Keta Masako

Foreword

On behalf of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies, I am pleased to present the third issue of *Religious Studies in Japan.*

Religious studies seems to be entering a new stage on several fronts. Perhaps the main issue facing scholars is that fundamental terms of the discipline are losing their potency. Concepts used to explain religious phenomena are no longer sufficient to explain the realities or tendencies of contemporary religions. It is not just that scholars are greatly divided in their opinion of what the term *religion* means; reaching consensus on anything from a variety of social settings has become difficult in the extreme.

A principal cause of the problem with applying the received framework of ideas is, of course, the dynamic transformations taking place in the way religions function in contemporary society. Advances in globalization and information technology have greatly affected our relationships with religion, and the rapid pace at which society today is moving has enormously complicated the continuity of traditional religions. We might also point to the fact that theories and methodologies that were developed within the European academic traditions to explain these changes do not necessarily fit the situation of religion in non-European societies. All of this reminds us again of how the achievements of religious studies are affected by historical, regional, and cultural conditions. That is not all. If indeed we admit that the formation of religious studies was a result of the attempt to categorize a wide variety of phenomena around the world by

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using the concept "religion," and that these phenomena were objectified based on this concept through a modern rationality, then the very foundation of our religious studies research is being challenged.

That said, these challenges can also be understood to mean that the research of phenomena called "religion" reflects the contours of knowledge and the current status of our modern world. From here on in, the study of religions must be done from the perspective of various methodologies, and reflect the plurality of phenomena in various localities. The Japanese Association for Religious Studies includes many specialists doing research in numerous fields: comparative study of religions, sociology of religion, psychology of religion, anthropology of religion, philosophy of religion, theology, and so forth. Our hope is that *Religious Studies in Japan* will serve to make the results of religious research in Japan better known around the world.

Keta Masako
Kyoto, December 2015

Satō Hiroo

Vengeful Spirits, Divine Punishment, and Natural Disasters

Catastrophe and Religion in Japan

Without scientific knowledge, the people of premodern societies in Japan tried to understand natural disasters through their association with transcendent beings (kami). In ancient Japan, natural disasters were interpreted as messages, that is, vengeful curses, from the kami. With the establishment of a systematic cosmology during the middle ages, the causes of catastrophes were explained in terms of the law of cause and effect according to which punishment and salvation were delivered by the kami. With the onset of the early modern period, the sense of reality inherent in the perceptions of fundamental beings declined, and the salvation of the dead could no longer be entrusted to the other-worldly kami. People then came to terms with catastrophes as natural disasters that must be faced. Rituals and customs, carried out over long periods, were put in place to raise the dead to the status of ancestral spirits. In addition to a shift from the traditional world in which kami, the living, and the dead coexisted, to a shutting out of the latter group, the process of "modernization" brought with it a restructuring of society around the exclusive rights and interests of human beings. The Great East Japan Earthquake has been an opportunity to reconsider the path ahead, and to reconsider responses to catastrophe which display the modern tendency to focus on the concerns of the living to the exclusion of those of the dead.

KEYWORDS: natural disasters—catastrophe—vengeance—the Great East Japan Earthquake—modernization

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On 11 March 2011 an extensive area stretching from the Kanto to the Tohoku regions was struck by a strong earthquake. This was the Great East Japan Earthquake. Within minutes, an enormous tsunami, frequently described as "unprecedented" and that came on the heels of intense tremors, took the lives of close to twenty thousand people. This natural disaster has had a great impact on the Japanese people in various ways, but particularly important among these is the fact that it made modern Japanese once more aware of the closeness of death.

There cannot be too many people living in the disaster zone who do not have relatives or friends affected by the catastrophe, including myself. Many, having barely escaped themselves, had to witness the horrific sight of seeing people they knew being swallowed by the waves. A majority of Japanese saw the images of people, cars, and houses swept away by the tsunami in the media. Many witnessed death from close up.

It goes without saying that death is a reality for everyone. There is no exception. It is not only us who are branded with the fate of death. For one person to live, the death of many living beings is unavoidable. Humans carry with them the shadows of uncounted deaths and are themselves fated to incessantly march towards the final destination of death.

However, is there actually any opportunity in modern Japan to realize this state of affairs? In their everyday lives, most people rarely have to see somebody who is dying. It is almost inconceivable to see the emaciated figure of a corpse. It is also difficult to imagine the forms of once living cows, pigs, or chickens based on the dismembered and packaged meat filling supermarket shelves. Death, wrapped tightly in a shroud and scrupulously hidden from view, is removed from everyday life. Even to announce aloud that everyone has to die is regarded as taboo. As if one could escape death by simply not talking about it, contemporary Japanese have lowered their voices and averted their gaze from death.

It is because contemporary society has taken this form that the Great East Japan Earthquake, which made us aware of the reality of death, could strike such strong disquiet into our hearts and minds.

Disaster as Fate

With one stroke, the disaster of 11 March unleashed the questions surrounding death, which had been sealed up for so long by people in modern Japan. Whether people were directly affected by the disaster or exposed to images of it, all were overwhelmed by that horrifying black wave surging forward and swallowing everything in its path. Through this event, we learned the hard way that however one tries to avoid it, it is impossible to escape an undeserved death.

I was on my way to the Shinkansen station in Sendai when the disaster struck. If I had chosen a plane for transportation, I would have been hit by the tsunami on a road close to the airport, in a parking lot, or inside the airport terminal. A slight coincidence or whim would have changed my life. It must have been the same for other people as well.

The disaster of 2011 cost the lives of many who carried no personal responsibility for the catastrophe, but this was not the first time the Japanese people have experienced wanton mass death. We had already experienced the Great Hanshin Earthquake of 1995, and if we go back even further, to the first half of the twentieth century, there was a time when all of Japan was utterly devastated. Towards the end of World War II, the sight of the burnt bodies of bombing victims littering roadsides was commonplace, regardless of their degree of complicity in the war, their age, or gender.

Apart from tsunamis, the Japanese islands have continuously been ravaged by disasters that are beyond human control. Most representative of these are famines. Famines costing the lives of people continued until the beginning of the Showa era (the late 1920s). The struggle with famine was a burden that the Tohoku region in particular had to carry.[1]

Famines occurred in succession. People exerted themselves in order to prepare for their onslaught. They also prepared for years in which there was a poor harvest. However, in the case of a prolonged famine such as the so-called Four Great Famines of the Edo period that occurred once every few decades, there was not much that could be done.

Famines in the Tohoku region were caused by cold weather damage to crops. At the time of the great famine of the Tenmei era in the second half of the eighteenth century, the famine was further exacerbated by the outbreak of Mount Asama. Smoke covered the sky and ash rained down like snow. The effects of the cold wave and the volcanic smoke interacted, leading to a record-breaking cold summer. The harvest was dramatically reduced, resulting in many famine victims in northern Tohoku. In the Hachinohe domain, it is estimated that the population was halved in just a few years (Hachinohe Shi 1976). In the fifth

1. Regarding famines in the Edo period, see Kikuchi (1997).

year of the Tenmei era (1785), Sugae Masumi (1754–1829), who visited Tsugaru, described the marks left by the famine: "Arriving at the village, like patches of leftover snow, white human bones were strewn all throughout the grass, or piled up in heaps" (from "Sotogahamakaze," SUGAE 1971).

People had to struggle hard just to survive. Whatever could be eaten, from wild grasses to the bark of trees, was completely consumed. The first to be sacrificed were household animals. Dogs and cats were turned into food. There were even cases in which people were forced to feed on human flesh.

On the other hand, in order to reduce the number of mouths to feed, the culling of the weak was practiced. All across eastern Japan, for example in places such as Shinshū or Tōno in Iwate Prefecture, there are legends about abandoning old people (*ubasute*), although their veracity has not been established. However, it is certain that this was something that was also actually practiced in some instances. For instance, there was the custom of infanticide known as the "culling of seedlings" (*mabiki*). As YANAGITA Kunio (1875–1962) describes in his *Kokyō nanajūnen* (1971), *mabiki* was still widely practiced in eastern Japan when he was a child during the first half of the Meiji period. There are still many extant examples in places of votive tablets (*ema*), which were written in order to stop infanticide. According to Yanagita, who saw one himself, it was "a ghastly thing showing a woman with a headband wrapped around her head in bed smothering a newborn child" (YANAGITA 1971, 21). Yanagita reminisces in his book that there was a "sense of having to eradicate famine at all costs" (YANAGITA 1971, 23). This was born out of the experience of the horrors created by famine that formed the original impetus for his inquiries.

Despite the prohibition of infanticide issued by the feudal lords, *mabiki* did not disappear from the world of the commoners. Someone had to be sacrificed so that others could live. This era in which people were repeatedly forced to make the ultimate choice between two lives continued on in the Japanese isles. People carried on living in order to pass on the torch of life to the next generation, with despair carved deep into their gut, and enduring cruel tribulations.

The Discovery of the Kami

Even Japan, the country with the most advanced systems for predicting earthquakes and tsunamis, was unable to avoid misery in 2011. In comparison, premodern society did not have any means of foretelling and avoiding the natural disasters besieging this archipelago.

However, people cannot resign themselves to merely live in constant fear of disasters that could strike at any moment. In order to come to terms with this situation, it is necessary to have a convincing interpretation for these repeated

catastrophes. Individual natural disasters cannot just be seen as random events, but by providing an interpretation rooted in the world surrounding us and explaining their occurrence as necessary, they can be incorporated into an intelligible order of things. By doing so, people are able for the first time to maybe not affirm disasters outright, but to accept the harsh realities accompanying them.

Just like other areas of the world, premodern Japanese society, with its lack of scientific knowledge, sought to interpret the occurrence of these unavoidable catastrophes in relation to transcendental entities (kami).

In the society of ancient Japan, where nature and the deities (kami) were not properly divided, natural disasters were seen as messages from the kami to humans. The *Kojiki*, which was completed at the beginning of the eighth century, records the case of a major epidemic during the reign of Emperor Sujin 崇神 [said to have reigned between 97 BCE and 30 BCE], which brought the people close to extinction. When Sujin, who was at a loss for a solution, prayed to the kami, the deity Ōmononushi no kami appeared to him in a dream, telling him that the epidemic had been caused by the punitive powers (*tatari*) of the deity and that the land could be pacified if the deity received worship from a person called Ōtataneko. When these instructions were followed, the epidemic subsided and people were able to return to a peaceful life (*Kojiki*, 182–84).

The kami inflicted not only disease onto humans. To people in ancient Japan, all phenomena occurring in this world that went beyond human understanding were caused by the doings of the kami. People had no choice but to unconditionally accept the will of the kami.

At that time, the kami were thought to express their will through their punitive powers known as *tatari*. Ōmononushi caused the epidemic in order to communicate to the people his wishes. While this resulted in many innocent people losing their lives, Ōmononushi did not unleash the epidemic out of mere spite. He only wanted to get the attention of people and realize his wishes.

As Orikuchi Shinobu has argued, for people in ancient times *tatari* was the manifestation of the will of a kami (ORIKUCHI 1995–). It was impossible to predict these manifestations of *tatari*, and until the power of *tatari* actually manifested itself and the kami revealed its identity, it was not possible to know which kami was causing the *tatari*. The content of their demands was also not possible to foresee. Thus, in ancient times, people interpreted the wanton disasters that would strike suddenly without any forewarning as being caused by the irrational character of the kami. Alongside simply enduring the disasters as something unavoidable, people saw in the resolution of the *tatari* another way to end them.

While the idea that disasters were caused by one-sided commands (*tatari*) from the kami existed throughout the ancient period, ideas concerning the cause of the *tatari* gradually shifted from *tatari* being regarded as completely

unintelligible demands to explanations focused on cause and effect. Further, alongside the establishment of the *ritsuryō* state order, responses to *tatari* became codified and systematized (Satō 2000, 25).

