through his own will. For example, the creation of the world was not just a one-time occurrence, but can be thought of as always occurring as long as this world exists. In this unceasing creation of the world, is God's limitless puissance needed? If God should abandon for a moment his own infinite puissance, then how can the world continue to exist after that?

It is possible to see the creation of the world and similar events as nonessential to the Christian gospels. However, if God, who exists as the Other that suffers along with human suffering, is not the almighty God of infinite power, then what is the salvation of mankind? If the other person who suffered along with your suffering is just another human, then what is the religion known as Christianity? Is it not by coming close to human suffering by an Other who is infinitely isolated from humans that we have religion? For Christianity, the contradiction between God being the Other with infinite power and being a neighbour just like us who suffers along with us is a contradiction that cannot end without choosing one over the other.

Can God suffer through bounds to his power at the same time as possessing infinite power? In other words, can God be finite at the same time as being infinite? This is the question that asks whether God can violate this logical contradiction. We can consider that since God is possessed of infinite puissance, God can—should he will it to be—easily violate the logical contradiction of being simultaneously infinite and finite. So this would mean that God can both create this world and not create it. However, is it possible that God could at once create this world and not create it? To violate this logical contradiction is to reply that this is possible. Is it not more reasonable to assume that God, even if he wishes it, cannot violate a logical contradiction?

If God is not to violate a logical contradiction, how can we consider the contradiction whereby God possesses infinite power at the same time as accepting suffering, which is perforce limited? For Christianity, God abides within our suffering and takes in the same limited power as we humans, yet at the same time is possessed of a limitless power that goes completely beyond humans. To discard
one of these contradictory choices is to deny the religion of Christianity. However, this contradiction is a logical contradiction and not even God himself can have both be valid. So how shall we resolve this contradiction?

At any rate, there is not much point in talking about the logical contradictions of religion. There is not enough space here to discuss all those who have or who still say this. However, this article does not take that position. It takes the stance that it will resolve the logical contradiction of thinking of God as simultaneously both infinite and finite. And this is where mathematics—general topology—enters the picture.

To jump ahead to the conclusion, in a topological space the infinite can be infinite and yet at the same time have limits. General topology is of course mathematics, so it is not possible to have a logical contradiction. As a result, if we add a predicate that describes God as a topological space, then we can see the hidden attributes of God being infinite at the same time as being finite. The phenomenon of God being infinitely beyond at the same time as being finitely abiding within can be thought of as a phenomenon where the two are logically able to exist coherently.

But let us not get too far ahead of ourselves. Weil was extremely forward about applying mathematics to theology. According to her, mathematics was the original form of theology:

The faith of the Greeks, the very faith stimulated by the love of Christ, gave them a thirst for accuracy, and brought about the invention of geometry. Their tenacity towards accuracy, too, was as their mathematics was theology.

(Weil 2002, 394)

According to Weil, that which in existing philosophical languages was contradictory, was not so in mathematical languages:

What for natural reason is a contradiction, for supernatural reason there is no contradiction. However, we have no choice but to use the vocabulary of natural reason even with supernatural reason. Nevertheless, the theories of supernatural reason are even stricter than the theories of natural reason. Mathematics represents this hierarchical order.

(Weil 2004, 139)

Weil considered mathematical limit theory as a specific candidate to apply to mathematical theology:

Also apply the move to mathematical limits to metaphysics. In calculus calculations, mutually contradicting things can be true. Nevertheless, these do include strict demonstrated proof.

(Weil 2004, 132)

In addition, Weil also included in her target the application to theology of the general topology itself, created in the 1930s by making mathematical limit theory abstract.
One field of mathematics that deals with all the diverse sorts of orders (set theory and general topology) is a treasure-house that holds an infinity of valuable expressions that show supernatural truth. (Weil 2004, 342)

This was written in 1942, when Bourbaki’s *Elements of Mathematics*, which determined modern general topology, had just been released, and as Weil had attended an overnight seminar held by Bourbaki, of which her brother André was a key member, this could be termed the sort of surprising insight we might expect from her. So, what is general topology?

**General Topology**

A topological structure is, along with an algebraic structure, one of the most fundamental structures of modern mathematics. It is well known that early modern mathematics began with the analytical geometry of Descartes, and the infinite analysis of Newton and Leibniz; general topology is the mathematics that deals with the most abstract infinite and its limits that the foundations of this analytical geometry and infinite analysis arrived at. Today’s general topology is on the horizon that the Bourbaki group of mathematicians, of which André Weil was a founding member, arrived at in the 1930s. This article follows the Bourbaki group’s interpretation of topology (Bourbaki 2007).

We will now consider set X and the set of its subsets Y. At this point, if the union with the given set $O_i$ (including infinite numbers) which belongs to Y,

\[ \cup O_i \]

also belongs to Y, and the intersection set of the finite number sets $O_1$, $O_2$ which belong to Y,

\[ O_1 \cap O_2 \]

also belongs to Y, then we call X topological space, and the element $O_i$ of Y the open set. Let us express this definition using mathematical symbols. First, we call the set of all subsets of et X the power set, and write it as:

\[ P(X) \]

The definition of the topological space X, in subset $Y$ of the power set $P(X)$ of X,

\[ Y \in P(X) \]

becomes

(1) $O_i \in Y \Rightarrow \cup O_i \in Y$

(2) $O_1, O_2 \in Y \Rightarrow O_1 \cap O_2 \in Y$
This is the most abstract definition. Let us look at an example. We shall consider the natural numbers:

$$0, 1, 2, \ldots, n, n+1, \ldots$$

A given natural number $n$ is always followed by the natural number $n+1$, so there are no limits to natural numbers. In other words, there is an infinite number of natural numbers.

Let us express these natural numbers as a set. We think of the set which has no elements of any kind, or the empty set, as the natural number 0. The natural number 1 is thought of as the set that has only the empty set 0 as its element:

$$1 = \{0\}$$

The natural number 2 is thought of as the union of 1 and the set which only has 1 itself as an element:

$$2 = 1 \cup \{1\}$$

As a result, we get

$$2 = 1 \cup \{1\} = \{0\} \cup \{1\} = \{0, 1\}$$

so 2 is a set with two elements, 0 and 1.

Generally, we think of the natural number $n+1$ as the union of the natural number $n$ and the set which only has $n$ as it element:

$$n+1 = n \cup \{n\}$$

You will see that $n+1$ becomes the set with $n+1$ elements, from 0 to $n$:

$$n+1 = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n\}$$

So we have now been able to represent the entirety of natural numbers in a set. Next, we shall consider the set of all natural numbers, $\omega$:

$$\omega = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n, n+1, \ldots\}$$

where $\omega$ is clearly a set with an infinite number of elements, or in other words, an infinite set. As we saw above, the elements of $\omega$ are all sets. And furthermore, a given $\omega$ member $n+1$ is a subset of $\omega$ that uses the elements 0 to $n$ of $\omega$ as its elements. In other words,

$$n+1 \in \omega \Rightarrow n+1 \subseteq \omega$$

stands. The elements of $\omega$ are the subset of $\omega$. This set of all natural numbers, $\omega$, is the simplest example of topological space. Now, if we consider

$$\omega \cup \{\omega\} = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n, n+1, \ldots, \omega\}$$

as the set of the subsets of $\omega$, then the union of given elements, including its infinite numbers,
\[ \bigcup n \bigcup \omega \]

is where \( \bigcup n \) is the infinite set sequence

\[
\begin{align*}
0 &= \{0\} \\
1 &= \{0, 1\} \\
2 &= \{0, 1, 2\} \\
\vdots \\
n &= \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n\} \\
n+1 &= \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n, n+1\} \\
\omega &= \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n, n+1, \ldots\}
\end{align*}
\]

limit

\[ \lim n = \omega \]

Therefore, if we realize that \( \bigcup n = \omega \)

then

\[ \bigcup n \bigcup \omega = \omega \bigcup \omega = \omega \in \omega \bigcup \{\omega\} \]

In other words, the union of given elements in \( \omega \bigcup \{\omega\} \) is once again the elements of \( \omega \bigcup \{\omega\} \), and fulfils definition (1) where \( \omega \) is the topological space (Ochiai 2009). It is easy to check that \( \omega \) fulfils definition (2). In other words, it is:

\[ n \cap \omega = n \in \omega \bigcup \{\omega\} \]

We have seen how the set of all natural numbers \( \omega \) is an example of topological space. From this, we are able to begin to see what topological space is. What definition (1) of topological space requires is that the limits of the infinite set sequence \( n \) which is a subset of \( \omega \),

\[ \bigcup n = \omega \]

once again exists as a subset of \( \omega \) (the subset of a set includes that set itself). If the limit \( \bigcup n \) of the infinite set sequence \( n \) of the subset of \( \omega \) exists as a subset of \( \omega \), then \( \omega \) fulfils definition (1) of topological space.

This fact means that topological space is infinite and yet bounded – in other words, it is a set with limits. Just as the simplest example of topological space, the set \( \omega \) of all natural numbers is infinite and yet bounded (by \( \omega \) itself), so topological space is infinite yet still a space that has bounds.

However, for an infinite set to have limits does not mean that the infinite set is finite. The infinite set and the finite set are mutually exclusive and cannot exist
at the same time. The infinite set has limits, or to be precise, limits in the sense of the minimum upper limit (or the maximum lower limit). However, if the minimum upper bounds of the infinite set are that set’s elements (as distinct from a subset), then that infinite set can be treated as if it is finite. And this is the compactness of topological space.

The set \( X \) is equal to the union \( \bigcup O_i \) of the open set \( O_i \), or in other words, when it is

\[
X = \bigcup O_i
\]

the union \( \bigcup O_i \) of the open set \( O_i \) is called the open cover of \( X \). When the numbers of the open set \( O_i \) are finite, then we call the open cover that derives from that the finite open cover.

When the topological space \( X \) is compact, then the given open cover of \( X \) always includes the finite open cover. In other words, the definition of the topological space \( X \) being compact can be written as

\[
X = \bigcup O_i \rightarrow X = O_1 \cup O_2
\]

The set \( \omega \) of all natural numbers is topological space but is not compact. This is because

\[
\omega = \bigcup n
\]

so \( \bigcup n \) is the open cover of \( \omega \) but \( \bigcup n \) does not include a finite open cover. Incidentally, the union of \( \omega \) and the set that only has \( \omega \) as its element,

\[
\omega \cup \{\omega\}
\]

is compact. This is because

\[
\omega \cup \{\omega\} = \bigcup n \cup \{\omega\}
\]

so \( \bigcup n \cup \{\omega\} \) is the open cover of \( \omega \cup \{\omega\} \) but \( \bigcup n \cup \{\omega\} \) includes the finite open cover

\[
\omega \cup \{\omega\} = \omega \cup \{\omega\}
\]

For \( \omega \) to not be compact, and \( \omega \cup \{\omega\} \) to be compact, even though the bounds of the infinite set sequence of elements of \( \omega \),

\[
\bigcup n = \omega
\]

and the bounds of the infinite set sequence of elements of \( \omega \cup \{\omega\} \)

\[
\bigcup n \cup \omega = \omega \cup \omega = \omega
\]

are the same, in \( \omega \) the limit \( \omega \) does not attribute as its own element, and in \( \omega \cup \{\omega\} \) the limit \( \omega \) does attribute as its own element; in other words, \( \omega \cup \{\omega\} \), where its own upper limit \( \omega \) attributes to itself and is compact, and \( \omega \) where its
own upper limit $\omega$ does not attribute to itself is not compact. In the finite set, for example natural numbers $n+1$,

$$n+1 = \{0, 1, 2, \ldots, n\}$$

its own upper limit $n$ is attributed as its own element. For its own upper limit to be attributed to itself is one of the fundamental characteristics of the finite set. In particular, for the topological space to be compact, the upper limit of that space must attribute to that space as an element. Thus a compact topological space can be treated as at once infinite and yet also as if it was finite.

### Topological Theology

This article asks the following. God is God as he has infinite power that goes utterly beyond humans, yet it is due to that same God being bounded, suffering the same sufferings as humans, that there is salvation. How can we reconcile this contradiction? I believe like this: we can look at God using topological space as a metaphor. In other words, we shall give to God the predicate of topological space. Topological space is a space that is both infinite and at the same time, as if finite. To compare God to topological space, or in other words to give to God the predicate of topological space, a category different to any previous, enables us to discover anew, as an attribute that were not previously predicated to God, the attribute of topological space being both infinite and having limits. If we give to God the predicate of topological space, then even the slightest contradiction does not exist in the issue of God having infinite power and at the same time having limits to his power and suffering.

Moreover, we can give God the predicate of being compact. A compact topological space is one that is treated as both infinite and as if finite. If we give God the predicate of compact topological space, then God can suffer the suffering of his neighbors, just as finite humans do.

Incidentally, making topological space compact is always possible. As we saw in the previous section, the set of all natural numbers $\omega$ is topological space, but not compact. However, the union $\omega \cup \{\omega\}$ of the set $\{\omega\}$ that uses $\omega$ itself as its elements with $\omega$ is compact. This is nothing less than the compactification of topological space $\omega$ through union with $\{\omega\}$, and this form is called Alexandroff’s one-point compactification.

As a result, if God is topological space, then by adding the set of God himself to God, God then becomes compact. God possesses infinite power and at the same time, suffers likes those whose power is finite. The “Death Notice” of Bourbaki noted,

God is the Alexandroff compactification of the universe. (Boubaki 2007)
So what does it mean for theology to use mathematics as a model? We all know the rhetorical device of the metaphor. A metaphor is the application of a predicate that is not in the appropriate predicate category for the target that is being given a predicate—intentionally making a category mistake. This method allows a previously unseen essence or hidden attribute of that target to be made visible by creating a category mistake.

For example, people say “God the Father.” This is a metaphor—God cannot be, in the biological sense, the father of humans, and is not even male. By giving the object that is God the predicate of the father, we are making a clear category mistake. However, by using “God the Father” as a metaphor, can we not see some previously unseen attribute of God a little more clearly?

Or, we might say that God is an actual infinity. This again is a metaphor. Since we cannot know the nature of God, whatever God might be, then even if we give him the predicate of infinity, that still does not change the fact that it is a category mistake. However, by using the metaphor that God is an actual infinity, or an infinity with limits, perhaps we can get a glimpse of the hidden nature of God that shared our suffering with us.