In May 863 (Jōkan 5), an epidemic that killed a large number of people and caused the court considerable consternation was determined to have been caused by "venerable spirits" (*goryō*). A Buddhist ritual was conducted at the temple Shinsen'en in Kyoto in order to quell the effects of the *tatari*. The spirits worshipped on that occasion were those of Emperor Sudō, Prince Iyo, Ioe no Iratsume (Fujiwara Yoshiko), a local supervisor [identified presumably as Fujiwara Nakanari], Tachibana Hayanari (former ambassador to China), and Funya no Miyatamaro. The spirits of these six persons were called "venerable spirits" (*goryō*), a "spirit seat" (*reiza*) was established for them, and an attempt was made to quell their anger by making offerings as well as reciting sutras and performing songs and dances (*Nihon sandai jitsuroku zenhen* 1952, 112–13).

These venerable spirits are essentially spirits of the dead. They were treated similar to the kami in that they were seen as the cause of epidemics, and this was an attempt to calm their anger (*tatari*) through offerings and the recitation of sutras. The court sought to quell rampaging diseases that had turned into major problems for society by connecting them to new deities referred to as "venerable spirits" and worshipping these entities.

Epidemics occur in all historical periods. Disease is certainly something to be feared, but diseases become even more terrifying when their cause is unknown. However dangerous a disease, if its cause can be understood, people gain a certain sense of security. During the Heian period, a specific type of deity known as "venerable spirits" was regarded as the cause of disease. Epidemics were traced back to the workings of the vengeful powers of a kami (*tatari*) and methods of quelling these were shared in society.

Salvation and Natural Disasters

In medieval society, which had seen the wide dissemination of Buddhist doctrine and the formation of a systematic interpretation of the cosmos and the world, it became more common to see the occurrence of natural disasters within the context of a larger law of cause and effect (*ingaritsu*). The Confucian theory of divine punishment (*tenken* 天譴) further boosted this tendency.

The eleventh century was a turning point in medieval Japan, in which the image of the other world (*higan*) as the ideal world expanded. For a majority of people at that time, the real world was only a temporary abode on their way to the Pure Land (*Jōdo*) after death (Satō 2000, 25). People assumed that there was a transcendental deity at the fundament of the universe that administered salvation and that the intentions of this deity were the moving force in the

world. Because of this shared world view, disasters also came to be interpreted in connection with theories of salvation in the medieval period.

Between 1257 and 1260, the Japanese archipelago was afflicted by a massive famine, known as the Shōka famine (正嘉の飢饉) after the name of the era in which it occurred. In eastern Japan, continuing frigid temperatures were further exacerbated by continual rain and storms. The shortage of grain caused by these disasters was accompanied by epidemics. The roads were littered with corpses and filled with the shambling, ghost-like shapes of the starving.

Nichiren (1222–1282) and Shinran (1173–1263) experienced this famine firsthand. Nichiren submitted his *Risshō ankoku ron* (Treatise on establishing the right teaching and bringing peace to the land) in the seventh month of 1260 to the regent Hōjō Tokiyori. In the opening of the text, he described vividly the horrors caused by the Shōka famine (*Shinranshū Nichirenshū* 1964, 292). Nichiren, who was in Kamakura at the time, personally witnessed the effects of the famine. He determined the cause of the disaster to lie in the fact that the protective kami had abandoned the country in revulsion at the spread of Hōnen's practice of exclusively relying on reciting the name of Amida (*senju nenbutsu*). He further argued that in order to call back these protective kami and establish the "peace of the nation" (*ankoku*), it was indispensable to ban the *nenbutsu* and promote the *Lotus Sutra*, which contains the True Dharma (*shōbō*).

For Nichiren, these calamities were warnings directed by the Buddha to those closing their eyes to true faith. By taking this to heart and putting it into practice, it would be possible to bring peace back to the land and ultimately enable people to reach an eternal world of enlightenment. Conversely, Nichiren argued, if this warning continued to go unheeded, punishments in the form of calamities would further escalate, and Japan would slowly slide into extinction.

On the thirteenth day of the eleventh month, four months after Nichiren submitted the *Risshō ankoku ron*, Shinran sent a letter from Kyoto to his followers in Hitachi Province, where he used to live. In the letter, Shinran wrote the following.

> It is saddening that so many people, both young and old, men and women, have died this year and last. But the Tathagata taught the truth of life's impermanence for us fully, so you must not be distressed by it.[2]

Shinran's comments concerning the Shōka famine are tame compared to what Nichiren had to say. Nichiren wrote about the horrific scenes caused by the famine at length, aiming harsh words at rulers and practitioners of *nenbutsu*

2. See *Shinranshū Nichirenshū*, 124. English translation taken from *The Collected Works of Shinran*; see http://shinranworks.com/letters/lamp-for-the-latter-ages/6-2/ (accessed 30 July 2015).

alike. In contrast, Shinran wrote that while many people had died because of the famine, the Buddha had already taught "life's impermanence" and therefore this should not be something surprising.

It might be possible to seek the reason for this difference in their responses in the fact that Nichiren had been right in the epicenter of the famine, while Shinran had been at a distance from it. However, what might be thought of as more crucial are the different world views held by these two figures. It was Nichiren's consistent belief that this world is essentially the Buddha-land (*bukkokudo*) and that it is possible to manifest it in the here and now.

On the other hand, for Hōnen's disciple Shinran, this world was basically nothing more than a defiled realm that should be left behind. The continuous stream of famine victims was certainly something sad. However, it was not enough to merely lament the arrival of the calamity. Instead, it was necessary to face the reality of this impermanent world and call to mind the teaching of the "impermanence of life and death" (*shōji mujō*). Shinran took the famine as an opportunity to try to guide his disciples away from their attachments to the mundane world and make them open their eyes to the true faith.

Nichiren and Shinran contrast in their responses to the Shōka famine, but on a more fundamental level they shared common ground. What they held in common was that both of them understood the tragedy unfolding in front of them within the context of the salvational mechanism emanating from the Buddha existing at the foundation of the universe. For both of them, the ordeal of the famine was an indispensable step towards reaching the world of enlightenment. Their ultimate goal was not the end of the calamity and the restoration of normalcy, but to go even further, towards the achievement of final salvation. This kind of interpretation was alien to the people of ancient Japan who regarded the basic function of the kami as lying in their "miracles" (*ryōi*) and aimed at calming the *tatari* of individual kami. A sophisticated and systematic interpretation of cosmology was something that first emerged out of medieval developments in the spiritual realm.

While Shinran and Nichiren sought to understand the ghastly disasters as part of the grand salvational scheme of the Buddha, this does not mean that they welcomed such calamities. Without doubt, they were deeply troubled by these recurring disasters. Precisely because of this, they were willing to suffer a powerful backlash from traditional Buddhism, and in order to rescue the people from calamity, they promoted practices such as the exclusive *nenbutsu* (in the case of Shinran) or the exclusive recitation of the *daimoku* (*senju shōdai*) (in the case of Nichiren) that offered salvation to everyone. However, the individual paths chosen by them diverged greatly.

Contact Between the Living and the Dead

The rich expressions of the afterlife that pervaded society suddenly began to wane at the start of the latter half of the medieval period in the fourteenth century. The heartfelt appeal of salvation after death faded and the importance put on the real world increased. At the end of this process came the arrival of early modern society in which people placed more weight on peace and comfort in this world than on salvation in the next.

Medieval theology, which sought to restructure the invisible transcendental world through abstract speculation, gradually lost its foothold. In its place, human knowledge about the natural world expanded and a spirit emerged that sought to elucidate the world's workings based on empirical evidence. Centered on the disciplines of medicine, agriculture, and calenderology, the mechanisms of the natural world and the human body were investigated and phenomena that used to be ascribed to the kami came to be explained in a scientific and logical manner. Instead of praying to the deities, people chose to seek secular, technical means to deal with the problems they were facing. Taking agricultural technology as an example, by improving breeds as well as improvements made in the realm of farm tools and fertilizer, productivity increased dramatically. This marked the transition from the "period of rice field plays" (*ta'asobi no jidai*), with its reliance on magical invocations towards the Buddhist deities and kami, to the "period of agricultural manuals" (*nōsho no jidai*) in which productive technologies in agriculture achieved a certain degree of autonomy (Kuroda 1985).

The secularization of society and the decreased role of the deities further advanced the expansion of the realm of this world and the contraction of the realm of the other world. People no longer saw embarking on the journey to the faraway afterworld as their ideal. The life that people in early modernity had in mind was one in which they would first thoroughly enjoy this "floating world" (*ukiyo*) and then continue to communicate with their descendants even after death while resting peacefully in one corner of this world.

However, despite this increase in rational thinking and scientific knowledge about nature, people were still powerless in the face of massive natural disasters. As a matter of fact, the Edo period saw the recurring outbreak of famines due to extraordinary natural phenomena. The daily dangers to life and body were also much greater than in contemporary society. People in the early modern period were forced to live in close proximity to death.

In times such as the middle ages, when people had a shared sense of the existence of an ideal world after death, it was possible to entrust the dead to this system of salvation without fear. By regarding falling victim to calamities as one step towards salvation, people were able to attain a certain peace of mind.

However, in the early modern period, in which the figure of an absolute savior disappeared, this was no longer possible. Alongside simply enduring calamities as natural occurrences, people in the early modern period invented a variety of new rituals and customs to ensure that even the spirits of those who had died unnatural deaths would be free of anger and rest peacefully. This relationship of ancestors and descendants entering from time to time into close communication with each other, as Yanagita Kunio described in *Senzo no hanashi*, thus took shape in early modern society. Through memorial services for the dead (*kuyō girei*) that were conducted for a long time following the death of a person, the deceased ultimately lost their identity as spirits of the dead (*shiryō*) and turned into kami granting protection to their descendants (YANAGITA 1990).

In the past, a folk custom in Tsugaru taught that when a child died, a stone Jizō figure would be carved that resembled the child's facial features and then would be enshrined at a temple. The two thousand Jizō figures at the Kawakura Jizōdō temple 川倉地蔵堂 bear witness to this tragic history. Tsugaru was an area that suffered from frequent cold weather damage to crops. During famines, the weak—especially children—were the first victims. Although this was not a case of *mabiki*, those lacking the strength to survive died one after the other.

In the face of extraordinary natural phenomena, there was nothing that parents could do. All fathers and mothers were left with was to look on as their children grew weak due to starvation, became emaciated, and their spark of life slowly grew dimmer.

When the crisis eventually passed, the survivors recalled the faces of their children and carved them onto Jizō figures. Contained in the gentle expressions of these figures was the ardent wish that people would never have to suffer from starvation again. From time to time, parents would visit the temple and talk to the Jizō figure while stroking their cold surface, gently apply makeup, and change the clothes worn by the figures. Through this mode of communication, the dead reborn as Jizō figures could share their lives with those still alive. This was not just the case in Tsugaru. Most of the uncountable Jizō bodhisattvas found at crossroads in eastern Japan carry within them the memories of past calamities and tragedies. They contain the deep compassion for those children whose lives were cut short by a violent death.

Overlapping Life and Death

To witness close-up how a loved one grows weak and passes away—such a connection carries on after death, with this kind of bond transcending the mundane world that used to exist in the past everywhere in Japan.

However, this has become rare today. People in a critical state are quarantined in intensive care units and are entrusted to professional health care providers.

While treated, even close relatives are prohibited from visiting them. In the clinical context, it seems that emphasis is put more on prolonging the patient's life for as long as possible than on the wishes of the patient or their family. Existence in whatever form has become the sole objective and turned into the highest value.

Once death has been determined, the body becomes the responsibility of professional morticians. A string of rational and polished rituals is conducted in quick succession and before one realizes, the funeral is over and the bereaved family is holding the ashes. After having hurriedly conducted the funeral, these people return the next day to their workplace, going about their everyday lives as if nothing has happened. In the extremely functionalized social system of contemporary Japan, the dying person as well as those close to him or her have not been allowed any active role in this moment that ought to be of utmost importance within the trajectory of a life that is essentially a transition from life to death.