We must rely on metaphors not only when making assertions about God, but when humans attempt to attribute predicates to the unknown. By comparing an unknown object with something else, we can get closer to what that object is. In the agency we call science, we call the thing to which we liken this unknown object to the object’s model. It goes without saying that mathematics provides this model to almost all sciences.

Therefore, the way mathematics becomes a model for theology is the same as giving the clearly categorically mistaken concepts of mathematics as a predicate to the objects of theology, of predicking the concepts of mathematics as a metaphor for the objects of theology. In other words, this is the same as using the concept of mathematics as a metaphor for the objects of theology. By doing this, theology is able to explain whether its own objects are logically consistent or not. This makes it possible for theology to be the apologetics of Christianity.

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This article explores the dogmatic understanding of “divine healing” (iyashi 神癒), or “faith cure” as it is called from an outsider perspective, as one of the constituting elements of the “fourfold gospel” (shijū no fukuin 四重の福音) in the Japanese holiness movement during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Sources from within the movement as well as responses from outside will be analyzed and compared to research findings on divine healing in North American traditions of radical holiness and incipient Pentecostalism. Following the exploration of cross-cultural continuities and adjustments, I attempt to indicate how holiness healing relates to the modern Japanese discourse on medicine.

KEYWORDS: divine healing—Uchimura Kanzō—holiness movement—intercultural theology—medical discourse in modern Japan

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As a representative of “popular (or common peoples’) Christianity” (minshū kirisutokyō 民衆キリスト教) the early holiness movement stood in striking contrast to, and often conflicted with, Japan’s elitist mainstream Christianity. Therefore, support from the elitist side was especially welcome in 1917, when the evangelist Nakada Jūji 中田重治 (1870–1939) decided to reestablish the interdenominational movement as the Oriental Missionary Holiness Church (Tōyō Senkyōkai Hōrinesu Kyōkai 東京宣教会ホーリネス教会), later renamed the Japan Holiness Church. Scenting support for holiness doctrines, Nakada cooperated with Uchimura Kanzō 内村鑑三 (1861–1930) in the Second Coming of Christ Movement of 1918/19 (abbreviated as sccm). Although Uchimura had started the Non-Church Movement (Mukyōkai 無教会) to “save” Japan from “Western” denominationalism, he was still accepted by mainstream Christians as one of the headliners of “rational” Christianity and was respected as a biblical scholar. While the promise of divine healing as a personal benefit had been the most attractive early holiness doctrine, Nakada’s and Uchimura’s cooperation demanded a shift from divine healing to Christ’s return. Their cooperation also increased the importance of a biblical foundation of holiness doctrines.

The following article analyzes the development of the doctrine of divine healing during the movement’s eventful formation period, starting with the establishment of the Central Gospel Mission (Chūō Fukuin Dendōkan 中央福音伝道館) in 1901, leading up to Nakada’s “enthronement” as bishop (kantoku 監督) of the Oriental Missionary Holiness Church and his involvement in the sccm, before ending with Nakada’s decision on a specific, “entirely biblical view” of divine healing around 1923. It was during these roughly twenty-five years that Nakada developed and established the Japan Holiness Church as a new denomination independent of foreign intervention, and exclusively controlled by himself.

Sources and Previous Research

Here I will focus on the concept of divine healing, the third element of the four-fold gospel, the common Japanese term for the “full gospel” of new life (or justification), sanctification (or holiness), divine healing, and the Second Coming of Christ (or glorification). My sources mainly consist of the weekly publications

1. In Japanese there are two different terms for sanctification (seika 聖化 or kiyome 聖潔) and two different pronunciations for divine healing (shin’yu, or iyashi 神療), and in both cases the latter form is used more often.
of the movement/church, that is, *Tongues of Fire* (*Honoo no Shita*, abbreviated as HS) mediated through Ikegami 2006, and *Friends of Holiness* (*Kiyome no Tomo*, abbreviated as KT).

Ikegami’s (2006) study is a rare study on the early holiness movement in Japan. The book’s chapters introduce central holiness doctrines and concentrate on an emic representation of a multiplicity of authentic voices, thereby providing a (largely) consistent and thus very readable summary of otherwise difficult to access sources. While Chapter 4 responds to the question of cultural adaptation, in connection with divine healing Ikegami suggests that all statements found in periodicals (including translations of American and European positions) share “the same line of ideals” (Ikegami 2006, 77). Without proper investigation into the choices made by translators/evangelists such a statement could be mistaken for a general identity of Japanese interpretations with Western “originals.” By the same token, intending to “redefine the meaning of radicalism in the religious landscape of modern Japan” (Ikegami 2006, 12), Ikegami reduces the meaning of “radicalism” to biblical “fundamentalism” without asking what kind of “radical” features beyond Biblicism the Japanese holiness movement might have inherited from North American radical holiness traditions.

Ashida (2007) focuses on the later Japan Holiness Church, predominantly citing texts written after 1925. Because of his concern to (re-)connect holiness theology to the (more widely appreciated) European traditions of Pietism and Methodism, he rarely refers to the American situation as experienced by Nakada and other holiness leaders. This lack of interest in North American traditions is one reason why the term “radical holiness” is missing in Japanese research literature.

In American scholarship “radical holiness” refers to a new interpretation of holiness starting around 1880 that added physical perfectionism (belief in divine healing) and restorationism (belief in Christ’s return) to the moral perfectionism of early holiness. In many cases the shift away from moral perfectionism resulted in a withdrawal from social responsibility into the direction of exclusive concentration on the body as the place of divine grace. However, as restorationism

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2. Cunningham counts twenty-five institutions for divine healing across the country in 1887. Disputes on the credibility of divine healing started in 1882; by the mid-1890s perfectionism, which had been the consensus of the various Methodist traditions, was increasingly perceived to be of sectarian nature (Cunningham 1974, 500–505). Although there are no direct references in research literature, the failure to heal President Garfield in 1881 might have added to the growing antipathy against healing doctrines. Thousands of independent holiness healing congregations in North America sprang up between 1893 and 1907, which means that a variety of interpretations must have already been abundant at the time when the Japanese proponents of divine healing studied there. Furthermore, as Poloma and Hoelter state, they “did not seek to make a systematic theology out of their experience” (Poloma and Hoelter 1998, 259).
also led to the establishment of Christian communes negating private ownership, it also created visible models for a society of equality. It is for this reason that Kostlevy names “more equal distribution of wealth, a kind of Christian humanism and autonomy of artistic creation” (with reference to Carey McWilliams; Kostlevy 2010, viii) as basic features of the “radical tradition.” Less value-based users of the term simply express it with the degree of unacceptability of certain doctrines for mainstream churches.

For the comparison with concepts of divine healing in North American radical holiness I will draw on research by Jonathan R. Baer and Raymond J. Cunningham. While Baer (2001) focuses on the healing movement until 1892, Cunningham (1974) restricted his research to the two decades starting in the mid-1880s. With regard to the “radicalism” of the early holiness movement in Japan, Kostlevy’s (2010) book is most informing, since it traces the development of radical holiness groups in Chicago—to which at least Charles Elmer Cowman (1868–1924), Lettie Burd Cowman (1870–1960), and Ernest A. Kilbourne (1865–1928), and perhaps Nakada, related.

Concerning Japanese reactions to the early holiness movement’s understanding of divine healing, sources in this article will be restricted to quotes from the Uchimura Kanzō Zenshū (Collected works of Uchimura Kanzō; from hereon, UKZ). While a broader inquiry is necessary, Uchimura’s reaction and his own understanding are particularly relevant as a position betwixt mainstream and outsider and as a temporary partner of the Holiness Church during the SCCM. Furthermore Uchimura’s position offers an alternative approach since he tried to stick as much as possible to traditional Japanese notions, while early holiness leaders felt less constrained against cultural imports. The reference to Uchimura is, however, not meant to imply any sort of “superiority,” but rather intended to highlight early holiness doctrine by means of contextualization.

**Key Questions**

Sources will be investigated with regard to the following key questions: First, which teachings relating to divine healing were chosen to be transmitted to Japan, and for what reasons and by whom? Second, how have these teachings been further developed in order to fit the new cultural context? In this connection we also have to trace the fate of the “radicalism” of holiness. Since critical reactions accelerate the process of cultural adaptation, Uchimura’s position will be consulted, and this also provides glimpses on the broader Christian response to healing theories. While the first two questions retain the perspective of the intercultural history of Christian thought (with links to intercultural theology), the third question employs the broader perspective of religious studies to point at the particular
importance of early holiness views for the difficult relationship between modern medicine and Japanese religions during the first quarter of the twentieth century.

With regard to the last question, I will, therefore, take up Shimazono’s stance as outlined in Shimazono (2003) that describes the development of modern Japanese notions of health during the period from 1900 to 1930 based on Kano Masanao’s 鹿野政直 analysis with the following words: “Perhaps we could say, a number of divisions have been introduced during the process of shifting emphasis from traditional ‘nurturing’ (yōjō 养生) towards ‘health’ (kenkō 健康). One of them is the distinction between the moral/mental/spiritual sphere and the physical sphere; another one consists of the distinction between private value(s) and national value(s). Thus the modern notion of health is characterized by a) an understanding of the physical body as being separated from the mental/spiritual sphere, and b) the establishment of a notion of health as personal benefit and its subsequent absorption into national values” (Shimazono 2003, 22).

Religious notions of illness, health, and healing during this period have to be seen against the background of the development of modern medicine, which contributed not only to cures but also resulted in inadvertent adverse effects (iatrogenesis).³ There are no Christian examples in Shimazono’s book, but his suggestion to understand alternative methods of healing as attempts to correct the “medical professionalism and resulting cultural impoverishment” could also be equally applied here. In order to facilitate such an understanding Shimazono pleads to not cut them off as forms of “superstition,” but rather to “try to see them as a different source of light illuminating the insufficiencies and distortions of traditional culture as well as of mainstream culture” (Shimazono 2003, 31). This article will keep Shimazono’s distinctions in mind and try to indicate how the early holiness movement contributed and how, at the same time, it succeeded or failed to overcome aspects of clinical, social, and cultural iatrogenesis.

Propagators, Motivations, and Choices
in the Transmission of Divine Healing to Japan
THE INITIAL MESSENGER OF DIVINE HEALING TO JAPAN:
SASAO TETSUSABURŌ 笹尾鉄三郎 (1868–1914)

The belief in divine healing has been part of holiness teachings since their earliest transmission to Japan. Nakada as well as his mission partners, the Cowmans

³. Shimazono borrows the term “iatrogenesis” from Illich (1976) who distinguishes three levels of the “side effects of modern medical science”; “clinical iatrogenesis” (injury done to patients by ineffective, toxic, and unsafe treatments), “social iatrogenesis” (medicalization of life which deprives humans of their personal ability to live an independent life), and “cultural iatrogenesis” (destruction of traditional ways of dealing with and making sense of death, pain, and sickness).
and Kilbourne,4 started to embrace the fourfold gospel and its emphasis on healing at Moody’s Bible Institute in Chicago where it was taught by Albert Benjamin Simpson (1843–1919). However, the most energetic propagator of divine healing was not “father” Nakada, but Sasao Tetsusaburō, the “mother” of the movement. But because of Sasao’s early death and his preceding departure from the movement he had been nearly forgotten by the time of the establishment of the Oriental Missionary Holiness Church.

Sasao had been a promising student at Keiō Gijuku 慶應義塾 (later Keio University). Having experienced a near-death situation due to a lung infection when he was a teenager, Sasao’s physical condition was too weak to realize his dream of becoming a marine. Instead he went to study in San Jose (1888–1894), where he converted to Christianity and was baptized by the United Methodist minister Merriman Colbert Harris (1846–1921), who had also baptized Uchimura during his work in Japan. Sasao witnessed a revival in San Francisco in 1890,5 and these were most likely the revival meetings of “the trance evangelist” and divine healer Maria Beulah Woodworth-Etter (1844–1924), which led him to ministry. Back in Japan he became a founding member of the “small flock” (chiisaki mure 小さき群), a group of six Japanese San Francisco converts trying to spread radical holiness teachings in Japan.

For Sasao, illness is a “result of sin, coming from the devil, and not at all a blessing from God.”6 He understands sin as a “violation of the law” to which God answers with the “curse” of illness. Thus Sasao distinguishes between the devil as the cause of transgression, and God as the initiator of illness. However,

4. At least for the Cowmans and their associate Kilbourne there is proof of close engagement with the radical holiness movement. They were acquainted with the late Martin Wells Knapp (1853–1901) as students of his God’s Bible School after his departure from the conservative National Holiness Association (nha), as well as with Seth Cook Rees (1854–1932), president of the International Apostolic Holiness Union (iahu). Knapp and Rees contributed to the radicalization of Metropolitan Methodist Church (Chicago) in 1900, which led to the foundation of the Metropolitan Church Association (mca) in August 1900. The November convention of the Metropolitan Methodist Church highlighted the Cowman’s call to Japan and ended with an ordination service for them. Kostlevy argues that the Cowman’s engagement with mca has been consciously omitted from historical accounts in order “to avoid the stigma of fanaticism” (Kostlevy 2010, 58). Kilbourne departed for Japan after witnessing the Chicago revival triggered by mca in 1901 (Kostlevy 2010, 71).

5. Japanese accounts of this revival usually restrict it to the small group of Japanese believers and understand it as initiated by Sasao’s sudden illness (reported symptoms suggest a heart attack) and subsequent healing experience (Yamazaki and Chiyozaki 1970, 31). However, I would suggest that without outside input no healing revival would have occurred among a Japanese immigrant convert group. However, the available material does not allow for conclusions about underlying intentions of omitting connections to radical healing traditions.

6. For citations of Sasao in this and the following paragraph see “The blessing of divine healing” (Shin’yū no megumi 神癒の恵) in hs 10 February 1904; also in Ikegami 2006, 75–78.
before cursing believers with illness, God speaks to them “silently through the Holy Spirit and by His Word.” Consequently illness is described as “God’s second voice” which is supposed to make the believer “acknowledge his/her sinfulness.” Since the “healing of illness is identical with forgiveness of sin” the acknowledgment of one’s sinfulness is the precondition to divine healing. Healing itself is realized as a “result of the wondrous influence of the Holy Spirit who works on the body.” This emphasis on sin as a violation of the law and on God’s educational usage of illness hardly departs from “traditional” Protestant interpretations of illness that deny the availability of healing rituals in our times.