There are without doubt those who will see in the background the busy nature of modern life. But is this all? I believe that there is a fundamental difference between how Japanese now see death and how they did in the past.

As expressed in the phrase "time of death, xx hours, xx minutes," we think today that it is possible to draw a clear line between life and death. The exact determination of death is a difficult question debated among specialists, but despite this, many people have the image that there is a dividing moment in which the living cross into the world of the dead. However, seen from the long-term perspective of human history, this commonly held understanding is extremely specific to and characteristic of the modern and contemporary periods.

In premodern society, it was common to recognize the existence of a temporally and spatially liminal realm between life and death. The extent of this realm differed depending on the historical period and region, but its longest duration was determined to last between seven and ten days. Even after breathing stopped, death was not determined right away. It was believed that the person had not yet died, but was wandering the realm in between life and death (SATŌ 2008).

What those who remained caught in this realm were believed to do varied with the cultural background of the time. In the ancient period, with its strong sense that the worlds of the living and the dead overlap, rebirth of the deceased was prayed for through customs such as the *tama yobai* (summoning of the soul). Texts from the time such as the *Nihon ryōiki* (Record of miraculous events in Japan) include many tales (*setsuwa*) in which the dead come back to life when the soul that had left the body returns into it.[3] The Heian period

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3. See *Nihon ryōiki* volume one, tale 30, volume two, tales 5, 7, 25, and so on. Translation adapted from that found in Lisa Nelson, "The Go-Tsuchimikado Shinkan-bon ~ Izumi Shikibu Shū: A Translation of the Poems and an Analysis of Their Sequence," page 200, at http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1531&context=theses (accessed 3 August 2015).

poet Izumi Shikibu wrote in her poem "On the last night of the twelfth month," "Although I have heard there is a night when the dead come back, you are not here. Is the place I live, a village without a soul?" (from *Goshūi wakashū*, 1994). As expressed in this poem, it was thought that even after death was determined, the soul would leave its grave in the ground and wander this world.

During the medieval period, in which the sense of the actual existence of the ideal world in the afterlife grew stronger, memorial rituals came to be conducted with the aim of sending the dead to the Pure Land. Clutching the ashes of their deceased family members, many people sought out sacred places such as Mt. Kōya for interment. As part of this process, people would talk to the dead while holding their ashes and communicate with them one last time before letting them depart to the faraway other world. Once the journey to the burial site was complete and the dead had successfully been reborn in the Pure Land (*ōjō*), they no longer existed in this world. However, even then the relationship between the living and dead was not interrupted. Memorial services were still conducted continuously in order to make sure that spirits that might still be lingering in this world because of some mistake would be sent off to the other world in an act similar to gleaning leftover crops or to enable a dead spirit in the afterlife to ascend to a higher stage.

In the early modern period, in which a shared sense emerged that the dead did not depart to a distant place but stayed on in this world, memorial services were conducted to enable the dead to shed the grievances and grudges they had held during life and turn them into pacified spirits resting peacefully within the grave and not aimlessly wandering the earth.

Modernity: A Strange Age

In premodern society, the zone of contact between life and death was not limited to a certain period after breathing had stopped. Already during life a variety of rites were conducted as steps toward the world after death, and after death had been determined, memorial services continued to be conducted for some time.

An example of the former is the group called Nijūgo zanmai-e 二十五三昧会 that was formed on Mt. Hiei in the latter half of the tenth century. This group was a religious society (*kessha*) based on the wish for rebirth in the Pure Land. Alongside proceeding with preparations for life after death as usual, when a member of the group died, there were detailed regulations for death watch and funeral rites to guarantee a dignified death (see *Goshūi wakashū*, 188; Genshin (1971). An example of the latter are the memorial services widely conducted during the Edo period extending from seventy-seven days to thirty-three or fifty years after death.

It is not just that there is a certain margin between life and death. It was the common perception of people in premodern society that before and after death

there is a long period of time in which the world of the living and the world of the dead interact. The living and the dead share the same space while communicating with each other. People did not think of life and death as essentially different states.

In comparison to this long-existing pattern of interaction between the living and the dead since antiquity, modernity draws a distinct and unsurpassable line between life and death. We can thus understand it as a time period seeking the complete expulsion of the dead from the world of the living. Death is kept at a distance and even the simple fact that everyone has to die cannot be expressed in public. After the funeral, once a deceased person has set foot into the world of death, the living immediately return to everyday life. Because the dead inhabit a different world, they are no longer equal conversation partners, but only mere objects of one-sided commemoration.

It was not only the living and dead that inhabited the same space in premodern society. The kami, buddhas, animals, and plants all formed part of the same world. Now, there are only traces of this left in such things as the bear sacrifice (*kumaokuri*) of the Ainu and the folktales of the Inuit, but societies in which animals and plants communicated with each other on an equal footing existed on this planet for thousands or tens of thousands of years (NAKAZAWA 2002). According to the *Nihon shoki* (volume 1, 134), in the past plants on the Japanese archipelago uttered words, but they no longer speak to us. This is not because the plants have turned silent. It is because we have forgotten how to listen to them.

Prayers made with a pious mind towards the kami made people realize their own wicked and humble existence. The whispered words directed towards the dead or animals and plants also infused the gentle gaze directed towards the people in one's vicinity. Once these had been expunged from society as "the other," people lost the framework to keep their ego in check, and they began to run wild in a drive for unlimited expansion.

The public space created by the kami and the dead used to fulfill in everyday life the role of a cushion to prevent the direct occurrence of conflicts of interest among people. I was raised in a mountain village in the southern part of Miyagi Prefecture. During the mid-1950s to mid-1960s, when I was a child, shrine festivals held in every community were still the center of community life in agricultural villages in the Tohoku region. On the occasion of the festival at Kashima shrine, the largest shrine in my village, afternoon classes were canceled at my elementary school. The time-consuming preparations for the festival were advanced and the surrounding paths mended and cleaned.

When I visit my village now, most of the shrines see no visitors and have fallen into ruin. Grass grows on the paths and it is even difficult to walk on them. The narrow paths on the shrine grounds used to also function as community roads

to get to school and other facilities. Even people who normally disliked exerting themselves for others enthusiastically participated in communal activities for the kami and buddhas. These activities had the function of maintaining the tiny paths criss-crossing the village like capillary vessels. However, when the kami lost their role of creating communal space, the people who used to maintain those paths also automatically disappeared.

As the postwar academic study of history has shown, it should not be forgotten that religion had also become complicit in the logic of domination and exploitation. How many people have been murdered in the name of a deity? This kind of foolishness is still going on today. However, on the other hand, it is also an undeniable fact that under the moniker of shrine rituals (*shinji*) and shrine festivals (*saiji*), a space was created that allowed people to interact and communicate across class-lines, and public facilities such as roads, bridges, or squares could be built and repaired. When conflicts between two groups could not be resolved, people submitted to the verdict of the kami (Shimizu 2010).

When people lost the ability to send messages to the kami, the buddhas, or the dead, nonhuman entities were expelled from the society and world around us. All intermediaries were eliminated and a situation was arrived at in which humans were facing each other in a straightforward manner. Having developed thorns for self-protection, humans were pressed into a narrow box without any cushion and modern society, in which the slightest movement will result in the injury of someone else, was born.

In a short period of time the earthquake of 11 March 2011 created a large number of dead and missing and caused vast destruction. The depth and size of the scars it left peeled off the superficial top layer of contemporary society, which we had taken for granted for so long. It thus made us question the meaning of life and death on a fundamental level.

People Who are Worshipped as Kami

Scattered throughout the area around Mt. Yudono in Yamagata Prefecture are the bodies of self-mummified religious practitioners (*sokushinbutsu*) who had themselves voluntarily inserted into the ground in search of enlightenment. These mummies have become objects of worship. According to a temple legend, the figure of Chūkai Shōnin 忠海上人, who worshipped at Kaikōji temple 海向寺 in Sakata, came from a low-ranking warrior (*bushi*) family, the Togashi clan. It is said that after living for two years in Senninzawa and abstaining from eating cereals (*mokujikigyō*), Chūkai Shōnin had himself interred in the ground in 1755 as part of his quest for enlightenment (*dochū nyūjō*). Shinnyokai Shōnin 真如海 上人, who is worshipped at the temple Dainichibō, underwent self-mummification in 1783. It is said that after practicing *mokujikigyō* for one thousand days, he

entered the ground alive, and passed away while sounding a gong and reciting scriptures.

Both of these years fell in the middle of severe famines. These two cases of self-mummification have in common with the majority of other *sokushinbutsu* that they occurred during years of famine. Naitō Masatoshi has pointed this out by asking, "was it not that the essential idea behind the practice of abstaining from cereals, in which the religious practitioners known as *isse gyōnin* at Mt. Yudono engaged, was to starve one's own body in order to pray for the starving people?" (Naitō 1999, 176). Naitō saw these *sokushinbutsu* as reflecting a messianic idea that had been passed on in Japanese folk beliefs.

A majority of those who underwent self-mummification at Mt. Yudono came from low-ranking *bushi* or peasant families. Undergoing ever-harsher practices, they fasted themselves to death. What can be seen in these instances are common people who shouldered the misfortune of others with their own bodies and laid down their lives in order to alleviate the effects of the disasters. In response, others began to worship these figures as deities.

Following the earthquake of 2011, I sometimes had the opportunity to visit the affected areas along the coast. Whenever I stood on ground that had been swept clean by the tsunami, I imagined the moment the tsunami hit. Many people lost their lives in the tsunami trying to fulfill their duties. For example, fire fighters who had been on their way to the coast in order to close the levee gates. Others had been swept away while continuing to guide others to safety. Yet others disappeared while continuing to broadcast warnings, and some failed to flee in time because they were rescuing complete strangers.

I myself could have easily died in the disaster. I am not alive—I have been allowed to remain alive. Whenever I stand on ground destroyed by the disaster, this thought is etched into my heart.

How many lives have been lost since the birth of mankind? To die surrounded by one's family with a tranquil expression on one's face was rather the exception. Without doubt, the number of those who died in unforeseen catastrophes without time to reflect on their lives is far higher. The number of those who, like the *sokushinbutsu*, sacrificed their own lives in exchange for the happiness of others is also likely enormous.

We cannot force others to sacrifice themselves. However, if there were no people to sacrifice themselves in order to save others, our existence today would be unthinkable. Their lives possess a shine that cannot be simply measured in the length of their existence. Precisely for this reason, our ancestors praised these people as deities and sought to commemorate their actions for eternity.

Unlike contemporary society, which has made longevity its goal, these societies put supreme value on the complete obliteration of one's own life in the

pursuit of benefitting others. In support of this, there existed a world view that saw life and death as a unity.

Conclusion

However much civilization evolves, it is our fate that disasters are unavoidable. As in the case of wars, nuclear accidents, or ethnic strife, there are also instances in which civilization further exacerbates disasters.

All the people that lived on these islands in the past could do was search for the cause of the recurring disasters in the workings of the kami. Exactly how the causal relationship between the kami and natural disasters was interpreted differed from era to era in accordance with the amount of scientific knowledge available and the dominant cosmology. However, against the background of strong beliefs in the existence of the kami, people sought to understand the disasters descending on them as something inevitable. Every time, a disaster would result in the loss of many lives. Based on the premise of the existence of the kami, the people of the Japanese archipelago sought to soothe their mutual pain by constructing a long-lasting intimate relationship that went beyond this world with those who had died an untimely death.

However, the shrinking of the world of the kami that occurred as the modern period approached did not allow for the continuation of this kind of relationship. A strict line was drawn between the worlds of the living and the dead and they came to be clearly distinguished from each other. Not only the dead, but also the kami, animals, and plants were expelled from the world of humans, leading to the arrival of a society in which humans sharply face each other as privileged entities. This marked the birth of the modern age founded on anthropocentric humanism.

Along Iwate prefecture's Sanriku coast, there were several hundred folk art groups performing such arts as *kagura*, *shishi odori*, or *kenbai*. Most of these suffered tremendous damage due to the tsunami of 11 March. Immediately following the disaster, religious rites and festivals were canceled, but were subsequently revived in many regions in advance of full-fledged reconstruction efforts. Although entire towns had disappeared and costumes as well as instruments been lost, performances were conducted in memory of the victims of the disaster by sharing among the troupes the equipment absolutely necessary for the performances. In the summer, portable shrines and local art troupes could be seen parading through devastated towns in all the regions (TŌHOKU BUNKA-ZAI EIZŌ KENKYŪJO 2012).

Confronting an extreme disaster, shrine rituals transcend the mere level of folk arts and become once more bonds connecting people with each other. In all localities, the kami created new public spaces. Not limited to shrine rituals, in all

regions in which there still exist functioning communities, it seems that revival takes place a little earlier.

Upon reflection we realize that the kami have been the oldest partners of humanity. From before the advent of the state, humans and kami have coexisted. The kami, who modern man once sought to expel from a society that disliked their rule, are now displaying newfound vigor towards their rebirth in the Sanriku region.

This makes me once again wonder what kind of entity human beings are, who have always needed the existence of the kami. What kind of age is modernity that seeks to expel the kami from society as the Other?

From in between the enormous rifts that the catastrophe of 11 March has opened in society, modernity shows itself as a strange age. Today, the majority of people cannot believe in the existence of an absolute supreme god and submit themselves to providential salvation. It is also impossible to recreate a time in which the living and dead peacefully coexist. However, by being aware that such a time once existed, it is possible to relativize the ground on which we currently stand.

Today, when the extinction of humanity is increasingly becoming a possibility, we are all individually required as bearers of the earth's future to make the tough choice of which path to follow. Precisely because we are facing a historical turning point, it is necessary to contemplate our current location within the framework of time spans—such as one hundred or one thousand years—and think hard about which direction to take.

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Nationalism, Religion, and Social Darwinism

Nation and Religion in the Works of Katō Genchi and Liang Qichao

Why does nationalism require religion? This article explores an answer to this question within discourses of Social Darwinism that gained in popularity globally from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. Social Darwinism conceived of international relations as the struggle for existence among societies or states as social organisms. In order to form a competitive state, it argued, the solid integration of the nation is necessary. Social Darwinism also called upon religion for this objective. Therefore, the integration of a society or a state requires people to share common values, and it was claimed that religion could play an important role in realizing social cohesion. This study attempts to show that an example of such an argument can be found in Katō Genchi's theory of religion that advocated Statist Shinto in Japan. The author also argues that the same case was made by Liang Qichao in his religious thought during the late Qing and early republican periods in China.

ᴋᴇʏᴡᴏʀᴅs: Katō Genchi—Liang Qichao—Nationalism—Social Darwinism

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REFLECTING widespread academic interest in nationalism, recent scholarship has devoted significant attention to the relation between nationalism and religion. While scholars have sought to specify how this relation can productively be studied, one particular issue has been marginal in much of the recent scholarship. To my knowledge, no one has paid close attention to the question of why nationalism requires religion.

Eastwood and Prevalakis sort out four distinct ways of studying the connection between religion and nationalism (EASTWOOD and PREVALAKIS 2010, 98). The first is to treat nationalism as the god of modernity, and posits the religious origins of nationalism. The second is to presuppose that nationalism fills the vacuum that religion's prior decline created. In other words, it argues that secularization gives rise to nationalism. The third is to maintain that in the process of modernization, nationalism displaced religion. More to the point, it is nationalism that caused religion's displacement from its role of the "sacred canopy." Due to the modernization caused by nationalism, which facilitated the differentiation of the religious sphere from the political as well as social spheres, religion has dropped and lost many functions it had but can no longer meet efficiently. The fourth is to deal with religion as part of nationalism. From this standpoint, religious nationalism arises as opposed to secularism. In short, the first is to extend the concept of religion to include nationalism as a subtype of religion; the other three ways consider nationalism as functionally equivalent to religion. For that reason, the four presuppose that religious nationalism rivals secular nationalism. Moreover, the first three approaches are premised on religious history in the West in that the god of modernity took over the place of the Christian God.

Nationalism serves to integrate individual citizens into a unified unit and, at the same time, specify this unified unit as, for example, a state, nation, or ethnic group. Given that religion used to play such an integrative role, it seems understandable that nationalism is thought to have taken over the role of religion. From the above, it may well follow that nationalism is functionally equivalent to religion. However, why is it that in Japan, nationalism called upon religion for the formation of modern statehood? Shinto has not been recognized as a social institution that integrates Japanese society. So why did nationalism have to "invent" State Shinto (国家神道) where it had not existed?

A claim was made by the Nagoya High Court that "as a matter of fact, during World War II, State Shinto was imposed upon the Japanese nation from above, thereby impinging on the constitutional principle of the freedom of faith and functioning as a spiritual basis for Japanese militarism."[1] This claim has been contested. According to Nitta Hitoshi, this construal of State Shinto derived from a theory of Statist Shinto (国家的神道) put forward by Katō Genchi 加藤玄智 (1873–1965), who taught at the Japanese Military Academy and Tokyo Imperial University. Nitta argues that Kato's theory concerned how Shinto ought to be (NITTA 1997, 311) and thus had nothing to do with how Shinto actually was during the war. For Nitta, it is only in postwar Japan that Shinto as it ought to be for Katō was conceived as if it had been oppressive during the war. The complexities of the disputes as to the historical reality of State Shinto need not concern us here. Rather, I would like to highlight that Katō presented a normative account of Shinto as a particular value system that he hoped would be shared by the Japanese and unify them as a nation.

Japanese intellectuals such as Katō were not alone in attempting to connect religion to nation-building. Here Liang Qichao 梁啓超 (1873–1929) deserves special mention. Liang was born in Guangdong Province in China in 1873 and sought refuge in Japan as the Hundred Days' Reform was ended by the coup of 1898. In May of 1899, Japanese scholar of religion Anesaki Masaharu 姉崎正治 invited Liang to deliver a lecture at the spring conference of the Society of Philosophy in Japan, where Liang asserted that the revitalization of the East requires a return to the true teachings of Confucianism (LIANG 1899a).[2] Liang's assertion was premised on the proposal of his teacher, Kang Youwei 康有為. Kang had campaigned for establishing Confucianism as the national religion during the 1890s in China, which developed into a political movement after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 that established the Republic of China. Confucianism was also considered a common value system and thus essential to integrate Chinese society. Liang's lecture in 1899 was intended to advertise Kang's account of the role of religion in national integration.

In order to elucidate Kato's and Liang's conceptions of the relationship between nationalism and religion, I propose to examine how Social Darwinism informed their ideas.[3] Social Darwinism became globally popular during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Famously, it was Yan Fu's 嚴復

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1. On the so-called "Tsu Jichinsai Case," the court famously ruled that public expenditures on a *jichiinsai* (a Shinto groundbreaking ceremony) are illegal; see Nagoya High Court Judgment, 14 May 1971, *Hanrei Jiho* 判例時報 630.

2. All citations from original texts in Chinese have been translated by the author.

3. I define Social Darwinism as holding the view that the state or society is an evolutionary organic entity in the fierce competition for survival. As social evolutionism is generally called

translation of T. H. Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics* (1896) that introduced Western thought to China in the late nineteenth century. His translation of *Evolution and Ethics* made known Herbert Spencer's social evolutionary theory to Chinese intellectuals. While Kang's charting of humankind's historical passage through the Three Ages of Disorder, Approaching Peace, and Universal Peace had influenced Liang's thought, Liang was also significantly inspired by Social Darwinism. Liang became instrumental in infusing Social Darwinism into the minds of Chinese intellectuals thanks to his lucid writings. He thereby established himself in Chinese society during the late period of the Qing Empire.

On the other hand, since Ernest Fenollosa lectured on social evolution based on the first volume of Spencer's *The Principles of Sociology* (1880–1897) at Tokyo Imperial University, Spencer's works were also translated into Japanese, and those works which drew on Spencer's thought were widely circulated in Japan. Relying on Social Darwinism, for example, Katō Hiroyuki 加藤弘之 understood international relations as natural competition among states. Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 advocated "the ethics of the citizenry" for "the survival of the fittest" (Miyachi 2012, 76). Following the lead of Inoue, Katō Genchi developed his theory of religion.

For Liang and Kato, Social Darwinism was knowledge that was taken for granted. As we will see later, it is arguable that Social Darwinism linked their theories of religion to nationalism. Social Darwinism explores international relations from a viewpoint of the survival of the fittest and the law of the jungle. It seems that such a viewpoint induced proponents of Social Darwinism to posit that the survival of a state depends upon the social cohesion of a nation. Hence it is not surprising that their attention was devoted to the role of religion, a role that presumably enables people to share common values in order to achieve social cohesion.

In what follows, I first attempt to show that Social Darwinism underlay Katō Genchi's theory of Statist Shinto. I argue that for Katō, for the formation of a nation it is necessary that all members of the national community share an affiliation to the same religion. Second, I hope to demonstrate that a similar argument for the relationship between religion and the formation of a nation was

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"Social Darwinism," it is thought that social evolutionism derives from an application of Darwin's theory to society. However, it is Spencer, rather than Darwin, who contributed to its popularity more than anyone else. Yet, Social Darwinism is hardly identical with Spencer's thought. Neither was Spencer's thought accepted nor understood in its entirety, and it is difficult to present a clear-cut outline of Social Darwinism (Hawkins 1997, 32). Moreover, as Bannister points out, social evolutionism is a suspect concept (Bannister 1979, 3–13). Social Darwinism should be understood as a cluster of Spencerian ideas that emerged from the widespread acceptance of Spencer's neologism, "survival of the fittest," which was taken to mean "the best always win" and "the stronger prey on the weaker."

made by Liang as, like Japan, the modernization and the Westernization of late imperial and early republican China became urgent.[4] As we shall see later, Liang conceived of the teachings of Confucius as a progressivism concerned with sociopolitical innovation. More to the point, he understood Confucianism as isomorphic to the evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer (LIANG 1899a, 58). That is to say, evolutionary theories framed Liang's thought on religion in a significant way.

Katō Genchi: The Reunion of the Divine and the Human

KATŌ (1935) distinguishes "Statist Shinto" (国家的神道) from "Sect Shinto" (宗派的神道). Further, he divides Statist Shinto into "Shrine Shinto" (神社神道) as its form and "National Polity Shinto" (国体神道) as its spiritual content (KATŌ 1935, 1). Katō emphasizes that "National Polity Shinto constitutes the spirit, beauty, and quintessence of Shinto" (KATO 1935, 395). According to him, the kernel of Shinto lies in "the divine monarch as a manifestation of sacred humanity" (KATŌ 1935, 998). What characterizes Katō's veneration of the emperor is that he finds in the emperor the union of the divine and the human.[5]

For Katō, religion designates "the divine-human interaction and the reunion of the divine and the human" (KATŌ 1912b, 766). He contends that religion typically manifests itself through a human being's approach to the divine in which the divine simultaneously draws the human to itself. Upon this basis, Katō postulates a historical trajectory in which as the human and the divine come close to each other, religion evolves accordingly. Since, for him, the essence of religion is found in the unity of the divine and the human, as religion reduces the distance between them, if that distance were completely dissolved, religion would lose its reason to exist. Hence, religion is to disappear at the end of its evolutionary

4. While it is Kang Youwei who advocated Confucian revival, Liang was more influential than him over his contemporaries as well as the following generations in this regard. Thus, this study focuses on Liang's thought as the counterpart to Katō's theory of Statist Shinto.