Notions like “second voice” and “curse” also appear in Simpson’s work, but Sasao’s usage seems to contradict Simpson’s intentions. For Simpson the curse consisted in the unrealizable law itself which had been, however, already overcome by Christ on the cross. “Being made a curse for us” Christ took away “the curse of the law” through the imposition of the “law of the cross.” Simpson did refer to illness as God’s second voice, sporadically interpreting it as a “temporary curse,” but as far as I can see, he did so only in connection with passages from the Old Testament. As for Woodworth-Etter (in _Baer_ 2001, 739–48), she interpreted her own illness as God’s trial to prepare her for ministry, in other words, a kind of blessing, just as Jesus had been tempted by Satan. She employs curses only to intimidate mockers at her meetings. As a leading figure in incipient Pentecostalism she held healing sessions available to everybody on the sole condition of faithful surrender to the power of the Holy Spirit. Although her revival meetings left a strong impression on Sasao, I would suggest that he finally followed Harris’ conventional lead on the topic.

In general, in the North American traditions, healing has been meant to bolster the central Christian dogma of substitutionary atonement (Cunningham 1974, 512) against Calvinist predestination theory as well as other “inconsistent theologies of God’s chastising love” (John Alexander Dowie cited by _Baer_ 2001, 751). The central message there was: “God cannot make you sick” (_Baer_ 2001, 751). Later we will see that Sasao’s conservative affirmation of traditional Protestant views on illness is paralleled by Nakada’s and other Holiness believers’ equally strong emphasis on “works;” again contradicting the theology of North American healers.

Sasao also questions the appropriateness of modern medicine. As a matter of fact, his explanation (see footnote 7) implies a complete denial of its application, but more important than the denial itself is the world view which lies behind it. In sharp contrast to the understanding of North American healers

Sasao starts with an approval of modern medicine as “the natural way” of healing based on the “usage of God-given materials in result of extensive research.” This “natural way of healing” is seen as sufficiently effective in the case of non-believers and animals. But surprisingly, this effectiveness is exactly the reason why believers should not practice it. Since believers have direct access to the power of the blood of Jesus Christ their usage of modern medicine would result in interferences between “natural” and “divine” effects of healing with uncontrollable consequences. For Sasao, the decision to use or not use modern medicine is an ontological and moral problem at the same time. His reference to the effectiveness of medicine on animals could imply a rejection of evolution theory, but there are other holiness believers who directly refer to modern biological thinking and postulate the “entirely sanctified believer” as an achievement of controlled human evolution.

Sasao’s explanation combines world-openness with a distinctively religious standpoint. While physicians and modern medicine have been essentially demonized by North American healers, he depicts them as highly educated men and products of civilization limited only by their secularity. For Woodworth-Etter and other radical healers the “natural way” was not worth considering, since it was simply evident that illness was “abnormal” and therefore only to be healed by the “divinely appointed remedy… the atonement of Jesus Christ” (see Simpson, paragraph 1, cited in footnote 7). The blood of Christ has been central to Christian theology from its beginning, but the recantation of its preciousness in the written work of healers (for example, Simpson) as well as in revival meetings, the ritualistic “sprinkling” and hymnal praise of blood (for example, Woodworth-Etter) accounted for a “magical” implementation transcending the ritual of communion and were clearly fruits of autonomous artistic creation in the field of Christian liturgy.

**The Pioneer of Moral Interpretations of Divine Healing:**

Nakada Jūji (1870–1939)

Nakada regarded divine healing above all as a means supportive of evangelization. During his stay in the US (1896–1898) he studied at Moody’s, after refusing cooperation with Harris who had picked him up at San Francisco port. In

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8. For example, see Satō Shunzō’s reflections on Jesus’ contribution to controlled human evolution in “Eugenics and Euthenics” (優生学と優境学) in 1918.

9. Compared to Woodworth-Etter or Dowie, Simpson’s view on modern medicine was rather moderate, also including affirmative statements. His audience, however, tended to simplify his controversial view as a general denial of modern medicine.
Chicago he experienced baptism by the Holy Spirit and met his later mission partners.

Nakada was a physically strong and to some degree hyperactive person. As a child, his mother brought him to Methodist missionaries in order to discipline his wild behavior. Given his physical and mental conditioning it is a little surprising that he later developed an intensely moral interpretation of divine healing. From the time he accepted the fourfold gospel Nakada emphasized sanctification rather than healing. He regarded temperance, patience, and a simple style of living, that is, moral achievements indirectly relating to physical wellbeing, as evidence of sanctification. However, he also referred to physical healing, interestingly with more cases of organic illness than healers in North America did. Statements from 1912 show his conviction in the biblical foundation of healing which forces believers to practice it. As he states, “Of course we have to seek salvation of soul and body from God. To leave the salvation of the body exclusively to the hands of the physician would be faithlessness.”

He does not reject medicine completely, but suggests it should be complemented by divine healing. In 1916, when his mother-in-law was close to dying of stomach cancer after long-term care for her daughter (his wife), he would recommend his mother-in-law see a doctor. She had accepted Christ only a year ago, so he explained: “I am not the type of person to force belief in divine healing upon others.” For him the call for medicine was a “gentle breeze of human kindness… but trust in the Lord of Hosts is the most secure way [to healing].” Nakada’s wife and his mother-in-law recovered one month later.

In general Nakada liked martial metaphors. Much like North American healers, especially John Alexander Dowie (1847–1907), whose healing tabernacle in Chicago was highly visible, Nakada would see prayer for divine healing as a “war of the spiritual world” against Satan. While World War I was still continuing, Nakada had ended his war, taking it as a sign of Christ’s close return. Spiritual war provided the connecting link between healing and restorationism and despite sympathetic comments on secular healing he still saw his church’s calling...
not in “saving the world, but saving from the world” for “the world as a whole had rejected the establishment of God’s Kingdom.”

This citation was made at Nakada’s “enthronement” as autocrat of the newly founded Oriental Missionary Holiness Church and published when he was already engaged in the sccm together with Uchimura, starting on 6 January 1918. In order to explain the meaning that has been attached to divine healing in this new situation, I will draw on statements from Nakada and various believers.

DIVINE HEALING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SECOND COMING OF CHRIST: COMPLETE MORALIZATION

At the beginning of the sccm it was once more stressed that humans often fail morally “because they seek the blessings of God without seeking God himself.” A God-centered life as a precondition of sanctification is constantly stressed: “Complete submission and trust in God” are called “the key for opening the treasure box of God’s favor.” But healing demands belief in what Nakada calls “brown rice Christianity,” that is, the full gospel with special emphasis on God’s signs and wonders. Another obstacle is “spiritual dullness” which makes people unprepared for Christ’s return. Here, the physical process of aging is supposed to be counteracted by refreshing mental and spiritual abilities. Although the term itself is not used in this paragraph, the text hints at a new interpretation of divine healing. During the early stages of the sccm, references to healing appear in a biographical series on the life of an English evangelist, and from time to time in witnesses. However, they appear predominantly in a memorial series for Sasao Tetsusaburō “who introduced the teaching of divine healing to Japan” and in the summaries of Sunday school.

There, children are advised to pray for recovery rather than go and see a doctor, but even more often they are advised to pray for release from demonic power which inflicts “illnesses of the heart.” Explicitly named as such are con-

15. See “The Church” (Kyōkai 教会) in kt 31 January 1918.
16. See “The way of glory” (Han’ei no michi 繁栄の途) in kt 3 January 1918. An alternative explanation can be found in the section “Sunday school” (Nichiyō gakka 日曜学課) in kt 17 January 1918: “Humans value fleshly matters higher than soul matters.”
17. See “Church news from Nagoya Church” (Nagoya Kyōkai 名古屋教会) in kt 3 January 1918.
18. See “Brown rice Christianity” (Genmaiteki kirisutokyō 玄米的基督教) in kt 17 January 1918. The term stresses the importance of indigenization while at the same time criticizing modernist images of national identity (white rice).
19. See “Daily renewal of the inner self” (Naijin hibi arata 内人日々新) in kt 3 January 1918.
20. See “In memory of Sasao Sensei” (Sasao Sensei o omou 箕尾先生を懐ふ) in kt 10 January to 7 February 1918.
tententiousness, disobedience, jealousy, arrogance, pride, anger, selfishness, luxury, crapulence, and “dirty desires.” The availability of deliverance from “illnesses of the heart” (as well as physical dependencies) is taken as proof of God’s existence in the “here and now.”

At the same time Nakada uses every opportunity to infuse fear of death on the side of believers. Since dying without entire sanctification would exclude them from rapture at Christ’s return, they are pushed to work ever more eagerly for the gift of sanctification. It is within this context that divine healing is understood increasingly in moral terms. If physical healing is seen in the light of Christ’s return as a merely “temporary benefit,” but justification and sanctification as eternal achievements, then the moral interpretation of divine healing seems but the only way to keep the dogma itself. Physical healing is still reported, however not anymore as a benefit for the believer, but only for the sake of “revealing God’s glory.”

Alongside the stress of “illnesses of the heart,” the sources obtrusively repeat the idea of divine healing for the purposes of an increased “zeal for good works” which is also thought of as a result of entire sanctification. This is regarded as the other main goal of divine healing besides the revelation of God’s glory. Since “good works” basically refers to missionary efforts, the “call to good works” could hint at the obligation felt by those healed to witness their experience. This point had been also stressed by North American healers who would predict setbacks of illness in case of refusal. But for Japanese holiness “even the most boring work becomes good work,” which hints at a more general application of the term. Since the SCCM was supposed to be a “revolution of morality” the reinterpretation of divine healing in moral terms had become inevitable.

As described in the preceding paragraphs, the early holiness movement shifted its theological emphasis away from the body towards the “heart.” If we

21. See “Let’s touch God” (Kami ni fureyo 神に触れよ) in KT 17 January 1918. Other statements expose nineteenth-century cessationism (based on James Buckley) as theological inconstancy. Based on Hebrews 13:8, “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever,” Kiyoyama Kenjirō regards divine healing as an issue of Christology rather than of ecclesiology. Decreasing frequency of divine healing is explained by increasing secularization. This article starts with a reference to the popularity of new religious movements and ends with the claim that the fourfold gospel is the true (and ever) “new teaching” which everybody should believe in. See “The new teaching” (Atarashiki oshie 新しき教) in KT 31 January 1918. According to Baer, the emphasis on God’s immanence explains the “antipathy for human and natural means” (BAER 2001, 766).

22. See “But today…” (5)” by a female believer using the initials S. A. (Shikaru ni ima wa (go) 然らに今は<五>) in KT 31 January 1918.

23. Numerous references could be given here. Nakada states this in the report on the healing of his mother-in-law. The idea can be found with S. A. (see previous note) and with Kiyoyama in “Until the end” (Owari ni itaru made 終りに至る迄) in KT 10 January 1918.

24. See “Additional benefits of contemplation” (Mokusō yoroku 黙想餘錄) in KT 10 January 1918.
further take into account that Christ’s return turned out to be believers’ ultimate hope in their struggle to harmonize “loved children’s deaths”\(^{25}\) with the doctrine of divine healing, we understand that the additional emphasis shift towards restorationism during the SCCM presented another necessary theological move. As a matter of fact, in 1918, the third component of the fourfold gospel had been dissolved almost entirely into the components of sanctification (moralization) and the Second Coming (restoration).

With its increasing emphasis on moral healing, the Holiness Church did not only distinguish itself from Japanese new religious movements which stayed focused on physical healing throughout World War II; it also developed in the opposite direction of respective theologies in North America. While changes in leadership structure, adjustment to believers’ life experiences, and more ambitious self-assertion internally pushed this development, it also reflects the increasing moralization (and spiritualization of morality) of national life beginning in the late Taishō 大正 period.

**THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF THEORIES ON DIVINE HEALING: THE IDENTIFICATION OF A BIBLICAL VIEW ON DIVINE HEALING**

Shortly before the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923 Nakada published his translation of *Divine Healing*\(^ {26}\) by South African evangelist Andrew Murray (1828–1917). In the “Translator’s Preface” Nakada expresses his concern over the multiplicity of theories on divine healing embraced throughout the world, which urged him to specify “an entirely biblical and healthy” (Murray 1923, 1) view. Nakada’s resentment against “all kinds of fabricated views and sophisms about divine healing” (Murray 1923, 1) was, perhaps, not only directed at other Christian denominations but suggestive of diverse interpretations inside the Holiness Church as well. The introduction of Murray’s view was meant to synchronize them, while at the same time it tied up moral/spiritual sanctification and physical healing in Nakada’s understanding as well. Since Murray’s stance represents Nakada’s stance in 1923, a short summary of his life and his view of divine healing shall be given below.

The son of Scottish immigrants to South Africa, Murray had studied theology at Utrecht University, where he got involved with a group of radical students pushing revival on the campus; summer vacation travel resulted in an encounter with Johann Christoph Blumhardt (1805–1880). Back in South Africa he pursued a career in the Dutch Reformed Church until 1879 when he suddenly lost

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\(^{25}\) Ikegami includes statistics on infancy death rates in modern Japan which show that the declining death rate up till then peaked again in 1918 (Ikegami 2006, 86).

\(^{26}\) Nakada obtained his first copy of the book during a world tour in 1921.
his voice. Two years of “silence” made him search for relief in Europe. In London he participated in a convention and met with Otto Stockmayer (1838–1917). At that time Murray was already acquainted with *The Lord Thy Healer* by William Edwin Boardman (1810–1886), an American minister under the influence of Charles Cullis (1838–1892). Their understanding of divine healing was based on James 5:14–16, a passage central to the discourse on healing in Japan as well. Following intense prayer Murray’s voice recovered and he returned to South Africa to become the leader of a local revival movement, proponent of divine healing, and author of more than 240 books.

According to Murray (Van de Vyver 2009), Jesus never referred to illness without describing it as evil resulting from sin. Since illness attacks the holy temple of the soul—in other words, the body—believers should be released from it.27 Murray criticizes “low-level Christians” who deny divine healing—despite Jesus’ atonement on the cross relating in equal parts to body and soul—for their inability to have a close relationship with God. Without the experience of victory over sin they lack a means of persuasion. For Murray, justification and sanctification are not merely two different gifts, but separate acts of faith, and healing depends on their respective degree of strength. He understands illness as a sign of divine judgment, arguing that God “makes use of Satan as a wise government makes use of a jailer” (Van de Vyver 2009, 315).