5. The question of why Katō had been attracted to Shinto studies in his late thirties and why he then came to advocate a social order centered around emperor worship was first posed by TAMARU (1995). Tamaru attempts to elucidate this issue in terms of Katō's hope for "the rise of a religious genius." Shimazono Susumu points out that what underlies Katō's Shinto studies are "his sense of a social crisis based on his statist ideas of national order" (SHIMAZONO 1996). Following these previous studies, I hope to show that both Katō's hope for "the rise of a religious genius" and "his sense of a social crisis" derive from Social Darwinism and that he theorizes them from a Social Darwinist viewpoint. Brief discussions on Katō's evolutionary ideas can be also found in FUKASAWA (1985). For a treatment of Kato's evolutionary view of religion, see TSUSHIRO (1985). For a detailed analysis of the development of Kato's religious thought see MAEKAWA (2011; 2012). Like Nitta, Miyamoto Takashi claims that Shrine Shinto has nothing to do with State Shinto since Katō's conception of Statist Shinto does not rely on Shrine Shinto (MIYAMOTO 2006).

process for its own fulfillment. While Katō calls the realization of this disappearance of religion *daidan'en* 大団円 (denouement; see Katō 1912b, 765), he initially posited this realization in the Buddha rather than the emperor. Katō states that "we find the ideal realization of religion in the person of the Buddha in which *daidan'en* (*Entelecheia*) has been attained." Thus, he regarded Gautama Buddha as "an ideal manifestation of the *Deus-Homo*" (Katō 1912b, 756).

Katō's idealization of the Buddha already appears in his maiden work (Katō 1900, 440). Japan at this time was making great efforts to import Western thought. In his opinion, however, "*sui generis* Japan" (Katō 1900, 5) was yet to be established for the critical assimilation and the digestion of what Japan imports from the West. As a result, Katō observes, the effort to obtain Western ideas led the Japanese to uncritical preoccupations with whatever they received from the West. It is clear to him that "a nation without intellectual independence could fall into national insecurities as well as crises of sovereignty" (Katō 1900, 7). Therefore, Katō is convinced that the people must be enlightened by "a healthy religion" (Katō 1900, 286). Such a healthy religion must be congruent with "philosophy." "The philosophical thought attested by scholarly certainty must be made into a religion for the nation" (Katō 1900, 371). He envisages the emergence of a religious genius who could create such a religion (Katō 1900, 384), which Katō finds historically exemplified in Jesus and the Buddha.

Katō assumes both that "civilizations develop according to the law of evolution" (Katō 1900, 149) and that "religions evolve hand in hand with their own civilizations" (Katō 1900, 376). He is also explicit that each religion is to meet the needs of "the advanced religious consciousness" (Katō 1900, 383) that the evolution of society gives rise to. Accordingly, Katō maintains that the social progress of a nation parallels its "religious evolution." "Each member of a national community must share the same religion that has progressed through stages of increasing social development" (Katō 1900, 169). As a nation envisions what it ought to be, his argument goes, "a new religion" (Katō 1900, 377) that is relevant to the present stage of the nation is required to emerge.

It is Katō's view of international relations that "the present world consists in cutthroat competition between various states that promotes the survival of the fittest states, on the one hand, while compelling the unfit ones to perish, on the other" (Katō 1904a, 12). Under a fictitious name, he presents his analysis of contemporary evolutionism as follows. "The Darwinian evolutionary theory, which is based on the law of the jungle and the survival of the fittest, would entail egoism. Darwinism is materialistic in nature, and it would result in a materialistic atheism" (Katō 1904b, 9). He expects that what he calls "a new religion" or "a healthy religion" will unite selfish individuals by means of transforming their egoism and bringing them the centrality of faith in God. For him, a religion that

could hold individuals together is necessary for the nation to survive the fierce global competition for existence.

However, it appears to Katō that the existing religions, and Buddhism in particular, are "disseminating vicious superstitions over the populace" (KATŌ 1900, 385), and they are thus far from what they ought to be. His critique of the existing religions reflects his "repugnance and distaste" for "the spiritless as well as obsequious atmosphere of Buddhism" that he confronted as he grew up in a Shin Buddhist temple in Tokyo (KATŌ 1961, 152). During his twenties, Katō was involved in a religious fraternity called "New Buddhist Caucus" (新仏教同志会) that aimed at reforms of Buddhism (TAMARU 1995, 51). While he was a Buddhist, Katō hoped to synthesize Buddhism and Christianity on the basis of which he wished to found a new religion (KATŌ 1900, 409). Yet, his religious ideals derived by and large from his images of the Buddha rather than those of Jesus.

During his thirties, Katō continued to explore a new religion in Buddhism. In his 1910 work, he argues that the heart of religion lies in the intimate relationships between the divine and the human and in their union (KATŌ 1910, 27), which were historically actualized in the person of the Buddha (KATŌ 1910, 44):

> It is in the beatific person of the Buddha that his disciples intuited a living Buddhahood, the Logos in flesh, and the Truth tangibly embodied so that they were immediately struck by this inexpressible mysterious lighting. Put in Christian phraseology, it is in the flesh of Buddha that the disciples indeed sensibly witnessed the *Deus-Homo*. (KATŌ 1910, 28–29)

In this way, Katō believes that the Buddha is the *Deus-homo* as the ultimate realization of the union of God and humanity.[6] Moreover, the relationship between the Buddha and his disciples is idealized to be what religious communities ought to be. While Katō sought an apotheosis of the *Deus-Homo* in Japan, Nogi Maresuke's 乃木希典[7] suicide occurred. For Katō, this tragic incident signifies the ideal *Deus-Homo* that has come to realization in Japan. He recognizes it as being parallel to salvation in the crucified Jesus (KATŌ 1912c, 27) and praises Nogi's death as a reappearance of what manifested Nirvana in the Buddha (KATŌ 1912c, 4). Katō insists that "in the person of Nogi, the divine humanity, that is, *Deus-Homo*, is acknowledged" (KATŌ 1912c, 44).

By projecting Nogi's death onto Jesus and the Buddha, Katō attempts to discover an altruistic act and a spirit of self-sacrifice. He remarks that "the purest selfless spirit was revealed in the righteous death of the crucified Jesus

6. In other works, he uses *Deus-Homo*.

7. Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912) was a general in the Japanese Imperial Army. After the Russo-Japanese War, he became the mentor of young Hirohito at Gakushuin. After Emperor Meiji's funeral, he committed suicide with his wife.

in Christianity, while it took on the form of suicide in the case of General Nogi"
(KATŌ 1912c, 27). In *Shūkyōgaku* (KATŌ 1912b), the Buddha's teaching of selfless-
ness is interpreted as bearing self-sacrificial morality—primitive Buddhism was
by no means other-worldly in character; nor was it pessimistic. On the contrary,
it concerned a healthy everyday morality in present-day life (KATŌ 1912b, 673).
Considering the relationship between the Buddha and his disciples analogous
to that between Nogi and the Japanese nation, he urged upon the nation a spiri-
tual reformation through the *Deus-Homo* of Nogi (KATŌ 1912c, 106).

Furthermore, the relationship between the *Deus-Homo* and the individual is
applied to that between the emperor and the nation. While Katō does not explicitly
describe the emperor as the *Deus-Homo*, he seems to regard the emperor as being a
living deity on earth (現人神) and the best example of the realization of the union
of the divine and the human (KATŌ 1912a, 83). This union is further considered to
be extended to the union of the emperor (the divine) and the nation (the human).
It is precisely here that he finds an imperial religion. His argument continues:

> In the idea that His Majesty and we the nation form a body politic, that is, the
> inseparable organic unity of the head and the body as one flesh as it were—
> the national ideal that the sovereign and the nation are to be united—emperor
> worship (天皇教) can be established as religion.   (KATŌ 1912a, 86)

For Katō, the evolution toward the *Deus-Homo*, namely, the union of the
divine and the human, which the Buddha, Nogi, and the emperor represent
respectively, is paradigmatic of the union of the *Deus-Homo* and the people,
which is exactly what the nation ought to be.

Therefore, Katō discovers a "new religion" in emperor worship that brings
about the organic unity of the state. What is then in question is the relationship
between emperor worship and Shinto. He is determined to investigate "the type
of Shinto that can be the great law and the source of public thought intrinsic
to Japan" (KATŌ 1914, 58) and make it known to the nation. His religious stud-
ies are intended to enrich the spirit of patriotism (KATŌ 1914, 57). Henceforth,
Katō proposes the division of Shinto shrines between "the innermost spirit" and
"externality" (KATŌ 1917, 185), and names "National Polity Shinto" (KATŌ 1920,
30) the Japanese consciousness of Shinto specifically concerning statehood—a
term that he borrows from Inoue Tetsujirō. In KATŌ (1929–1931, 1, 31), National
Polity Shinto is described as a spiritual resource expressed religiously for the
Japanese nation.

From the viewpoint of religious evolution, according to Katō, Shinto had
advanced from "the sacralization of natural materials" in the primitive stage.
When "advanced ethics and wisdom were activated in religious consciousness," it
then spiritualized itself into a worship for edification in the civilized stage (KATŌ
1935, 9). Finally, Shinto developed into emperor worship, with an emperor who is

equipped with wholehearted ethics as a divine virtue (KATŌ 1935, 978–92). In this manner, Katō incorporates emperor worship as filial piety (KATŌ 1926, 288) into National Polity Shinto as the quintessence of Statist Shinto.

Because he holds fast to the idea that Shinto is a religion (KATŌ 1929–1931, 2, 31), Katō remains skeptical about the theory that categorizes Shinto as nonreligious. For him, Shinto gives hope insofar as it is a religion. His hope as expressed in his early writings is that a healthy new religion will arise in the future (KATŌ 1900, 377), and this remained consistent throughout his life.

The above-mentioned points exhibit no more than "a man of the emperor cult" (TSUSHIRO 1985, 85). However, Kato's revered emperor is not so much a real emperor as his own ideal image of the emperor. He commends emperor worship only insofar as it is thought to lead Japanese society to a future that he deems better. Hence, he stays away from the National Learning School (国学) that he thinks fails to recognize what Shinto ought to be in modern times (KATŌ 1961, 155). In comparison with the existing Shinto, his Shinto appears idealistic. Like all the armchair intellectuals, he seems to build a theoretical castle in the air, although it does look splendid. Tamaru locates Katō's thought somewhere between popular religious movements and mere intellectual products—Tamaru labels it as one of the religious philosophical movements (TAMARU 1995, 52). The same thing can be said of Liang Qichao's theory of religion.

Liang Qichao: National Salvation and Religion

As we saw, Katō contends that true Buddhism is by no means pessimistic; rather, it can edify people as a moral basis for their worldly lives. Liang Qichao once held the same view. Liang submits that instead of negating the world, Buddhist faith affirms it (LIANG 1902d, 47).[8] Citing a passage from a Buddhist scripture that goes, "Unless everyone enters Nirvana, I vow not to attain the perfect Enlightenment," he also recognizes the spirit of altruistic self-sacrifice in Buddhism (LIANG 1902d, 47), as Katō does. Liang also characterizes Buddhism by autonomy instead of heteronomy. According to him, credulousness never leads one to Buddhism; one can come to Buddhism only through one's own intelligence. It is clear to him that the Buddhist doctrines of the immortality of the soul and karma cultivate moral agency. The belief in karma is particularly underlined as the highest doctrine of Buddhism. It is his contention that "the principles of evolution recently expounded by Darwin and Spencer simply remain within the theoretical reach of the concept of karma" (LIANG 1902d, 51). Liang points out the conformity of the doctrine of Karma to the evolutionary idea of hereditary

8. For my translation of "群治" into "society" I am indebted to TARUMOTO (1997).

transmission, and justifies Buddhism by evolutionism (LIANG 1904b). Yet, it should be noted that he does not extol Buddhism persistently.

Marianne Bastid-Bruguière divides the development of Liang's interest in religion into four distinct periods (BASTID-BRUGUIÈRE 1998).[9] According to her, in the first period, Liang begins to study religion as he considers it to be a means of national salvation. His lecture at Tokyo alluded to earlier occurred in this period. His conception of social evolution is based on Kang Youwei's doctrine of the Three Ages that humanity develops through the Age of Disorder, the Age of Approaching Peace, and the Age of Universal Peace. In the first two ages, people are governed by the rulers from above. But, in the end, people will reach the final age in which they rule themselves (SATŌ 1996, 1103). In order to realize the Age of Universal Peace, Liang believes, the populace must be educated by religion such as Confucianism.

However, during the second period of Liang's interest in religion, as Bastid-Bruguière sees it, his thought on religion begins to change within a short period of time. From 1901, he keeps himself away from Kang's influence, and develops his own thought. He even becomes increasingly critical of Kang's theories of Confucianism and religion. Liang goes as far as to claim that there is no need for religious reformation, for fortunately China has no religion in the first place and that "while religion is useful in the ages of humankind's infancy, it is more harmful than helpful in the ages of their maturity, for religion impedes the freedom of thought" (LIANG 1902b, 3).

Moreover, he goes on to argue that "what the West calls 'religion' involves in making a fetish of superstitions." Therefore, he regards religion as the least conducive to the development of humanity (LIANG 1902a, 52). Yet, it must be noted that his criticism of religion is not directed against Confucius. Liang does not include Confucianism in the category of religion, stating that Confucius is not so much a religious teacher as a philosopher, or a scholar of political economy, or an educator (LIANG 1902a, 52). While the true value of Confucianism as scholarly ideas will be shown in an advanced civilization, he explains, it remains available only to a small number of the elite until humankind becomes fully civilized. Thus, an alternative way for the edification of the masses must be sought elsewhere. Whereas the religious person cannot rival the philosopher in exploring the truth, Liang claims, the philosopher is less competent than the religious person in leading the masses (LIANG 1902c, 44–45). According to him, the "global masses" of today are too feeble to unite themselves. They can be united

9. For an important treatment of Liang's religious thought in addition to Bastid-Bruguière's article that traces in detail the development of his thought, see MORI (1998). Drawing upon these two works, this article attempts to summarize the development of Liang's thought and to find what persisted through that development.

only when guided, and religion is one of the best means to integrate the masses. Since religion possesses an invisible force to exert pressure on the freedom of the masses, it can make their spirit one and the same. Thanks to this power of integration, Liang hopes, religion can overcome its selfish desires and fractional disputes (LIANG 1902c, 46).

In addition, he observes that the religious spirit resembles the military spirit. He reasons that a nation in the "barbarian stage" has recourse to religion alone. In contrast, the people at the zenith of civilization are no longer in need of religion, he argues, because they are capable of ruling themselves. Unfortunately, for Liang, China as well as the world at large are yet to reach that maturity. Therefore, China cannot have national unity without religion (LIANG 1902c, 46). Since the late Qing dynasty faced its so-called "greatest danger of partition," the social evolutionary law of the jungle appears to him more than a metaphor. Thus he is propelled to search for a means of survival for China.

LIANG (1902d) construes Buddhism to be relevant for the national integration of China. That Buddhism to which he entrusts his hope is neither the historic Buddhism nor the existing one. It is the Buddhism that he envisions through the lens of a Social Darwinist world view. This is a "new religion" that he wishes could give rise to the new Chinese nation (LIANG 1902c, 45). Still, for him, such a new religion is considered the second best means of national renewal at the same time. This ambiguity of his construal of Buddhism betrays his disappointment to his fellow Chinese, which is further deepened during his travels in the United States (LIANG 1904a).[10] In these travels, he finally comes to hold "enlightened despotism" (LIANG 1906), that the Chinese nation be led by an enlightened despot under coercion (TAKAYANAGI 2003). Then, during "the third period" that begins after 1905, as Bastid-Bruguière sees it, Liang becomes disinterested in religion.

Religion—Buddhism in particular—reappears in his thought during the fourth period of his interest in religion that starts in 1918 and ends with his death. Regarding the mature Liang's thought, what comes to the fore are both the critique of his early statism and his turn to individualism as well as a cosmopolitanism that accords with the fashion of the age after World War I (YOSHIZAWA 2003, 222–23). Certainly, he himself describes his earlier position as a "chauvinistic statism" (LIANG 1920, 69). Yet, what he criticizes is not so much statism as much as chauvinism. In his writings based on his observations and information about postwar Europe, he commends the cosmopolitan state (LIANG 1919, 21). This seems to indicate that he now extends his statism to embrace the whole human community. He never renounces the "whole" in favor of the individual. Rather, Liang seeks "the whole" above the nation-state. During this last period of

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10. For Liang's travels in the United States, refer to KAWAJIRI (2005).

his intellectual development, while he continues to hold on to some elements of nationalism insofar as they are useful to incorporate individuals into the whole, the locus of "the whole" is shifted from the existing state to a higher community.

On the other hand, Liang accepts no prospect that political associations and party politics will be able to rescue China. His distaste for associations and party politics are expressed quite frankly in his critical letter of 1927 on the contemporary political situation in China: "I would never join any association and organization, for they seem to me hopeless of saving China" (DING and ZHAO 2009, 729). His criticism derives from the fact that political associations fail to advance in China as a whole. Nonetheless, his concern with China remains persistent even during this last period.

Mori Noriko points out that while Liang's thought on religion became increasingly scholarly in style in the course of his life, he remains consistent in his interests in the doctrine of reincarnation and a selfless spirit of Buddhism (MORI 1998, 213–14). It is explicit in his speech of 1923 that, for him, selflessness is common to Confucianism and Buddhism. In this speech, he remarks that "we can be freed from afflictions as we get rid of our personal and private concerns." What would remain then are "concerns for humankind—parents, the family, friends, the state, and the world." His comment that "suffering for humankind constitutes my act of faith" (DING and ZHAO 2009, 631) suggests that he has never left from his concern with the state, the world, and humankind, namely, his concern with "the whole." As his "faith" consists in suffering for the whole, his insistence that the individual contributes to the whole stays the same.

His remark on an antireligious movement in 1922 also indicates the same posture. This movement emerged in opposition to the World Student Christian Federation that announced a conference in Beijing in April 1922. Liang observes that disputes over this conference signal an active public spirit that should be welcome. In his public lecture delivered on 16 April 1922, he first defines religion as the individual's object of faith, and speaks to his audience as follows:

> The object of faith may be natural beings such as a serpent, fire, and genitals, or transcendent beings such as God, Paradise, and the Pure Land, or religious individuals such as Lü Dongbin, Guan Yu, Muhammad, Jesus Christ, and Gautama Buddha. Additionally, a secular ideology may well be seen as a religion insofar as indvidiuals have absolute faith in it. A case in point is Marxism. Those who adhere to Marxism in Europe might be called "the people of Marxist faith"; those who espoused anti-Manchu nationalism during the late Qing period may be called "the persons of anti-Manchu faith." Faiths in secular ideologies are isomorphic to religious faiths as far as their mental operation is concerned. (LIANG 1922, 19)

From a phenomenological viewpoint of consciousness, Liang submits, faith in religion is identical to faith in secular ideology. In short, he argues, an anti-religious movement holds an anti-religionism as a religion.

Liang does not mean to deny secular ideologies as such. It is his position that religion is sacred, necessary, and useful for humankind (LIANG 1922, 23). His emphasis on the advantages of religion to the public welfare of society is consistent with his earlier opinion articulated in his lecture of 1899 in Japan that the revitalization of the East requires a return to the true teachings of Confucianism.

For him, "faith is holy such that it revitalizes the individual as well as society.… The most serious problem of the contemporary Chinese is their lack of faith" (LIANG 1922, 24). Such an insight makes him doubtful whether the Chinese nation could survive the fierce international struggle of all against all for existence (LIANG 1922, 25). Hence, "what is necessary for our nation is nothing but faith in order to prevent social corruption" (LIANG 1922, 25). This argument is not so much a theological defense as a defense of religion in terms of social proficiency—the contention that he already put forward in his lecture of 1899. On the other hand, Liang later moves beyond a naïve prospect of religion in his youth. In his lecture delivered to students in 1927, he no longer identifies morality and faith with religion proper. "Needless to say, knowledge and talent are important. But morality and faith are all the more indispensable—by faith I do not mean to refer to religion" (DING and ZHAO 2009, 735). He goes on to contend that "in order to reform our society, we must begin to edify the individual one by one; one becomes two; two become four; in the end, thousands or even millions of individuals will be edified" (DING and ZHAO 2009, 736). It seems that his conviction that the reformation of the whole begins with the cultivation of the individual continues to stand firm, even though his point of emphasis on the edification of the individual has shifted from positive religion to abstract faith. There seems to be no fundamental change in his prospect for social reform. That is to say, however he names it—for example, religion or faith—the social function that he expects of it is one and the same: namely, the edification of the individual.

Conclusion

Right after he was exiled to Japan, Liang saw banners to welcome soldiers. These said, "May you sacrifice yourselves in duty!" It struck him tremendously that Japan was ready to sacrifice the individual to the state. This was the moment in which he realized the importance of the self-sacrificial service of the individual for the whole. According to Roland Robertson, nation-states "copy" ideas and practices from other societies (ROBERTSON 1995, 41). It is in that moment that Liang "copied" from Japan the idea of national integration for the struggle for existence in a global society.

What is common in the early works of Liang and Katō is the sense of an impending crisis as to whether their nations survive or not. Liang argues:

> Any national struggle for existence depends on the knowledge as well as the capability of the people. The increase or the decrease in the knowledge as well as the capability of the people hinges in turn upon the kind of ideas and thoughts that the nation cherishes. The superiority and the dissemination of national ideas are contingent on the custom and the faith of the nation. For that reason, if the nation hopes to achieve its national independence, conversely, it has to grow its knowledge and capability. If the nation wishes to grow, it must improve its national ideas and thoughts. If it wants to change its national ideas and thoughts, it is required to renew the custom and the faith of the people and propagate something new.　　　　　　(LIANG 1899a, 55)

For Katō and Liang, international society means the jungle of the struggle for existence. They presuppose that Social Darwinism reveals the criteria by which to compare one state with another. States are to be measured in terms of the survival of the fittest and the law of the jungle.[11] The state struggling for existence is understood in the biological analogy of an organic entity. One aspect of Spencer's social evolutionism can be summarized as social organism theory, which can be extended to understand the nation as an organic entity. In order to win the international battle for existence, they also insist, the state must be strong and organically formed: the solidarity and the integration of the nation are indispensable. Hence they wrestled with the issue of how the atomistic and utilitarian individuals who seek their self-interests alone can be transformed into moral agents, thereby integrating the state into a unified whole. Katō and Liang internalized this problematic and explored the answer to it throughout their lives.

Kato's exploration proceeded from his inquiry into primitive Buddhism to the idea of a new religion of the *Deus-Homo* and ended with his proposal of Statist Shinto, the essence of which is National Polity Shinto as emperor worship. Liang thought as to whether what he conceived of as the solution to that problematic could be considered religious or not, and whether Buddhism and Confucianism should be used for his project. At any rate, for him, religion is necessary as "a catalyst in reshaping the cerebrums of the people" (LIANG 1899a, 55). He had once expected religion—Buddhism and Confucianism—to function as a "catalyst" for "faith." But, his disappointment that such an expectation is unlikely to be fulfilled turned him from religion, which, in the end, led him to his conceptual separation of faith and religion.

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11. While the terms "survival of the fittest" and "the law of the jungle" denote two different things, Katō uses them as synonyms. While Liang distinguishes between them, his followers did not attend to the semantic differences between these two terms (ONOGAWA 2010, 93–99).

In spite of all the changes and revisions within their thought, the basic framework of their projects remained the same: namely, that they aspired to develop and integrate their nations by means of internalizing common values into each spirit of the individual citizen. Unless the individual were united with the state—and unless the individual were united to the whole—Katō and Liang believed the nation would fail to survive the struggle for existence. In short, the basic idea of Social Darwinism determined their conceptual frameworks and persisted in their thought.