Like Sasao, Murray acknowledges medicine as made by God and its application as the “natural way,” while at the same time pushing for a decision for the life of a believer. Although the young Murray met with Stockmayer and Blumhardt, who emphasized the “promise” of health throughout the Bible, declaring illness to be “not of God’s will,” he finally leaned towards Boardman’s moral perfectionism.

*North American Concepts in New Context: Old and New Radical traits*

A summary of the interpretations of divine healing chosen by Sasao and Nakada shall not be given here. It should be clear that their respective preferences have been heavily influenced by their respective physical and mental conditioning.

In general we can say that both of them avoided interpretations of the radical wing of holiness, although they witnessed its influence in North America during their sojourn and stayed influenced by it through their cooperation with the Cowmans and Kilbourne. Furthermore, no matter how radical their acceptance of Christianity may have been to them, in transmitting holiness teachings to Japan they did not display the “autonomy of artistic creation” that can be found in North American radical holiness healers and incipient Pentecostalism. This is not to say that they lacked creativity at all. Commitment to hymn composition,

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27. This argument was also raised by Dowie and Woodworth-Etter (Baer 2001, 765).
the use of traditional Japanese instruments, and the implementation of performing techniques during holiness meetings bear testimony to their creative activity. However, with regard to dogmatic development, they seem to have sought out the most traditional and in large parts conservative interpretations that would still allow for a contemporary practice of divine healing.

Nakada himself did not fear any scandal or accusation of irrationality, but he increasingly understood the importance of biblical support for holiness doctrines, thus fostering the biblical fundamentalism inherited from the North American holiness movement. The early Japanese holiness movement experimented also with radical traits unrelated to divine healing such as communal life with shared finances and unpaid evangelistic work. Later Nakada’s enthusiasm for a perceived genetic link between the Japanese and the Jewish people would be for many believers too “radical” and resulted in a schism of the church.

The stress on curses was not new to Japanese religious thought, whereas the correlation of illness with the violation of God-given law contradicted the modern stance of *hirihōkenten* 非理法権天, the superiority of imperial authority over any law. This trait provided one of the reasons for state repression during the 1940s.

But what kind of responses did these holiness teachings on divine healing earn from the broader Christian community? As explained earlier this paper will focus on Uchimura’s response.

**Responses to the Early Holiness Movement’s Doctrine of Divine Healing: Uchimura Kanzō and his View of Divine Healing**

Although Uchimura’s final conclusion also pointed to the Second Coming of Christ as the only hope against the existential varieties of “death,” he perceived the holiness doctrine’s swift transition to the Second Coming to be a shortcut that is a little too short. When Uchimura pursued his studies in New England (1884–1888), regular holiness summer camps took place near Amherst, and Uchimura reportedly attended at least one of Moody’s lectures. Presumably he was acquainted with a variety of healing theories.

28. For the rest of the believers Nakada aspired to motivate them to give the highest monthly offerings among all denominations in Japan. Every synod reported the ranking of the holiness offerings.

29. Suzuki (1962) sketches the development of Uchimura’s interpretation of human suffering in four phases, with the last one being dominated by Uchimura’s complete surrender to the coming of Christ. He also indicates that Uchimura suffered from a severe fear of death. However, he does not consider Uchimura’s understanding of divine healing. Harajima (1983) considers Uchimura’s view on divine healing but does not read it as a response to holiness doctrine. This section will try to focus on Uchimura’s critique of holiness healing, which still includes the possibility of a conceptional influence.
Ten years senior to Nakada, Uchimura had been writing on the topic of “faith cure” even before the Japanese holiness movement came into being. His *Consolidations of a Christian* (*Kirisuto shinto no nagusame* 基督信徒の慰) and *Search after Peace* (*Kyūanroku* 求安録) from 1893 both contain well-known paragraphs on the meaning of (terminal) illness, although he used to focus on other forms of suffering. Uchimura focused on mental suffering resulting from interference in daily life. He called for a correct understanding of modern medicine that “has not yet entirely understood the miraculous microcosm of the human.” “The power of life (seiki 生気),” he continues, “permeates heaven and earth and constantly works to stop decay and disintegration. If all doctors send me away, I will go to the doctor of doctors, the creator of heaven and earth” (ukz 2: 60–71).

Uchimura defines “faith cure” as “relying entirely on hygiene and prayer” and insists on its “scientific truth.” For Uchimura a combination of “the natural way” which works well on “lower-class animals” with “a peaceful mind” comprises “the most educated way of faith cure” and “excels methods of healing that regard the physical body as test object” (ukz 2: 60–71).

In contrast to the (not-yet-pronounced) holy emphasis on works Uchimura proclaims: “Work is not the goal of Christianity.” He explains God’s use of illness as a preventive measure against workaholism. Since “in this world illness exists for the reason to have objects of love,” the sick person should accept his/her “privilege of being the one to be loved” and engage, depending on his/her condition, in Bible reading, contemplation about God’s providence, and “recognition of humanity’s permanent suffering” which would “deepen [his/her] capacity for compassion.” Uchimura conceives illness and suffering in this world as hinting at humanity’s “animal” dimension and therefore prompts the sick person: “The animal part of you is suffering, but the angelic part of you is gaining health. Abolish your animal pleasures and catch hold of angelic pleasures!” For the nurturing of that “angelic” side “God inflicts the hardest suffering on those he loves most” (ukz 2: 60–71).

He repeats this idea, which holds elements of chastising judgment while transforming it into a form of medical treatment in basically all texts relating to healing. Although there is a common line of argument with holiness notions of judgment, he stresses God’s fondness as motivation to a degree that makes the sick person look like the privileged one.

In *Search after Peace* (ukz 2: 178–86) Uchimura criticizes healers who pretend to heal by “defining illness away” like “Unitarianism defines sin away.” The connection is not arbitrary, since he uses it to attack moral perfectionism: “Quick temper is one of my character traits.… But does this mean that anger is no sin to me? When somebody violates my rights without reason I must anger, and I do not regard this kind of anger to be sinful. But when this anger extends into thoughts of revenge that seek to pay back harm with harm then I am com-
mitting a sin.” Statements of Uchimura like this illuminate his differentiated understanding and critique of what Nakada called “illnesses of the heart.” Actually, Uchimura felt more alarmed about “malpractice of intellect” (interekuto no ran’yō 知能の濫用), in other words, a sin against the Holy Spirit and therefore a “terminal illness” (UKZ 9: 391).

From 1902—in other words, when the early holiness movement had started its activities in Tokyo,30 Uchimura kept responding to questions about divine healing from readers of his periodical Biblical Studies. His article “The tribulation of the Christian believer” (Kirisuto shinto no kannan 基督信徒の患難) outlines his view of illness as a form of medical treatment. When believers take the “stimulant drug” of suffering they “start to see the glory of heaven” and receive step by step more mercy from God. Uchimura imagines humans as vessels designed to contain God’s mercy. However, these vessels are very narrow at birth and therefore need to be “continuously widened” through the “softening agent” of suffering (UKZ 10: 165–71).

“About the possibility of faith cure” (Shinkō chiryō no kahi 信仰治療の可否, 1902) supports the use of medicine/doctors, although they should be chosen carefully. In an age of advanced medical science, “in most cases God would not use his miraculous powers, but save the sick with medication.” He cites a number of Bible passages which show God or Jesus using substances in healing that could be thought of as medication and even claims individual approaches to illness since Jesus “seems to have chosen different ways of healing depending on the person” (UKZ 10: 388–91). One year later he suggests that God “wants to work higher [wonders]” than temporary cures for the body, in other words, “God wants to save people forever” and therefore only rarely performs miraculous healing. But as healing of the “interior spirit” will result in a healed “exterior body,” Uchimura praises the “hygienic value of sanctification (holiness)” (UKZ 11: 497–504) which is, above all, entirely for free.

“On divine healing” (Shin’yu ni tsuite 神懲について) from 1906 adds new elements by stating that no matter how much the proponents of divine healing stressed the importance of faith, they nonetheless contributed to the process of secularization. Since faith should not rely on “signs and wonders” divine healing will never become a credential for him, he declares (UKZ 14: 23–31). One month after this declaration Uchimura contracted an illness and he reports on this (co) incidence stressing once more that he “cannot yet comply completely with the so-called doctrine of divine healing.” But at least his illness made him find his “only comfort in the hope of glory in Christ’s kingdom.” The article ends with the words: “Illness might be healed or not be healed.… Faith that does not ask

30. From 1903 Uchimura and Nakada were teaching in close neighborhoods, since the holiness Bible school moved from Kanda 神田 to Kashiwagi 柏木 in Shinjuku 新宿.
for health is precisely the kind of faith that has the strongest power to restore health” (UKZ 14: 42–45).

Only in 1912, eight months after his daughter Ruth’s death, does he return again to the topic. During Ruth’s illness Uchimura consulted Sasao, of whom he got a very favorable impression. But the death of his daughter changed his understanding of divine healing: “People who speak of divine healing and regard cures for the physical body as a special favor/mercy of God misunderstand the spirit of Christianity,” he states. “The greatest mercy consists not of being saved from death, but of encountering death and being saved out of it” (UKZ 19: 211). Those who “cannot believe without seeing ‘signs and wonders’” are too preoccupied with results and effects which lead them to misconceptions of Jesus’ atonement on the cross. Christianity in Japan should throw away its American utilitarianism and return to the faith of “faith alone” (UKZ 21: 24–31).

In “Strength and weakness of faith” (Shinkō no kyōjaku 信仰の強弱) from the same year he compromises and states that result-oriented utilitarian faith is not “mistaken faith” but “weak faith.” But Uchimura also criticizes the overemphasis on emotions, that is, “subjective psychological experiments” (UKZ 21: 203–11). Then, at the start of the SCCM, he declares, “I do not believe in so-called ‘divine healing’” (UKZ 24: 47–49), and after the end of the cooperation with Nakada, Uchimura reveals that he had been criticized from within the movement for being “a disbeliever of divine healing” (UKZ 25: 274–75). But in 1922 he suddenly proclaims, “I believe in divine healing” (UKZ 27: 184–85). Still this proclamation comes with a disclaimer, in other words, that healing results in the healed person’s complete submission to Christ, but he does not make submission a precondition to healing. And in line with holiness teaching during the SCCM he adds that divine healing occurs to enable a person to “finish his/her God-given work.” His last statement on divine healing was written close to his death and still seems to echo his encounter with holiness healing: “Today I was again thinking all day long about the issue of health. [My] conclusion was that humans, i.e. doctors, are unable to heal the disorders of that ingenious machine, which is the physical body. Only God who created it can heal its illnesses. Finally, I myself turn gradually into a believer of faith cure” (UKZ 35: 531).

Divine Healing in Relation to the Modern Japanese Discourse on Medicine and Religion

What can we say about the early holiness movement’s understanding of divine healing based on Shimazono’s approach? First of all, the movement’s distinction between sanctification and healing led to a conceptional split between the physical and the moral/mental/spiritual spheres. Within the movement as a whole both sides still appeared to be in balance, but to outside observers their doctrine
seemed to disconnect the body from the soul. Although divine healing aimed at re-sacralizing the body, it was perceived by observers as a materialistic concept pushing secularization. The doctrinal distinction allowed for the division of tasks that was not necessarily exclusive, but enabled Sasao and Nakada to specialize in their favorites according to their respective physical and mental conditioning. Sasao concentrated on physical healing/care; having been impressed by female believers (his host mother in San Jose) and Woodworth-Etter he himself took on the role of a “mother” for holiness believers. Nakada tied healing to the mental/moral sphere/care, thereby almost dissolving it into the dogma of sanctification. Because of such a division of tasks the death of Sasao immensely influenced the further shaping of the doctrine.

During the sccm, however, the attention of the whole movement was drawn towards the mental/moral sphere. Given that the sccm was one of many alternative spiritual movements during the Taisho period arising in response to perceived insufficiencies and distortions of the time—in other words, shallowness or lack of public morality— the adjustment of holiness doctrines must be seen as a natural development. While the popularity of divine healing without an emphasis on morality in the West has been understood as an expression of the spiritual devastation after World War I (Means 1925), I would suggest that the moralization of divine healing in the Japanese holiness movement resulted from increasing social imbalances under the push of the war economy followed by the onset of a recession, that is, imbalances calling for a “revolution of national morality.”

The prescription of Murray’s Divine Healing as an “entirely biblical view” in which physical healing and moral perfectionism represent two faces of the same coin can be understood as an attempt to correct earlier problematic tendencies of separation. Nonetheless, as long as the Holiness Church continued to preach the fourfold gospel it could not completely overcome the separation of body and soul/mind indicated in Shimazono’s first division.

Uchimura’s critique of holiness healing as “secularization” is based on his own view of the body as the “animal” dimension, which denies the holiness movement’s claim of a “sacral body,” as well as on his antipathy against “American” utilitarianism. Uchimura’s early understanding seems to be influenced by Inoue Enryō’ (1858–1919)’s “method of psychological healing” (shinri ryōhō 心理療法) that managed to keep the traditional interrelation of the two spheres by introducing (modern) knowledge on psychosomatic effects. Uchimura differentiated the physical sphere from the mental/spiritual/moral sphere and rated them according to their “sanctity.” Still he did not divide them but rather postulated them as bound together by a positive correlation of physical (and mental) suffering and spiritual/moral wellbeing.

Returning again to holiness doctrines, the proclamation of “universal healership” in the sense that everybody could heal or be healed under just two condi-
tions, in other words, faith (as result of justification) and sanctification, definitely worked against modern medical professionalism and thereby strengthened independent believer’s lives. Dualistic conceptions of a chastising God and of devils that must be expelled may be unattractive to educated Christians; but to believers of the early holiness movement such conceptions were more comprehensible than modern medical terminology and (or because) they provided a sort of “explanation” in cases where doctors had no clue. Still, the gulf between secular physicians and religious healers was not as deep as in North America. Since the Japanese holiness movement attracted few from the middle class, although mostly people who could not afford doctors anyway, polemics perhaps were dispensable. Divine healing was “sold” as a privilege to the financially deprived. The transformation of financial/social deprivation into privilege must have implied an enormous mental gain.

As a privilege of the poor, divine healing demanded the outright denial of medicine. The refusal of modern medicine may have been a passive one, but nonetheless was a way to prevent adverse effects. In conclusion we can say that the early holiness movement struggled with the body-soul/mind-unit, a division of which historically created the base for Illich’s social iatrogenesis. However, the holiness claim of religious authority over both spheres still prevented it from developing social iatrogenesis in the form of dependence on medicine. Furthermore the holiness response towards clinical iatrogenesis was very consistent. With his emphasis on the selection of “faithful” doctors and modest use of medication Uchimura presents another Christian option of resistance to social and clinical iatrogenesis.