From their Social Darwinian perspectives, two claims follow: first, what must be prioritized is the survival of the state; second, both the nationalism that incorporates the individual into the state, as well as the individual's service for the state's survival, are necessary.[12] Such a nationalism demands that people share common values in order to incline individual members of a nation to the whole. For that purpose, the existing religion is mobilized, or a new religion becomes necessary. After all, the shared values that the members of the nation imagine are to be framed by the requirements of the survival of the state.

As mentioned earlier, Liang became critical of his early chauvinistic statism and seems to have attempted to go beyond his own nationalistic framework. Kato also refers to statism as chauvinism (Katō 1935, 957). One may uphold chauvinistic statism, identifying the whole with "the state"; alternatively, one may envisage a wider "world" in pursuit of the whole; or one may posit a "society" as totality that is predicated on different principles. The problematic of the content of "the whole" can be in no way exhausted by Katō's and Liang's discussions. The individual, the whole, and the mediation between them are the triad of terms that constitute an "equation," so to speak, that may solve the problematic of social unity. "The whole" signifies one of these three terms. For this term, one may choose "the state," or "the world," or "society." In any case, the question presents itself: What must be the content of "the whole"?[13] The same question about the term "religion" as mediation may also arise.

For Katō and Liang, religion stands for the mediating term between the individual and the whole. Katō and Liang were concerned with the question of what

12. Nationalism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. While it tends toward xenophobia and predatory warfare, it also lays claim to the equality and the solidarity of citizens, and orients people toward democracy. Such an ambivalence of nationalism makes sense if we look at it in terms of Social Darwinism, that the survival of the nation requires national integration amid the fierce international struggle of all against all for existence.

13. The indeterminacy of the content of a nation, as well as the impossibility of defining a nation, seem to be rooted in the impossibility as well as the meaninglessness of defining "the whole" substantially: any definition of "the whole" is more or less arbitrary. Social Darwinism temporalizes, as it were, the empty "whole" by positing the restless progress of humankind from the past toward the future.

sort of mediating term incorporates the individual into the "public" whole, for example, the state or society. They found the answer to this question in the adherence to common values and the spiritual integration of the nation that religion may or may not make possible. In this sense, they indeed faced one of the fundamental problems in social science: how is social order possible? They so internalized this issue that impatience arose in them as they tackled it. Then, they were irritated by the ignorance of those who did not share the same awareness of this problem with them, and their impatience and irritation restricted their thought.

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Views on the Pursuit of Happiness in Japanese New Religions

The Vitalistic Conception of Salvation and Systems of Instruction

This article presents views on, and approaches to, the pursuit of happiness in Japanese new religions, and elucidates their theodicean features. Using as its frame of reference the vitalistic conception of salvation, a fundamentally identical structure in views on salvation and the world in new religions, this article focuses on the systems of instruction (*kyōdō shisutemu*) they use as it proceeds. The article relies mainly on statements from the major religious groups for its sources, making reference also to groups categorized as "new new religions." The study ascertained that the new religions have in common a rationally systematized theodicy. They have a shared world view that holds that a person (1) should "polish their heart," strive to live the right way, and return to the true nature of a pure and unspoiled human being; and (2) should put teachings into practice in their everyday lives, proactively reach out to other people, disseminate the truth, and carry out deeds that are useful in the world; through that process, a person will (3) earn "blessings" and "merit" from a transcendent being that in turn will (4) make it possible to enjoy a happy life. Furthermore, the study also makes clear that not just appealing to a transcendent being but also engaging in ethical practices and discipline in one's life are necessary conditions for enjoying happiness.

KEYWORDS: Japanese new religions—theodicy—vitalistic conception of salvation—instruction system—worldly benefits

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T HE OBJECTIVE of this article is to elucidate the kinds of views on happiness that Japanese new religions preach, the instruction they give about how to pursue it, and their logic and practices that make it possible to obtain happiness.

Max Weber wielded the concept of "theodicy" (Ger. *Theodizee*) to give meaning to happiness and suffering. Weber argued that there were only three bodies of thought in the world's religions that provided theodicies that were logically consistent: those of Indian karma [Ger. *Karman*], Zoroastrian dualism, and predeterminism with its hidden god [*Deus Absconditus*] (WEBER 1972, 48). He contrasted predeterminism premised by an all-powerful god with human beings being guided to a purely ethical rotation/revolution, and assessed the teachings of karma, Zoroastrian dualism, Confucianism, and Japanese Buddhism as not evoking ethical demands nor forming a rational, secular inner life and attitude based on abstemiousness in this world. Weber further argued that the core of mass religious consciousness in Asia, including Japan, lay not in wonder (*wunder*) but rather in magic (*Magie*). Magic is an irrational operation that destroys all meaningful connections between phenomena, according to Weber; it stood in a contrastive relationship with wonder, which was regarded as an act of rational global domination and bestowed by god's blessings (WEBER 1951; 1958; 1963).

The present article seeks to answer the question of what makes up the theodicean characteristics of Japan's new religions. Of course, while "new religions" may be a short phrase, the *Shinshūkyō kyōdan jinbutsu jiten* (The encyclopedia of new religious groups and persons in Japan) presents articles on some three hundred such groups (INOUE et al. eds. 1996). There is considerable variation depending on the period in which these religions were created or stepped to the forefront, as well as on their pedigree (Shinto-derived, *Lotus Sutra*-worshipping, and so on). Nonetheless, it has been noted that if one brackets the details of jargon and teachings unique to each group separately and focuses on overall structure, they basically share an identical world view that has been termed a vitalistic conception of salvation (TSUSHIMA et al. 1979).

In the following, I proceed by reviewing key concepts extracted from empirical Japanese research on new religions while presenting specific discourses (lessons, sermons, teachings, doctrines) from the groups. The ideas, concepts, and

examples presented in this article rely heavily on a series of surveys conducted regarding "instruction systems" and "religious strategies for interpreting and resolving problems in life" under the direction of former (now emeritus) Toyo University Professor Nishiyama Shigeru (joint researchers Kojima Nobuyuki, Ōnishi Katsuaki, Tsukada Hotaka, and Kumamoto Masaki).[1] Please note that some of the materials contained herein duplicate existing articles and reports.

Vitalistic Views of Salvation in New Religions

In this section, I will advance my argument by stipulating that the new religions are religions formed through mass-led movements that established a new religious style, and relatively different from the religious traditions formed prior to the early modern period. They have been created or have upsurged in the years since around the Bakumatsu (the end of the Edo) and Meiji Restoration periods (mid nineteenth century; see Nishiyama 2005).

Groups originating or upsurging between the end of the Edo and the early years of the Meiji periods include Kurozumikyō 黒住教, Tenrikyō 天理教, Honmon Butsuryūkō (later Honmon Butsuryūshū 本門佛立宗), Konkōkyō 金光教, Maruyamakyō 丸山教, and Renmonkyō 蓮門教. From the later Meiji to the Taishō periods there were Ōmoto 大本, Taireidō 太霊道, Honmichi ほんみち, Amatsukyō 天津教, Ennōkyō 円応教, and Bukkyō Kanka Kyūsaikai 仏教感化救済会 (later Hōon-ji 法音寺). From the end of the Taishō through the early Shōwa periods arose Hitonomichi (later Pāfekuto ribatī kyōdan パーフェクト・リバティー教団, also known as PL Kyōdan), Nenpō Shinkyō 念法眞教, Gedatsukai 解脱会, Reiyūkai 霊友会, Seichō no Ie 生長の家, Bentenshū 辯天宗, Sekai Kyūseikyō 世界救世教, and Soshindō 祖神道. Groups that emerged to prominence from the end of the war to the years of high-speed growth included Jiu 璽宇, Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō 天照皇大神宮教, Risshō Kōseikai 立正佼成会, Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, Busshō Go'nenkai 佛所護念会, Myōchikai 妙智會, Zenrinkai (later Zenrinkyō 善隣教), Nakayama Shingo Shōshū 中山身語正宗, Byakkō Shinkōkai 白光真宏会, and Reiha no Hikari 霊波之光. Following the high-speed growth years, Shinnyo-en 真如苑, Sekai Mahikari Bunmei Kyōdan 世界真光文明教団, Sūkyō Mahikari

崇教真光, GLA, Agonshū 阿含宗, Kenshōkai 顕正会, Aum Shinrikyō オウム 真理教, Kōfuku no Kagaku (Happy Science) 幸福の科学, and Worldmate ワールドメイト all stepped forth. New religions have developed and become prominent in several waves, and these groups have their respective systems of belief, practice, and organizational structure.

Research into the belief systems (precepts and thought) of the new religions has been pursued based on three approaches: (1) to understand them in terms of their links with traditional religions and relationship with their intellectual foundations; (2) to understand them as expressions of popular and mass Japanese thought; and (3) to see the new religions as having unique teachings distinct from those of the existing religious traditions, and to understand in an immanent way the structure of their religious thought (TSUSHIMA 1990a, 213).[2] The vitalistic conception of salvation that the present article presumes as its point of reference is a concept that arose from the third of the approaches mentioned above.

I would like to provide a basic summary here of an article written by TSU-SHIMA et al. (1979). The article investigates eleven religious groups: Kurozumi-kyo, Konkōkyō, Tenrikyō, Ōmotokyo, Reiyukai, Seichō no Ie, Risshō Kōseikai, PL Kyōdan, Sōka Gakkai, Sekai Kyuseikyō, and Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō. According to Tsushima, the precepts of the new religions are identical in terms of their basic structure. A deity in these groups is conceptualized as "the source from which all life emanates and the source which nurtures all life," or even as "the Original Life" itself. They (whether in the singular or plural sense) have the image of "a motherly being who affectionately nurtures all things." The true nature of a human being, on the other hand, is conceptualized as "an individual-ized manifestation of the Original Life or an existence which has been endowed with this life force" that is "divine, unpolluted, pure, and perfect." Human beings are considered as being "kept alive" and "nurtured by the gracious and infinite benefit of the Original Life" who "cannot exist independent of it." Deriving from this is the understanding that human beings are naturally obliged to be grateful for this welcome beneficence. To forget that they were given life out of that, to not have a sense of gratefulness, and to cling to their ego and their selfish desires is conceptualized as being "evil" and a "sin." This is the root of "suffering" and "misfortune." It becomes possible to gain happiness by renouncing self-interest and self-centeredness, and by recovering the heart of one who is grateful for

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2. Examples of the first approach are the research of Hori Ichirō 堀 一郎, Fujii Masao 藤井 正雄, Miyata Noboru 宮田 登, and Kōmoto Mitsugi 孝本 貢. The second may be exemplified by the research of Saki Akio 佐木秋夫, Takagi Hiroo, Murakami Shigeyoshi 村上重良, Yasumaru Yoshio, and Kozawa Hiroshi 小沢 浩, while the research of Tsurufuji Ikuta 鶴藤幾太, Morioka Kiyomi 森岡清美, Ikeda Akira 池田 昭, Shimazono Susumu 島薗 進, and Tsushima Michihito illustrates the third.

the blessings of life. The specific norms and practices demanded of humans therein are regarded as expressions of a sense of gratitude toward other people and things, as well as ethical conduct in daily life such as integrity, honesty, and sincerity. On the other hand, the explanation given for why misfortunes occur to people who live with a "proper heart" is that some selfish or self-centered behavior in the past (in one's previous life or on the part of an ancestor) is creating a blockage in the present life through the influence of the genealogical relationships among lives. The foregoing are essential to theories on the cause of misfortunes as well as the theodicies of new religions as presented in the above-mentioned article.

Tsushima would subsequently recast the vitalistic conception of salvation into the broader "vitalistic world view and conception of salvation." Thought on human life would be categorized into the idea of it as a living collective that derives directly from a parent deity, that is, a cosmic life force, and the idea that it is supported by reciprocal linkages with other living beings (parents and ancestors, as well as other people and animals with whom we have a connection) that surround us. He conceptualized the former as "great life thought" and the latter as "spirit world thought" (Tsushima 1990b). As to how they are related, Tsushima argues that life thought accounts for the fundamental part of the so-called world view in the majority of new religious groups. Spirit world thought does not appear on its own; rather, generally it is found together with great life thought.