But how about the prevention of cultural iatrogenesis? To what degree did holiness doctrines help believers endure fundamental human experiences like terminal illness, aging, and death? While the believers themselves seem to have been satisfied with their hope of Christ’s return, Uchimura’s critique of the holiness movement’s understanding of divine healing focused precisely on this point. Instead of explaining illness (and suffering) away he pleaded for the wholehearted acceptance of all kinds of suffering and stressed this approach in his theology.

So far Western research on divine healing has concentrated on the healer’s contribution to theology, but with Shimazono’s approach we catch sight of their contribution to the modern medical discourse. The early holiness movement and Uchimura were fighting on the same frontline of the conceptionalization of illness and health. While proposing different solutions, their common con-

31. It must be noted that holiness theology, like most Christian theology, saw believers as entirely dependent on Christ.
tribution to the discourse can be seen in reclaiming medicine/healing as a field relating to morality.

However, the moralization of healing was embedded in a larger process of moralization and of the spiritualization of morality which fed on an increasingly anti-modernist national ideology. Because of this background it is necessary to consider Shimazono’s second division, the distinction between private and public value(s). In a sense the shift in the holiness movement’s interpretation of divine healing from personal benefit towards the purpose of “revealing God’s glory and infusing zeal for good works” can be understood as a process of absorption into national value(s). As a matter of fact, this theological shift was accompanied by strong nationalist sentiment. But even without overt nationalism, “national value(s)” can be understood as a reference to “God’s kingdom” in the Christian context.

Before arguing about faith cures, the young Uchimura used to see suffering as a means of becoming a serviceable citizen. After 1891, he replaced this “confucianist idea in the style of the Mitō School” (SUZUKI 1962, 97) by a more Christian interpretation, but never stopped aspiring to be in service to his nation. Uchimura’s preference for spiritual and moral health over physical health basically shared the newly-founded Holiness Church’s assumption that the Japanese nation was in need of a spiritual and moral recovery. It was exactly for this reason that Uchimura cooperated with Nakada in the organization of the SCCM.

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In the field of the study of religion, a number of attempts have been made to bridge Western and Japanese scholarship. Among them, considerations of the applicability of Western concepts to Japanese cases are especially important because religions in Japanese history, culture, and society are completely different from Christianity and other Abrahamic religions that have greatly influenced the characteristics of the study of religion in the West. In my view, there is one concept that deserves special attention—“civil religion.” As is widely known, if we put aside the prehistory of the concept, starting with Rousseau and others, this concept was—at least in the field of the contemporary sociology of religion—originally discussed by Robert Bellah (1967) in his argument about American society.

In scholarly literature written in English more recently, a number of publications contain chapters related to civil religion (Parsons 2002; Cristi and Dawson 2007; Robertson 2009). According to Annika Hvithamar and Margit Warburg, the subjects surrounding civil religion, nationalism, and globalization have caught the interest of scholars in various disciplines, including history, sociology, and political science. With this understanding, they edited and published a compilation with Brian Arly Jacobsen (Hvithamar, Warburg, Jacobsen 2009). All these publications illustrate that the concept of civil religion has somehow been kept alive, at least in the study of religion published in English,

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not to speak of an accumulation of scholarship on civil religion in the United States as a particular and original case.

I will first review the current arguments on civil religion in the publications mentioned above. Then I will take up the question as to how this concept has been applied to a Japanese case by reflecting on discussions on civil religion in Japan developed in English by Bellah and other scholars, including Takayama (1993) and Davis (1992). Finally, I will attempt to contextualize the most recent discussions on civil religion in Japan by referring to the related concepts of “public religion” and “national religion” in Japan.

Based on the understanding of the field summarized above, this article will try to reflect on the implications of the arguments of “civil religion” in Japan, while thinking about some commonalities in those arguments, with the purpose of reaching a renewed understanding of the scholarly approaches toward modern Japanese religion.

**Arguments on “Civil Religion” in the Sociology of Religion**

Gerald Parsons takes up three cases of civil religion from the UK, the USA, and his own field, Siena, Italy (Parsons 2002). If I only focus on the first two cases, the basic characteristics of his arguments can be summarized as follows.

In Parsons’ view, in both the UK and the USA, public rituals associated with the remembrance and commemoration of the war dead are regarded as an important element of the “civil religions” of these nations, although they are not the only expression of them. In the UK, there are a series of other expressions in royal symbols and rituals, whereas in the USA, there are others in presidential symbols and rituals. In the history of national rituals of the remembrance and commemoration of the war dead, the First World War was crucial both in the UK and the USA, but in the case of the latter, in the formation of the rituals of American civil religion, the Civil War was as important as, or more important than, the First World War. With the Civil War in the USA, and the First World War in the UK, although there were a few precedents, both nations needed to treat fallen soldiers of these massive wars as individuals, devise rituals to remember and commemorate the war dead individually on the one hand, whereas on the other hand they also needed to both physically and ritually give unknown fallen soldiers certain treatment. In both wars, a massive number of ordinary people were conscripted and died. Treating fallen soldiers as individuals was important because they themselves wanted to be treated as people who died for a solemn cause that either the Union in the North, the Confederacy in the South, or the UK put forward.

* This article is a revised version of a presentation given at the 82nd Annual Meeting of the Japan Sociological Society, held at Rikkyo University, 11 October 2009.
In his arguments about civil religion, Parsons refers to five functions that a civil religion fulfils that have been developed by Richard Pierard and Robert Linder: 1. it will refer to the widespread acceptance by a people of a shared sense of their nation’s history and destiny; 2. it will relate their society to a realm of absolute meaning; 3. it will enable them to look at their society and community as in some sense special; 4. it will provide a vision which ties the nation together as an integrated whole; and 5. it will provide a collection of beliefs, values, rites, ceremonies, and symbols which, taken together, give sacred meaning to the life of the community and thus provide an overarching sense of unity that transcends internal conflicts and differences (Pierard and Linder 1988, 22–23). In Parsons’ understanding, “the invention and subsequent history of the principal rituals of remembrance of those killed in war in both the USA and the UK do, indeed, reflect and express most—if not all—of the characteristics of civil religion identified by Pierard and Linder,” although “in both contexts, these processes are far from being straightforward, unambiguous or uncontested” (Parsons 2002, 42).

A civil religion is comprised of symbols and rituals shared by a community or society of a nation, but Parsons also pays attention to more personal practices of the remembrance and commemoration of the war dead. Pilgrimage to the cemeteries, battlefields, and memorials of the two world wars has become resurgent since the mid-1980s, after a time of disinterest among the population. Renewed interest in such pilgrimages can be attested to in novels and films such as Steven Spielberg’s 1998 film Saving Private Ryan, where an American veteran returns to a cemetery in Normandy. As for academic studies, Parsons notes that “the 1990s witnessed a growing recognition that the whole area of war memorials, remembrance, and the cultural significance of such phenomena and activities, had been curiously neglected by historians hitherto. Articles and books duly began to appear with increasing frequency” (Parsons 2002, 74). One reason for the increase in public interest in war memory is that the fiftieth anniversaries of a number of key moments and events of the Second World War were held from 1989 until 1995.

I will not trace all the detailed arguments by Parsons here, including his exploration of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, but only point out his attention to the war memorial in the discussion on civil religion. Reflecting back on Robert Bellah’s suggestion of a possible idea for the future not of an American civil religion but a “new civil religion of the world,” Parsons proceeds to comment:

[If such a broader concept of a world civil religion were to emerge, then the role of war cemeteries and war memorials—experienced and interpreted not as commemorations of national pride or military glory, but as monuments to human loss and grief—might prove a strangely effective element of such a religion. (Parsons 2002, 101)
A world civil religion is a concept that we cannot easily imagine in the current age of religious pluralism. But if we are to think about a civil religion that can be found in parts of the world other than the UK or the USA, the remembrance and commemoration of the war dead may well be an important element of a civil religion outside of these two nations. Here we can see one possibility of the applicability of the concept of civil religion to a society or nation other than the UK or the USA. Although highly polemical, Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo provides a concrete focus for the argument of a Japanese civil religion based on Parsons’s suggestion of this concept.

More recently, Marcela Cristi and Lorne L. Dawson (2007) also discuss the concept of civil religion. Their theoretical argument mainly focuses on the American context, and then moves, though briefly, to civil religion in a comparative perspective. They start their argument by presenting their own usage of the concept as follows:

A civil religion is a system of symbols, beliefs, and rites of a reverent and celebratory kind, concerning the myths, history and destiny of a people that is used to establish and express the sacred character of their social identity and the civic and political order associated with it. The elements of this civil religion are commonly derived from, yet institutionally distinct from, existing religious systems. In some instances the civil religion may be the result of strong emotional commitments to political ideals that are elevated to a position of transcendence consonant with religious beliefs, yet without any specific reference to traditional religious systems. (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 269)

Cristi and Dawson review a wide variety of arguments on American civil religion stimulated by Bellah and succeeding scholars, and also refer to criticisms of the concept. They then attempt to recast the concept of civil religion “as a continuum of possibilities for the public expression of religion” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 268). According to them, “[t]his continuum varies from a conception of civil religion as ‘culture,’ as a spontaneous and integrative social phenomenon, to a conception of civil religion as ‘ideology,’ as an imposed and manufactured political resource” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 268). One conception of civil religion as “culture” reflects “the classical Durkheimian position which ascribes sacredness to the group and asserts that each collectivity has a common religion” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 276), and the other conception of civil religion as “ideology” reflects the Rousseauan political approach that presupposes a political ideology “constructed by the state and/or its political leaders, and used as a political resource” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 276). Cristi and Dawson note that there will always be ambiguity when one introduces into one’s argument the concept of “sacred,” as in Durkheim. Regarding this point, they avoid further arguments for resolution in this chapter, only presenting the
It suffices to say that sacralization entails attributing an ultimate meaning and importance, as well as a sense of permanence, even eternal significance, to whatever is held sacred” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 281).

As to the comparative perspective on civil religion, Cristi and Dawson find in the existing literature at least three common types of civil religions: 1. totalitarian, state-directed civil religions; 2. sacralized forms of nationalism, imposed with various degrees of indoctrination and/or coercion; and 3. civil religions manifested as historically specific ideologies promoted by a political or intellectual elite (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 281). They enumerate several examples of each type. As to totalitarian, state-directed civil religions, they subdivide “state-based” and “church-based,” and as one example of the former, they refer to “State Shinto in Japan from 1868 to 1945” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 281).

For State Shinto, in their view, “there was an overt identification of political and religious allegiances,” which can also be regarded as an example of the second type (sacralized forms of nationalism, imposed with various degrees of indoctrination and/or coercion; Cristi and Dawson 2007, 282). Their explanation is based on the discussions by Bellah and Takayama that will be reviewed later in this article, and goes as follows: “In Japan the emperor was assumed to be linked genealogically to the prehistorical age of the gods, and the Japanese social structure was justified in strictly religious terms” (Cristi and Dawson 2007, 282). The concept of “State Shinto” is considered to be highly debatable, but as Cristi and Dawson suggest, we should possibly rethink Shinto in the late Meiji through the early Showa era, and whether it can arguably be called “State Shinto” or not in the larger framework of the civil religion debate.

Roland Robertson (2009) approaches the topic of civil religion through the perspectives of globalization and theocratization. He mentions State Shinto, regarding it as a “political religion” among other cases, while he notices President Lincoln’s statement that the US Constitution constituted a political religion (Robertson 2009, 453). Although Robertson does not seemingly elaborate on the relation between the concept of “political religion” in Lincoln and his own usage of the concept, he refers to the other cases as follows:

Other societies with political religions (or theocracies) have included Nazi Germany, contemporary North Korea, and the period of State Shinto in Japan (approximately 1890 until 1945); while China is surely a very prominent contemporary case. (Robertson 2009, 453)

As for the relation between the concept of “civil religion” and that of “political religion,” he presents his understanding in the following way:

1. For recent discussions on State Shinto, mainly by Japanese scholars, see Okuyama (2011).
Political religions were, and are, forms of religion that have been, or are, “invented” in order to provide a rallying point of reference for the inhabitants of particular societies. These contrast with Bellah-type civil religions. Whereas the latter provide a standard to which the relevant society has ideally to conform, political religions and theocracies are much more directly manipulable by specific regimes. In Bellah’s formulation, the state religion of, for example, Japan—namely, State Shinto—was not a civil religion, precisely because it served the interests of a particular regime. There are, and have been since the late nineteenth century, many examples of political or state religions.

(Robertson 2009, 471)

Here Robertson differentiates between civil religion and political religion, referring to Bellah’s original idea about civil religion that contains a prophetic and eschatological role that would judge a nation on earth by resorting to higher ideals. For Robertson, a political religion can be understood, in contrast, as a religion that is utilized by a political regime. In his understanding, so-called State Shinto is considered to be a political religion, rather than a civil religion. Now we need to rethink the arguments accumulated in the study of modern Japanese religious history, especially those elaborated on in the theoretical framework of civil religion in Japan. Before proceeding to this subject, the last part of Robertson’s article deserves special attention. He reminds readers of another area of Bellah’s academic interests that started well before his expertise on American religion, by juxtaposing American civil religion and its counterpart in Japan. The very last sentences of his argument reads:

[I]n spite of Bellah’s strenuous attempts to oppose the distortion of civil religion into a theocratic, authoritarian form, it is striking that this is precisely what appears to be happening in many parts of the world, not least in the USA itself. There is some irony in this, since in the years before Bellah published his very influential article on American civil religion in the late 1960s he had been a scholar of Japan. And in speaking of the USA, he emphatically declared American civil religion to be very different from Japanese state religion prior to the Pacific War…. Irony lies in the fact that it is in the USA that one now finds a particular problem of a politicized civil religion with a strong theocratic tinge. In Japan, on the other hand, there are certainly elements of theocracy, but only intermittently do they have a direct effect on politics.

(Robertson 2009, 472)

As has been shown, the current discussion about civil religion, directly or indirectly, relates to the Japanese case. Robert Bellah himself had given his thought to this possible topic—civil religion in Japan—earlier than these recent discussions. We will go back to his argument in the next section, and then proceed to other scholars’ treatment of civil religion in Japan.
Japanese Civil Religion in Scholarship Abroad

Bellah (1980) gives a comparative argument on both American and Japanese civil religions, referring to his own theoretical scheme of religious evolution. Based on the idea of the development of five religious symbol systems, primitive, archaic, historic, early modern, and modern, Bellah contrasts civil religions in these two nations. He explains that, “In Japan in the recent past and to a certain extent even today there seems to have survived a civil religion of archaic type (involving a fusion of divinity, society, and the individual), whereas the United States has a civil religion of distinctly modern type (with a high degree of differentiation between divinity, society, and the individual)” (Bellah 1980, 28). As can be seen from this citation, Bellah’s idea of religious evolution derives from his insight into the differentiation of social systems, and that of related symbolism reflected in the world view and cosmology of a given society. In his view, one contrast between premodern non-Western societies and modern Western societies can be summarized as hierarchy and equality in the structure of each society, and each of these characters can be found “at the core of the respective civil religions” (Bellah 1980, 28), though he admits that there have been some exceptions to each case.

Since Bellah discusses a civil religion of archaic type surviving in Japan even until today, it is important to ask how he describes religion in modern Japanese society. He notices the importance of conscious rational manipulation in the hierarchical aspect of Japanese civil religion, and although there were precedents in history, he thinks that “clearly the prime example of conscious manipulation is modern Japanese civil religion, composed of the modern emperor system and its pervasive ideological influence, of which state Shinto was only a part” (Bellah 1980, 31). Bellah refers here, though critically, to Winston Davis’s usage of “civil religion” around the turn of the century through the prewar period of the 1930s. Davis states:

The pivotal symbols in this [civil] religion were the sacred ancestors of the imperial family. By homologizing these deities (i.e., the lineage ideology of ancient Japan) with the ancestor worship of the common people, the government thought to create a feeling of national unity and dedication. The machinations of Japan’s new industrial and military leaders which caused such suffering and deprivations among the rural masses, were now beautified as the “wish” of the imperial ancestors.

(Winston Davis, cited in Bellah 1980, 32–33)

Regarding Davis’s analysis, Bellah’s comment relates to the meaning of hierarchy in Japan:

Hierarchy in Japan as elsewhere is linked to an ethical system and a set of values. Clearly, from the Confucian point of view, which has been most explicit about these matters, the legitimacy of rule is contingent upon the embodiment
of values. Rulers who are not benevolent and righteous do not deserve to rule. Only virtuous rulers deserve respect. Though in Japan the enormous importance of lineage muted this ethical conception of politics, it did not destroy it. (Bellah 1980, 32–33)

After arguing about American civil religion, Bellah again presents his understanding of Japanese society in the last part of his chapter:

Japanese society has seldom been a system of amoral exploitation, and individual Japanese have not been reduced to the fearful and spiritless automatons despotism classically creates. Indeed, the presence of public spirit and concern for the common good in Japan rivals the public consciousness of the great republics. Without facing this paradox Japan remains an enigma. (Bellah 1980, 38)

Davis’s argument cited above actually showed his understanding of the attempts to strengthen national unification around the early twentieth century by homologizing the common people with the imperial deities through the imperial household. Although Bellah seemingly wants to criticize Davis’s argument, he does not really disprove Davis’s point. If we only focus on the concept of civil religion in Japan, Bellah argues that the archaic type of civil religion has survived through Japanese history, referring also to ethically positive meanings in the hierarchical society of Japan. Thinking about the citation in Bellah’s argument, Davis seems to present an important treatment about this concept, so I will focus on his argument later. But before that, another argument deserves to be mentioned.

Takayama’s article (1993) was originally written around the end of the Showa era, the last years of Emperor Showa, when reflection of the aggressive war of 1931 to 1945 followed by the disastrous defeat, and a postwar reevaluation of history was occurring, while some revisionists were trying to recast the legacy of Japanese society and culture in a positive light. At this very moment, Takayama saw the attempt to revitalize Japanese civil religion emerging.

As it was originally written more than twenty years ago, Takayama’s argument has its limitations, especially in his dependence on an outdated understanding of not only of Shinto but also of so-called State Shinto, on which there have been many academic debates in the past fifteen years or so. The concept of civil religion itself is not clearly defined in Takayama’s argument, but we can assume that it basically refers to the semi-religious Japanese regime comprising of the imperial system and Shinto-related rituals that continued from the Meiji era to the end of World War II. This can be illustrated in his description below:

With Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945, the Allied powers demanded the abolition of the Japanese civil religion molded during the nationalistic and ultranationalistic periods. With this Japan lost more than the divine prerogatives of the throne and the immense institution of State Shinto. These were
only the external symbols of something much deeper: the Japanese sense of issues and destiny based on the nation’s ancient cosmological world view.
(Takayama 1993, 109)

As the title of his article shows, Takayama notices the revitalization of this pre-war (ultra-)nationalistic complex of the imperial system and Shinto, especially in the situations surrounding Yasukuni Shrine, among others. First, the so-called Yasukuni Shrine Bill to renationalize Yasukuni Shrine was repeatedly presented to the Diet, from 1969 to 1974, though in the end it was dropped. Second, Prime Minister Miki Takeo visited Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August 1975, the first time for a prime minister to do so on this particular day, making the politicians’ visits to this shrine a political problem; this was followed by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit on the same day in 1985 in his capacity as prime minister. Third, Yasukuni Shrine announced in 1979 that in the previous year it had enshrined fourteen war criminals judged by the Tokyo Trials (International Military Tribunal for the Far East) to be class-A war criminals. It follows from this enshrinement that any solemn visit to Yasukuni Shrine from 1978 onwards would mean a visit to the place where the war criminals of the wars in the Asia Pacific region were religiously revered.

Another major topic of that revitalization in Takayama’s essay is the textbook controversy and possible education reforms, promoted by the politicians of the (then) ruling Liberal Democratic Party, as well as conservative thinkers and intellectuals. The controversies regarding the fundamentals of public education in general—and textbooks in particular—have continued until today, and in the meantime there was a revision of the Fundamental Law of Education in 2006. Advocating traditional values and conservative morals can be regarded as an example of resurgent nationalism, but it seems to me to be doubtful whether it can be reasonably called an example of the revitalization of “civil religion.” Takayama himself does not present any convincing argument on this matter, but only concludes:

[W]henever government leaders take up such national religio-political issues as the nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine and the moral education of children, other related issues inevitably emerge. These include the restoration of the emperor system as the center of the state, the promotion of national defense efforts, anti-Communism, the revision of the peace constitution, and the reform of education, particularly in the areas of social studies and history—issue closely associated with the framework of Japanese civil religion.
(Takayama 1993, 118)

This framework of Japanese civil religion remains unclear in Takayama’s argument, but as mentioned earlier, the complexity of the imperial system and Shinto can be counted as its main element. He seems to keep a somewhat static understand-
ing of Shinto when he describes that the fundamental metaphysics of the Japanese attested to in Shinto communal rites and festivities remained intact, and that “[t]he traditional cosmology and religious values that help shape the Japanese cultural identity and upon which Japanese civil religion was constructed have survived without much alteration to the present day” (Takayama 1993, 119). We could say that since the time when Takayama’s essay was written, the understanding of historical Shinto has undergone major revisions, as has that of State Shinto, but this is another issue for scholarly consideration, separate from that of civil religion.

I will now focus on the third example of the discussions of Japanese civil religion in scholarship abroad. Davis (1992) discusses “civil religion” in relation to another series of arguments known as “Japan theory.” Davis originally published this in 1983 at a time when economic growth had generated excessive self-confidence among Japanese authors (and also foreign authors such as Ezra Vogel, the author of Japan as Number One) about Japanese uniqueness. According to Davis, one function of Japan theory is self-defense, especially self-defense against charges brought by foreign people or countries. He then continues that “[t]he symbolic defense, justification, or legitimation of a society is, of course, one of the major roles of a ‘civil religion,’ a point not to be forgotten when we later examine Japan theory as a secularization of the civil religious sentiments of the prewar period” (Davis 1992, 260).

In his terminology, “civil religion” is defined in contrast with “civil theology,” as is shown in the following explanation:

By “civil religion” I mean to imply… a “network of moods, values, thoughts, rituals, and symbols that establishes the meaning of nationhood within an overarching hierarchy of significance. While civil religions are the precipitates of traditional religious communities, they transcend specific religious communities and dogmas. The symbols and suasions of the civil religion must speak to “all sorts and conditions of men.” “Civil theology,” on the other hand, is the articulation of civil religion by the elite. One could say that civil religion—a reticulation of implicit sentiments—is “thought in.” Civil theology is “thought out.” (Davis 1992, 298, note 84)

Based on this understanding of civil religion and civil theology, Davis explains his understanding of Japan theory as a secularization of civil religion. He notices that “many of the values and self-images of prewar Japan continue to flourish in the Japan theories of the postwar period,” pointing at “consensus, unity, harmony, paternalism (or hierarchy), asceticism, loyalty, flexibility, efficiency, and so on” among such values and self-images (Davis 1992, 269). These elements of Japanese values were, in his view, contained in the civil religion of prewar Japan:

In the civil religion of prewar Japan these values were securely grafted into the emperor system and the Way of the Warrior (bushidō), and were therefore suf-
fused with the religious and patriotic emotionalism of that period of history. With the defeat of Japan in 1945, this civil religion was radically secularized. (Davis 1992, 269)

Now on this point again, Japanese civil religion, especially that of the prewar period, is characterized as something related to the imperial system. Since Davis does not mention Shinto here but bushidō, it will be necessary to ask what bushidō really was in history, and what the relationship was among the imperial system, bushidō, and Shinto. Davis holds the idea that prewar civil religion was secularized after the war. In his view, in the course of this secularization, “[m]any of the functions of the civil religion of pre-1945 Japan—the generation of national purpose, symbolic self-defense, value-consensus, and so on—are now being assumed by the symbols, values, and imagery produced by the literature of Japan theory” (Davis 1992, 269).

Although he suggests a possibility that Japan theory might give birth to a new civil religion after the secularization of the prewar civil religion, “because secularization itself is not inevitably a one-way or irreversible process” (Davis 1992, 270), the basic idea of Japanese civil religion in Davis’s argument is that with this secularization the values of the prewar civil religion have been succeeded by postwar Japan theory.

More recently, Atsuko Ichijo (2009) mentions civil religion in Japan with a special reference to State Shinto from the perspective of nationalism studies. As a specialist in nationalism, Ichijo discusses nationalism in the modern Japanese case, especially in the period between 1868 and 1945, but here I mainly focus on her argument on civil religion, which is actually dealt with in a short concluding part of her chapter. Before jumping to this, it is necessary to get an idea of her understanding of State Shinto. State Shinto is, in her view, characterized as a modern invention or fabrication constructed by the emerging state of Japan through “manipulating religion, customs and traditions for the purpose of state- and nation-building” (Ichijo 2009, 125). She points out monotheistic features in this State Shinto on the understanding that nationalism as a modern phenomenon tends to take a form of political monotheism, suggesting that modernity is built on the Judeo-Christian traditions (Ichijo 2009, 129). Referring to earlier discussions on State Shinto as a civil religion brought up by Bellah and Cristi, the latter treating State Shinto as “civil religion à la Rousseau,” (Cristi 2001, 142) Ichijo pays attention to the relations among civil religion, political religion, and nationalism. According to Ichijo, State Shinto can be regarded as a Rousseauan version of civil

2. Ichijo uses macrons with “Shintō” and “State Shintō” in her chapter, but here I only use “Shinto” and “State Shinto,” even when citing her.

3. Cristi devotes one book to a discussion on civil religion and political religion, but her arguments cannot be discussed in detail in this article. See Cristi 2001.
religion, a political religion, and nationalism at the same time (Ichijo 2009, 134). Then, in the closing part of her chapter, Ichijo leaves the following question:

The interesting area of enquiry would then be whether there was any sign of the emergence of a “civil religion à la Durkheim” in Japan of the same period, and if so, what is its relationship with State Shintō and nationalism in general. In this way, the utility of the concept of civil religion outside the United States could be tested. Also, this would be an endeavour to shift the focus of enquiry from the state-dominated level to the more “popular,” “lay” level, the area that is often neglected in many sociological studies. (Ichijo 2009, 134)

These four authors—Bellah, Takayama, Davis, and Ichijo—focusing on the Japanese case, would all agree that the prewar sociocultural regime of Japan, crystallized in a political-religious complex comprising the imperial system and Shinto (or bushidō), can be regarded as “civil religion.” Cristi and Dawson would join in this arena, suggesting some differentiation of the terminology, whereas Robertson would call it “political religion” rather than “civil religion.” Bellah, Takayama, and Davis would also agree that the values of the prewar civil religion have continued until today, either under the revitalization as discussed by Takayama, or under another form of Japan theory as argued by Davis.

Here we see a couple of issues emerge. Theoretically, is the concept of civil religion useful enough for scholars of religion to discuss the prewar Japanese regime? Or is a more nuanced argument about the conceptualization to differentiate civil religion and political religion, or a Rouseauan civil religion and a Durkheimian civil religion, necessary in such a discussion? Has it been convincingly proved that the prewar values of that political-religious complex have remained until today under some form or another? Parsons pointed out another subject—the remembrance and commemoration of the war dead on a massive scale, which is specifically a new element that has appeared only in the postwar years. Can this subject be satisfactorily situated in these arguments mentioned above? This article will not tackle these issues head on, but will present other arguments to reflect on, namely, the arguments presented in Japan, which I will turn to in the next section.

Arguments in Japan on Japanese Civil Religion and Related Concepts

Almost independently of these arguments discussed above, Yonehara Ken takes up the subject of modern Japanese national identity, referring to both civil religion in Rousseau and a national entity (or national polity, kokutai) in modern Japan. In Yonehara’s understanding, the theory of a Japanese national entity can be regarded as a civil religion. He explains:

The theory of a national entity is a product of the acute apprehension that the crisis of being colonized might fall on Japan. Taking the dual challenges of
modernizing the nation and of keeping national independence, Japan created one kind of civil religion, that is, the theory of a national entity. A number of thinkers, including Fukuzawa Yukichi, sought the foundation of a national identity in Shinto and the unilinearity of the imperial lineage, attempting to base the core of the national entity there. Civil religion is, however, a fiction constructed arbitrarily after all, and cannot but turn out to be defective.

(Yonehara 2002, 5–6; author’s translation)

In Yonehara’s understanding of Rousseau’s civil religion, in modern nation states where the secularity of the state needs a tool to sanctify the state itself, as such a tool civil religion should not be too universal in its teachings, so that loyalty to the state may not become weaker. On the other hand, it should not be too particular in its teachings so that loyalty to the state may not become exclusive and oppressive (Yonehara 2002, 14). Applying this understanding to modern Japan, Yonehara traces the arguments of national entity held by intellectuals from the Meiji through early Showa periods.

If I focus more on his argument of civil religion than on national entity, one critical thinker, active in the late Meiji through the early Showa eras, deserves special attention. According to Yonehara, Christian thinker Kinoshita Naoe’s (1869–1937) criticism of the theory of a national entity is quite severe. Kinoshita attacked such ideas as a model of the (Japanese) state conceived as a family with the imperial household at the core, and the related religion of ancestor worship, both contained in national entity theory. In this national entity theory, in Kinoshita’s argument, the emperor is accepted by the nation not only politically and legally, but also morally and religiously, and Kinoshita insisted that the religious image of the emperor, and “the national religion,” in Kinoshita’s words, should be analyzed critically (Yonehara 2002, 33–34, 44–45). Kinoshita was also critical of some Christian churches in Japan at the time because of their compromise with the national entity ideology (Yonehara 2002, 45).

Yonehara’s conclusion is that as a civil religion of modern Japan, national entity theory did not function successfully and it became a principle of exclusion and oppression. He is not interested in delving into academic conceptualization, but his suggestion that national entity theory be reviewed from the perspective of civil religion theory would stimulate further reflection. The relations among the imperial system, the national entity, and Shinto will also be a focus of further study.

More recently, Michael Pye and Kiba Akeshi had a brief discussion on civil religion in Japan at a symposium held in Japan. Pye tries to situate civil religion in contemporary Japan in a context between “primal religion” and “spiritual culture” (Pye 2009, 29–30). Critically referring to the earlier definitions of civil

4. Since Pye’s chapter does not contain a name of a translator, he may have prepared his chapter in Japanese; English translations are therefore my own, based on Pye’s discussion in Japanese.
religion by Robert Bellah and Robert Nisbet, Pye himself presents his definition of civil religion as “a system of symbolic ideas and ceremonial actions generally considered to be obligatory, by which the developed social life entailing a variety of institutions is sustained and promoted” (Pye 2009, 33). According to Pye, civil religion is situated in relation to religious groups and public institutions. “Civil religion has vague relations with religious groups or traditions that support or sometimes criticize civil religion” (Pye 2009, 33).

Pye categorizes consciousness of place (for example, the Japanese archipelago felt as something sacred), consciousness of time (for example, seasonal ceremonies annually celebrated), festivals in society (beyond the framework of Shinto), and rituals in the course of lifetime and rituals for the dead as the elements of civil religion in contemporary Japan (Pye 2009, 36–37). These categories look similar to those in primal religion, but he notes that civil religion lacks this-worldly soteriology that would meet an individuals’ needs.

In reaction to Pye’s argument as well as to another presented at the symposium, Kiba comments on several points. In Kiba’s understanding, civil religion can be understood as transcendental or religious ideas that justify the formation process of a modern nation state, or the idea of the history of such a state. On this point, civil religion functions as a supplier of normative foundations in the modern public sphere that is generally removing interference from religious values (Kiba 2009, 48). Thus said, Pye’s argument about civil religion, that it is excessively dependent on the categories deriving from primal religion, seems doubtful. From Kiba’s historical standpoint, an ahistorical projection of the modern concept of civil religion onto a premodern era must be avoided (Kiba 2009, 48). In a word, Japanese civil religion can be understood as ethical and moral values comprising of diligence, frugality, and filial piety that originated from popular thoughts and Buddhist traditions but was appropriated for the purposes of national unification (Kiba 2009, 48–49). Kiba thinks, however, that these kinds of values have broken down in postwar Japanese society.

These arguments developed in Japan have added a few points to the discussions on civil religion on Japan accumulated abroad. The theory of a national entity, as argued by Yonehara, naturally seems to have some relationship with the postwar arguments of Japan theories—the question is how we should relate one with the other. Pye, on the other hand, has presented his own view of civil religion as much closer to primal religion, although Kiba is very critical of it. In Kiba’s understanding, modern Japanese civil religion also seems to be closer to the traditional value system that was, in his view, appropriated by the nation. Here it seems necessary to ask how civil religion can be located in the multilayered stratification of value systems, from basic and traditional popular thought, to nationalist and ideological political thought in modern Japan. The elements
of civil religion are one object of inquiry, and we now understand that the position of civil religion in relation to other value systems is another.

Concluding Remarks

The arguments thus far have covered some breadth of the discussion on civil religion in Japan, but there are still other areas that I have not touched on. Here I will only briefly mention an argument by another Japanese scholar.

Tsushiro Hirofumi is a religious studies scholar who introduced José Casanova’s argument on “public religion” into the Japanese academic circle as the Japanese translator of Casanova’s Public Religion in the Modern World (Casanova 1994). Although he is Casanova’s translator, Tsushiro does not exclude other scholars in his own discussion on “public religion” (Tsushiro 2005). These other scholars include specialists in US religious history such as John F. Wilson. However, Tsushiro seems to have skipped theoretical arguments as to how to connect the discussion—particularly surrounding modern Christianity either in the cases of Casanova, Wilson, or others—with his own discussion on the Japanese cases. Without apparently paying attention to this theoretical gap, he then proceeds to systematize his own understanding on “public religion” in the Japanese context, briefly referring to such related concepts as “national religion” and “civil religion.”

“National religion” in Tsushiro’s usage is considered to be a sub-category of public religion. In the description of the modern Japanese case, he seems to have avoided the concept of civil religion intentionally. Even though the concept of civil religion is absent here, another issue is already present. We should ask here what the relations are among public religion, national religion, and possibly political religion already mentioned above.

After reviewing the discussion on civil religion, and particularly the Japanese situation, the following are some concluding thoughts. First, when we argue a concrete case, the question of whether a specific concept—“civil religion,” “political religion,” “public religion,” “national religion”—is applicable or not is, in my view, not a good question. As long as arguments have been accumulated by referring to some abstract concept, a historical or social phenomenon argued under that concept must have some common features with a different historical or social situation. Thus this application will make a comparison possible between two or more phenomena, promoting further consideration and hopefully leading to renewed understanding of those phenomena under consideration.

In our case, if we think about a possible “civil religion” in Japan, this has stimulated us to think about commonalities and differences between American civil religion, which was originally discussed under this concept, and Japanese civil religion, if any. This kind of comparative research will at least, in turn, contextualize both the American case and the Japanese case, and possibly shed light on
any specific features in each case. This should make it possible to rethink American civil religion under a renewed understanding of civil religion in general.

Second, and more specifically in the case of Japan, we have witnessed scholarly interest in the prewar Japanese religio-political regime that is comprised of the imperial system and Shinto, among others, at the core. This is also related to the accumulated arguments about so-called State Shinto, which I have not delved into in this article. With the understanding of the scholarly discussion of civil religion, we should consider this issue further; see Okuyama 2011.

Finally, regarding the postwar situation in Japan, a number of scholars have some interest in finding continuity or a reappearance of values from the prewar regime. What has remained or reappeared from prewar Japan in contemporary Japanese culture and society, and how it has happened? It is important for us to keep asking these questions.

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This study was conducted by the Religious Information Research Center (RIRC) and its associated researchers who collected approximately six hundred books, four hundred video tapes, and one thousand audio tapes of and on Aum Shinrikyō. The aim was to analyze 1. the information strategy of Aum for advocating and soliciting members among the general public in Japan; 2. the vulnerability of the Japanese mass media that fell into the trap set by Aum; and 3. intellectuals and academics who were unable to play a critical role with regard to controversial religions.

Due to the limitations of space, I cannot introduce each chapter (there is a total of twenty-one chapters). Instead I will review the current research on Aum and evaluate this study, then introduce the main findings concerning the change in Aum’s dogma and its religious activities (including the manipulation of the mass media and religious scholars), and finally consider the question of research and the methodology in religious studies after Aum.

**Data Availability and Accurate Analysis of the Aum Affair**

Many of the books on the background in which Aum carried out its violence have been published in Japan, but most of their analyses were based on secondary information in newspapers and/or magazines, and this is somewhat unavoidable. Given the nature of the Aum incident, there is little or no opportunity for a critic or researcher to have direct access to an original source. Nevertheless, a precise reading of the trial decisions on the Tokyo subway system attack by sarin nerve gas is required.

The directive order system of a founder/executive and disciple/general believer is clarified by the statements, memos, and so forth of people who are responsible for the crimes. Nevertheless, recently in journalism a theory of “interaction of
founder-and-disciple” (Mori 2011) has become influential. We also find academic arguments that search for the origin of violence in “the history of the philosophy of Aum” (Ōta 2011). Of course it is necessary to reflect upon the Aum incident from various angles, and these bold academic arguments also provide some words to the wise, but I am still rather concerned about current works that are not always based on exact data.

In order to discuss Aum, a precise analysis of the relevant data is required. Concerning matters in direct connection with the incidents of violence, prosecutors have most likely collected nearly all the relevant data. However, concerning matters that are not related to the prosecutions, the active believers, defectors, supporters of the believers or defectors (such as counselors and civil rights activists), or specialists who submit specialist testimony and/or a written opinion to the lawyers regarding the trials—know many things that have yet to be revealed. And in the case of a large-scale criminal case such as this, not only Asahara Shōkō but also a number of those concerned have bolted their mouths shut. Even if we collected their testimony, the tendency to interpret the whole through the partial would be unavoidable. Therefore, caution is needed when dealing with their retrospective and interpretative stories and opinions.

The external researcher should be conscious of limitations when exploring the Aum incident and the group itself so that they can obtain accurate data and consider the issue deeply, and here lies the value of this book. Resisting the temptation to draw a whole, complete image of Aum, the authors have restricted their arguments to that based on solid data.

**Changes in Dogma and the Activities of Aum**

In the “Introduction,” Inoue (as the editor) outlines the formation of Aum until and after the sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system on 20 March 1995. The group has now changed their name from Aum to Aleph, and it then further split into two sects, Aleph and Hikari no Wa (“Circle of Rainbow Light”). Next, the violent nature of the founder Asahara and the relation to occultism are described by Fujita Shōichi, who is known as a specialist on cult problems. The analysis from the “Preface” and Part 1 in this book corresponds closely to that of Ian Reader (2002, 193–99).

By the time Aum appeared as a candidate in the general election of 1990, and in the media from 1989 to 1991, they had had a number of strong confrontations with citizens as well as municipalities. The criminality of Asahara, who committed the crime of inflicting injury, and the violation of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law, was remarkable. His devotion to Tibetan Buddhism and the occult amplified and the group changed its original vision from “Shambala paradise” to “Armageddon.” Furthermore, in order to strengthen believers’ commitment to Aum, he enforced guru worship and forced members to renounce their property. In order to strengthen internal control, he ordered his disciples to lynch defectors to death and brutally
attack citizens, simultaneously producing his unique teaching that justified homicide as “relief” (powā). Asahara in this way continued holding the group’s power to the last through religious group management. His disciples were given the role of propagating his charisma and supernatural powers among members, as well as to the general public through various media.

Asahara won the hearts of his disciples, and they competed to demonstrate their loyalty to him, and compiled his teachings into the canon of Aum. He directed what his disciples should do, and a practical faith was systematically produced through such teachings. As for outside-oriented publications, Aum published a bricolage of world religions, occultism, and disciples’ religious experiences in which they claimed they achieved Kundalini awakening. On the other hand, teachings such as vajrayāna and mahamudra were explained in the textbooks for insiders.

There are probably various ways to bring out the commitment and affection of believers in a religious group. Aum demanded perfect allegiance from its disciples. Although the accomplishment of the deliverance originates in Tibetan Buddhism, after Aum was defeated in the 1990 general election the axis of teaching shifted to conspiracy theories such as mind control by the mass media and world rule by the Freemasons. Of course, the ideas of occultism, conspiracy theories, eschatology/millennialism, or good-and-evil dualism are not necessarily the only origins of violence. Not a few religious groups have such world and historical views. If religious groups deceptively perform soliciting and financing, their illegal actions are limited to fraud and to forcing civilians to convert to the group using scare tactics. There have also been accidental cases in which a religious person committed a violent murder in the course of religious training, or another refused medication and practiced a false scientific operation that resulted in a patient’s death. There had been no religion, however, that aimed at the intentional and habitual homicide of members of the general public. Where do we find the difference between Aum and other religious groups? This question is the key to explaining the violent nature of Aum.

Prosecutors think that the Aum violence was the result of personal characteristics such as the malice of Asahara, the loyalty and ambition of high ranking disciples, and the mindlessness of rank and file disciples. On the other hand, some critics think that the believers were brainwashed to become homicidal in this cult. How should researchers of religion respond? Unfortunately this book does not necessarily develop its argument on this point.

However, there are hints suggested in some chapters. One concerns the time of the formation of the group and the believers’ sense of urgency. There was a marked increase in the number of believers, and the initial yoga circle, which was an audience and/or client cult, was organized into a religious movement between 1988 and 1993. A hasty and easy authoritarian systematization of the group, compiling texts of Asahara’s teachings that changed from deliverance or realization of a kingdom to the fight over intrigue, progressed in haste. Moreover, Asahara searched for spies and murdered several disloyal and defecting disciples. His actions gave believers a
sense of crisis, as if they faced repression. This changed the thinking and behavioral patterns of believers from that of peace, to wartime readiness, and they internalized the ideology that they could not avoid killing people in order to save them. The same remark was made by LIFTON (1999). Since there are many articles that relate religion to violence and *jihad* to holy war, I would like to refrain from commenting on this point further.

What we should consider still more is the state of the society that allowed the homicide or militarization of Aum at that time. Part II scrutinizes the state of the criminal investigations in the case of the lawyer Sakamoto Tsutsumi in 1989, the sarin-spraying incidents of 1993 and 1994, and the state of the mass media and intellectuals. Discussed here is the cultural structure of Japan that allowed Aum to manipulate the media.

**Strategy and Management**

The years from 1989 to around 1992 was a time when Aum was evaluated in the mass media. Some TV programs caricatured Aum, but Asahara demonstrated his gift of the gab and intervened in the arrangement of those programs. Measures against intellectuals also took effect so that some intellectuals held colloquia with Asahara and wrote favorably about Aum both in general journals and in Aum publications. Aum was conspicuous among the so-called “new new religions” that fascinated the general public with their magical powers and merit-making. Such people might now regret why a more prudent judgment was not made. I feel some remorse for Shimada Hiromi, who resigned his professorship after the criticism against him in his college regarding suspicion of his relation to Aum. This situation exposes the limitations of religious studies scholars who only discuss abstractly, in contrast with journalists and lawyers who approached the problems directly with those concerned.

When Asahara gave a lecture at Hokkaido University in 1992, which I attended, I felt some dubiousness toward him, but I knew nothing about the actual conditions of Aum until 1995. Since a religious group could affect religious policy through strong political connections, it is necessary to elaborate on how the group acted towards the media and politics. In many cases, religion and politics leave no record as to their possible relations, so this is difficult to investigate. However, this book reports an example in Russia based on an analysis of documentary data.

Meanwhile, Mori Tatsuya reported on the Aum situation with self-acclaim through a series of documentary films, *A* and *A2*, and the book *A3*, keeping his distance from the huge anti-Aum atmosphere and the cult bashing in the media. He has so far expressed an original viewpoint, and he is as congenial as some newspapers, magazines, and lawyers who assert freedom of religion in principle. However, it has been pointed out by the Aum Shinrikyō Family Association and others that the editing process of the above-mentioned documentaries poses many problems.
In 2011 all of the Aum trials were completed, and capital punishment for thirteen of the accused, and life imprisonment for five, was handed down. How much difference was there between Asahara and the actual executants and the other disciples who were not involved in the incidents? What is the difference between the death-row inmates and the believers who still keep their faith in Aum (currently Aleph and the Circle of the Rainbow Light)? Opinions differ as to whether we can see any qualitative or quantitative difference in connection with the probability of violence between those criminals and current believers. One opinion finds potential danger in the religious groups, and supports the surveillance and dismissal of the group. The other respects believers’ freedom of religious activity as a fundamental human right. In the book under review, each author seems to reserve judgment on this point. Since this book discusses the backgrounds in which Aum committed crimes, readers would expect a certain viewpoint on this issue.

Conflicts between Aum followers and citizens over the residential rights for the former and the rights of security for a community has continued, and since the number of individuals and organizations who sponsor Aum has been few, Aum has faced financial difficulty. However, they can afford to manage their religious organization by the income from the wages that live-in followers earn, and from the donation of lay followers, in addition to businesses that they own. The head of their Tokyo branch was arrested in 2004 on a charge of the unauthorized sale of an ointment called Tōgen (“paradise”) containing steroids for patients with skin problems. Some believers offered testimonies on the group’s homepage of having been cured. Recently, each branch solicits young people who are interested in yoga and health issues without disclosing their real name and purpose of recruiting. Aum continues such practices in business and recruitment, hence we can naturally assume that Aum tends to play a double-sided game. This is in the same vein as when Aum sold their religious goods in their antenna shop in the front, and managed a telephone sex club in the back.

Although some disciples still remain in the group, worshiping Asahara even after they arouse suspicion against the state of Aum, others have defected. Some defectors have left Aum with depression, and others have conducted collective defection and established a new sect because of frustration with the present Asahara-oriented organization. One example is the Circle of Rainbow Light that Jōyū Fumihiro is guiding.

Scientific Contributions and Unsolved Problems

Three general comments can be made concerning the accomplishments of this book. First, in his capacity as editor, Inoue Nobutaka and his group have compiled into a database the data of Aum publications, as well as the textbooks of the group, and images and voice data both inside and outside of Aum. He also organized a group of young researchers who arranged and analyzed religious information so
that each author could conduct comprehensive research on Aum’s teachings, activities, and organizational structure.

Second, they extended their analyses of teaching not only to the Aum canon but to miscellaneous texts such as images, music, and additional textbooks. In so doing, they have deepened consideration about the way and the extent as to how believers internalized the teachings. As a result, it can be seen that extreme occultist thinking and conspiracy theories were seething under their religious exterior.

Third, it was clarified that when there is a degree of laxity among the specialists and mass media who evaluate religious activities, the difference between the virtual and real image becomes vague in our information society, and social responses to problematic religions tend to lag.

I have tried to make some evaluations regarding the Aum problem that this book discusses, but a number of questions have not been answered about Aum. One concerns the psychological mechanisms that enabled believers to fall in thorough obedience to the founder, and made them attack society violently and without hesitation. If we consider that it was the result of brainwashing and/or mind control, this explanation takes the concepts and logic of psychology, but not of religious studies. How can we explain mystical experiences and the desensitizing of consciousness that make a believer susceptible to religious authority? What are the common features of mental conditions and actions in the brutal homicide and indiscriminate terrorism of Aum and the United Red Army incidents in the early 1970s, and what features are unique to a religion? In order to consider such questions based on a believer’s experience, we should accumulate various and polyphonic accounts of believers as well as defectors, both of whom have unique religious experiences.

Another problem is the fashion of the New Age, the so-called “spiritual world boom” around the 1990s, when Aum was active, that is related to the second “spirituality boom” at the beginning of the century, when TV psychics, fortunetellers, and various therapists attracted the attention of Japanese people. Can we consider these two kinds of spirituality-oriented periods within the same trend that probably includes occultism and conspiracy theories?

Although Aum seemed to reject the secular world, it overtly filed lawsuits against opponents, simultaneously exploiting the renouncers’ property and dealing in fraudulent business practices, which was parasitical. The believers were fascinated with Asahara’s charisma and his conspiracy theories. Also, in the present age the charismatic attitude and a viewpoint of dualism are influential weapons in the mass media, and these attract the public. Political and opinion leaders illustrate the good or evil in a complex society by asserting justice through striking at wrongdoing. Although it is said that an information society promotes the pluralistic nature of information, it actually tends to converge homogeneous statements and radicalize them. What kind of difference is there in the “information age” before the Aum incident, and that after the incident?
Practically speaking, what kind of differences do the Aum followers at the time of the incident and the present Aum followers have? After the incident, new members face social obstacles that make them hesitate to join Aum because it has been under surveillance by the Public Security Investigation Agency. Moreover they can easily get information on Aum’s problems through the internet. However, approximately half of the current twelve hundred believers, students, and members of the younger generation are said to have joined Aum after the incident. Why do young people jump so easily over such hurdles? When I talked with Aum members, they said, “Those who caused problems have been arrested. The current members have no connection to the crimes…. Even when there are moral obligations to the victims and the bereaved families of the incident, the hardship for victims and families is a matter of their karma.” As religious studies researchers and/or as those involved in higher education, what should we think of their replies, and how should we deal with them? Such problems remain, and I urge younger researchers to continue such research in order to answer the above-mentioned questions.

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The central issue that the author, Inaba Keishin, is trying to address in his book *Ritashugi to Shūkyō* is whether in this highly materialistic modern world—where human relationships have become desolate and self-centered, and the pursuit of wealth and happiness for oneself is the prime concern—religion can nurture altruism in the hearts of people and motivate them to care and serve others, especially those in need of help. Written at the time of the massive devastation caused by the earthquake and tsunami that hit the Tohoku region of Japan on 11 March 2011, the author draws inspiration from the fact that a large number of religious organizations, faith-based voluntary groups, and people affiliated with various religions of Japan rushed to the affected areas to carry out relief activities. Even local religious institutions in the devastated areas, such as Shinto shrines, Buddhist temples, churches, and centers of new religious organizations opened their doors to people of all faiths and served as temporary evacuation centers; and people of faith, such as priests and monks, despite losing their own homes and religious buildings, were involved in providing shelter and solace to other survivors.

Altruism, as defined by the author, is an action carried out not for one’s own benefit, but rather for the benefit of others (41). Inaba’s main assertion in this book is that religion can make people incline towards altruistic actions such as volunteering and participation in charitable activities, and this can generate social capital, which can be harnessed for the common good and for the betterment of society. In order to highlight what motivates religious people to work for the benefit of others, he uses ethnographic data from his earlier study of religious altruism among the members of two new religious organizations in England. From 1997 to 2000, Inaba, through participatory observation, studied two new religious movements, the Jesus Army (JA) and the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order (FWBO). (This study is the
subject of an earlier book by the author titled *Altruism in New Religious Movements: The Jesus Army and the Friends of the Western Buddhist Order in Britain*, University Education Press, 2004.) Both of these religious groups emphasize community living and involvement in social welfare activities. The members of these new religious movements were actively involved in charitable activities such as providing food to the homeless, supporting drug addicts or alcoholics, and so on, which the author asserts could be traced to various factors related to their religious affiliation, such as the soteriology of these religious groups and the social application of its teachings; rational choice theory (for example, helping others to seek the blessing of the god[s]); the process of socialization of the members of the religious groups; the presence of a role model in the religious organization who inspired them to work for the benefit of others; and a sense of communitarianism and empathy for others that was inculcated in them as a result of living together in a community.

Although Inaba begins by discussing the altruistic actions of Japanese religious people and organizations, particularly in the aftermath of the 11 March earthquake, he has relied on non-Japanese ethnographic data to highlight the religious and social conditions that could influence the altruistic motivations and actions of religious people. One cannot deny the significance of this study as it gives valuable empirical data for analyzing possible correlations between religious affiliation and the motivation for altruism, particularly in Western capitalistic societies. However, one would hesitate to extend the results of this study to arrive at an understanding of the interrelationship between religion and altruism in the context of Japan. The altruistic behavior of the members of the two new religious organizations in England surveyed by Inaba was derived from their experiences of monastic-style community living in a modern Western society. In Japan, the new religious movements that are actively involved in social activities are characterized by *zaikeshugi* or layism—in other words, they emphasize familial relations and the fulfillment of social obligations towards one’s own family before engaging in social actions for the benefit of others. Hence, any understanding of altruism in the case of Japanese religions should be based on a case study of new religious organizations in Japan. The active participation of Japanese new religions in post-disaster relief and rehabilitation activities could provide vital empirical data for analyzing the role of these religions in nurturing altruism and generating social capital in Japan. Inaba and other scholars of religious studies in Japan are already engaging in such projects, and their study will give new insights on the role of religion in creating a culture of altruism in a non-Western context.

This book uses the theories of altruism and social capital as developed by scholars such as Robert Wuthnow, James Coleman, Ram Cnaan, and others. Their theories have focused on the role of church and faith-based organizations in mobilizing people and resources for contributing to the common good. How can these theories explain religious altruism or faith-based social activism in a society such as Japan, where strong church-like religious institutions do not exist and, moreover, most
people regard themselves as mushūkyō, or “non-religious”? In this regard, Inaba makes an important observation that in the case of Japanese people, their zeal for volunteerism is not inspired by neo-liberal ideologies as in Western societies. Rather, he claims, its roots can be traced to the “unconsciousness religiosity of the Japanese people.” That is, rather than conscious faith in a religion becoming the source of inspiration for altruistic action, it is the indigenous cultural values and spirituality of the Japanese people such as omoiyari or concern for others, reciprocity, gratitude, and/or the emphasis on wa or harmony that motivates them to act for the benefit of others. However, this raises a question: What constitutes religious altruism and how do we distinguish faith-based altruism from humanism-inspired altruism or the values of caring and service that people inculcate as members of society? Hence, as stated above, further research is required to identify the religious roots of altruism in Japan.

Besides, analyzing religious altruism as a motivational aspect of the members of religious organizations, the author—in order to highlight the factors that make it conducive for religious organizations to contribute towards the common good—compares the social, cultural, and legal conditions of various countries such as England, France, and the USA that have a high level of civic participation by religious organizations. Inaba asserts that the increasing pluralism, multiculturalism, and globalization of our societies will further enhance the social outreach of religious organizations. Inaba sees the future of altruism in networking among those who are engaged in altruistic practices, in other words, the human relations that develop from helping and caring for others. He sees this kind of network of altruism as a panacea for Japan’s social problems, particularly for the lack of empathy or interconnectedness among people, a social malice of Japanese society termed muen shakai (“unconnected society”).

The attitude of the Japanese media and the public perception of religious organizations in Japan has been largely negative. Even after the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake of 1995, various religious organizations in Japan were involved in post-disaster relief. However, the media ignored these contributions by religious organizations and the organizations themselves were also hesitant to publicize their social work, as they feared that the media and the public might view their activities as propaganda. However, in the last two decades, and particularly after the 1995 earthquake, there has been a proliferation of faith-based organizations and religious NGOs in Japan that are involved in various social welfare activities within Japan and abroad. Unlike the 1995 disaster relief, after the Tohoku earthquake of 2011, religious organizations were upfront about their involvement in relief activities and through their websites forthrightly informed the public about the kinds of activities in which they were involved, which indicates the maturity and confidence that the religious organizations have gained over the years regarding their participation in social activities. A few days after the Tohoku earthquake, the author himself had set up a website called the “Faith Based Network for Earthquake Relief in Japan.” The purpose of this web-
site was to support religious organizations involved in relief and rescue operations by facilitating an exchange of information among them.

Hence, Inaba is optimistic about the future prospects of social engagement by religious organizations in Japan. He also sees the social conditions in Japan—declining birthrate, unemployment, an aging society, and demands for social welfare services—as preparing the ground for religious organizations to play a larger role in civil society. In fact, through this book, Inaba is trying to impress upon academics and the public the need to appreciate the role of religion in harnessing social capital that can be used to address the various social problems of Japanese society. This book, however, while emphasizing the contributions that religion can make towards the common good, does not adequately address larger issues concerning the role of religion in the public sphere, such as the problem of secularism, the relationship between the state, civil society, and religion, and how to evaluate the civic participation of religious organizations and the goods and services that they deliver.

In recent years, the social engagement of religious organizations has drawn considerable academic attention in Japan. There has been a proliferation of publications on Engaged Buddhism (Ama 2003; Ueda 2004; Mukhopadhyaya 2005), social welfare activities, and other forms of social activism (Ikeda et al. 1999; Inaba and Sakurai 2009) by religions in Japan. This book belongs to this genre of academic literature. While the majority of works on the social engagement of religious organizations have focused either on the activities of religious organizations or on that of a religious leader, Inaba’s work gives a new perspective as it uses the concept of altruism to analyze religious motivation for participation in social activities at the level of individual believers. This book will be an important contribution to this emerging field of research in the religious studies of Japan.

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