The vitalistic conception of salvation is strongly compelling as a bottom-up concept closely related to the realm of experience, and has become one of the best-known in the study of the history of new religions (Nishiyama 2005, 219; Yumiyama 2003, 51). Many scholars in the field, including the present author, have touched on and cited it, and special sessions were organized at the 2002 conference of the Japanese Association for the Study of Religion and Society and the 2008 conference of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies to discuss it.[3]

Various opinions have been put forth about the concept, but to the author's mind its validity remains completely unshaken. However, researchers have pointed out a number of considerations that should be noted: (1) follow-up efforts at corroboration are necessary given the strongly tentative character of the assumptions underpinning this concept; (2) careful studies of each group are needed, particularly in regard to the relationships between "self-directed spiritual renewal" (*jirikiteki na kokoronaoshi* 自力的な心なおし) and "other-directed esoteric ritual" (*tarikiteki na higi* 他力的な秘儀) and between "official doctrine" and "on-the-spot precepts"; (3) there is room for investigation as to

3. For details regarding the two sessions, refer to the *Japanese Association for the Study of Religion and Society* (2004), and Kojima et al. (2009). Regarding the literature that refers to the vitalistic conception of salvation, see Terada (2009).

whether or not one can observe vitalistic conceptions of salvation and world views in new religions that have been created or stepped to the forefront in post-modern social conditions (the so-called "new new religions"); (4) it is hoped there will be comparative research into whether one can detect similar views on salvation and the world in religions elsewhere in East Asia and outside of Japan; and (5) careful studies should be made into the similarities and differences with the Taishō vitalism concept that has been presented in literary studies.[4] The present article proceeds with considerations (1) and (3) in mind.

Theodicies of Happiness in New Religions

The following kinds of teachings can be ascertained when we reexamine the vitalistic concept of salvation from the perspective of views on happiness. Let us examine the discourses of Konkōkyō, Tenrikyō, and Seichō no Ie:

> Kami (the deity) does not exist separate from human beings. The function of Kami is to create the foundations for humans to live. People cannot maintain themselves without the functioning of Kami. We turn to Kami, pour in the heart and soul of our lives that Kami has produced, and do our best to make that truth function. By so doing, we reveal our own function on a line in the manner of actualizing and making manifest the will of Kami. Thanks to our doing so, Kami is given expression there.
>
> (Konkōkyō: Konkōkyō Honbu Kyōchō 1972, 225)

Konkōkyō explains that by becoming a human being who makes manifest the workings of Kami—that is to say, a *kamihito*, it becomes possible to achieve the *medeta medeta* [happy, happy] lot in life of "ancestral and familial prosperity" through "safety and health":

> God the Parent (Oyagami) created human beings to see the Joyous Life of humankind and, thus, to share in that joy. To bring this intent of God the Parent into realization is the significance of human life.
>
> (Tenrikyō: Tenrikyō Kyōkai Honbu 1973, 69)

In Tenrikyō, a "paradise on earth" without illness, hardship, or privation is expressed as *yōki-gurashi* (translated by the group as "joyous life"). The Oya-

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4. Regarding the above-mentioned points, see Nishiyama (2008) as well as both the *Japanese Association for the Study of Religion and Society* (2004), and Kojima et al. (2009). In particular, refer to Tsushima Michihito's summary briefing, Yumiyama Tatsuya's report, and floor comments from Nishiyama Shigeru at the 2002 Religion and Society conference, and to Kojima Nobuyuki's panel summaries and comments from the 2008 Japanese Association for Religious Studies conference; see Kojima et al. (2009). Nishiyama (2008) attempts to investigate items 1 and 2; Terada attempts to investigate item 5 (Terada 2014).

gami, it explains, created human beings in order to bring about such a life. As for Seichō no Ie:

> The life of human beings is that of being "children of god." They were created to enjoy from the start, to be happy from the start. . . . True enjoyment and delight are generated from within. Because human beings are the children of God, immanent within them they have enjoyment and delight that can always be called out if they call it out.　　　　(Seichō no Ie: Taniguchi 1996, 156)

> The True God or True Buddha is a being without limits, like teaching only about the next life or the flesh or the soul. . . . Because human beings were made by god, they were not made with imperfections like becoming ill. And inconsistences did not take place, like God making human beings to commit sins or to punish them for such. If there is no sin in this world that God made, then there is also no illness. . . . If that True Image befitting God or Buddha is not understood . . . then you cannot achieve true happiness.
>　　　　(Seichō no Ie: Taniguchi 1962, 24–28)

Next we turn to Kōfuku no Kagaku, which has not yet been addressed in the literature from the perspective of a vitalistic conception of salvation:

> Why is it that human beings are able to want happiness in the first place? The reason for this is because human beings are children of the light that have branched off from the one God. And if human beings are the children of God, then one would expect human beings to have within them the same disposition as a god. . . . So, what exactly does the happiness of a God mean? What on earth might God feel happy about? Might not God take pleasure at creation, evolution, development, and prosperity? Within the great harmony of all things developing and prospering? Amid the experience on the way of that tremendous development taking place? This is what I feel.
>　　　　(Kōfuku no Kagaku: Ōkawa 1990, 179–81)

We can see that Kōfuku no Kagaku—a group categorized as a so-called "new new religion"—also sticks to the same type of world view and rhetoric as the "old" new religions.

To achieve a happy lot in life, the following practices must be undertaken. Let us look at Konkōkyō, Tenrikyō, and Seichō no Ie.

> Whether we can accept blessings or not is something that lies within our hearts. If we can only renew our hearts, we can receive any number of blessings.　　　　(Konkōkyō: Konkōkyō Honbu Kyōchō 1989, 54–55)

> Originally, the relationship between Oyagami and the human beings who were made out of divinity's intent was that of parent and child; it certainly was not a relationship lacking in affinity. However, with the free spirits they have

been given, human beings over many years became selfish in their attentions and prideful.

I would like to see human beings firmly change and develop a spirit of single-hearted salvation (*tasuke ichijō*). If human beings would only develop a spirit of supporting and helping one another, Oyagami would also save them in some way. (Tenrikyō: Tenrikyō Kyōkai Honbu 1973, 212–13)

To become truly happy, one must control the desires of the ego in the correct direction. . . . To become truly happy, one must have a generous mind. . . . When a person is truly pardoned, and all incidents and affairs are accepted with a sense of gratitude, a person can obtain the release of his/her soul.

(Seichō no Ie: Taniguchi 1996, 169)

Among Buddhist-derived new religions, the logic extolled is similar, though they use the Buddha (*hotoke-sama*) in place of God or Oyagami. Here is an example from Nenpō Shinkyō:

Leave everything up to the Buddha when it comes to past karma. If you treasure and value this world, and work with all your heart to accumulate virtue and do good, then there is nothing to worry about. For example, even when some karma has made itself known, the Buddha will protect you so that great misfortunes become small ones and small ones become nothing at all. . . . We must first "polish our hearts" and chase out the gloom. . . . The heart in essence is something that is perfectly pure. It is the self that darkens it.

(Nenpō Shinkyō: Ogurayama Kongō-ji 小倉山金剛寺, *Nenpō hōgoshū*
[*Kaiteiban*] 念法法語集[改訂版], 1984, as cited in Kojima 2008, 16)

The "ethic of purity" that Fujii Takeshi noted can be clearly observed here (Fujii 1990).[5] By returning to the true "pure" and "unspoiled" nature of a human being freed from self-centeredness and self-interest through "polishing the heart" and "polishing the soul," it becomes possible to obtain the "blessings" and "help" of a "god" or "Oyagami" or "Buddha" and thus obtain or receive happiness. Deities and humans are not separate from one another. They are "parents and children" or "children of gods" who have the "same dispositions." They were made "to be happy in essence." The foregoing theodicies regarding happiness can be seen.

5. See Yasumaru Yoshio's concept of "the philosophy of heart." However, caution is necessary with regard to the differences between the folk morality of hard work, filial piety, harmony, self-sacrifice, and subservience and the nature of the correct heart that the new religions espouse (Yasumaru 1999).

Worldly Benefits in New Religions

Words that appear in the teachings of the new religions such as *okage* ("blessings"), *tasuke* ("help"), *kudoku* 功徳 ("merit"), and *genshō* 現証 ("actual proof") refer to improvements in situations and changes in fortune in real life—that is, worldly benefits. The new religions are forthright in their preaching about worldly benefits, but there are individual variations in how they go about it. Furthermore, even the same group will change its content and tone regarding worldly benefits promised depending on the times. Let us look here at Sōka Gakkai, who teach about worldly benefits in an easily understood fashion and a direct way of speaking. First I will present statements from Toda Jōsei 戸田城聖:

> By believing in the Gohonzon 御本尊 ("object of devotion") and working hard on the Daimoku 題目 (chanting "Namu myōhō renge kyō") to train oneself and teach others, the sick will become healthy, the poor wealthy, and the foolish clever.
>
> (Sōka Gakkai: *Daibyakurenge* 大白蓮華, January 1964,
> as cited in NISHIYAMA 2012, 50)

> The next time we come into this world, we want to have thirty maids and five servants, graduate from a first-class university, marry a fine girl, and enjoy supreme happiness together with our gifted children . . .
> (Sōka Gakkai: *Daibyakurenge*, September 1956, as cited in NISHIYAMA 2012, 50)

Next, I offer statements from when Ikeda Daisaku 池田大作 was president.

> Even if the doctors have given up, the Gohonzon will save you. If you confess to having disparaged the teachings, and devoutly strive in your prayers to be made healthy because you sincerely have faith and will be useful to spreading the word, you will certainly be bathed in the expansive merit of the Gohonzon.
>
> (Sōka Gakkai: Izumi Satoru 和泉覚, *Shidō no izumi* 指導の泉,
> Seikyō shinbunsha 聖教新聞社, 1979, as cited in ŌNISHI 2008, 88)

> You cannot say that a religion where obtaining merit in this life is a given and prayers are powerless in this world is a true or correct religion.
> (Sōka Gakkai: KODAIRA 1962, 113)

> If you join Sōka Gakkai and believe sincerely, no matter how serious your illness you will be healed.   (Sōka Gakkai: KODAIRA 1962, 115)

The Sōka Gakkai of more recent years has adopted the following tone:

> It is taught that when you deeply believe the Gohonzon and strongly chant the Daimoku, a powerful life force wells up and you can overcome any disease and become healthy. Believing that with good grace and practicing it

is important. . . . If you decide you cannot get well, then naturally no matter how much you pray you won't get well. If you can decide and pray that you absolutely will try to heal yourself, then you will start on the path to recovery. In that sense, you can say that illness is not about whether you will passively "get well" or not, but rather about to actively "heal or not heal."

For that reason, even when you are seriously ill the crucial thing is to decide to be forward-looking and pray that you will "turn poison into medicine, change my fate, and make this a chance to be even healthier than ever before.

(Sōka Gakkai: Kawai Hajime 河合一, *Zoku: Seikatsu ni ikiru shinkō Q&A* 続・生活に生きる信仰 Q&A, Daisanbunmeisha 第三文明社, 1997, as cited in ŌNISHI 2008, 89)

One can perceive that the optimistic worldly benefits of the Toda and Ikeda eras have changed into soft and cautious turns of phrase with the changes in the times and the maturation of the group. Of course, changes of this nature were not limited to Sōka Gakkai. However, whether in the past or today, there has been no change when it comes to new religions regarding the pressing problems of life, such as unease, anxiety, and torment brought about by need, illness, and disputes, as well as the expectations for improving the situation. Let us examine some Risshō Kōseikai discourse from recent years:

When suffering is produced due to troubles over illness or relationships with other people, everyone hopes that it will be quickly alleviated. There are many people who seek relief from real suffering and turn to deities and buddhas. Beneficial worldly merit (*genzeriyakuteki na kudoku*) is what most average people seek of religion. This is the thread that leads to religion. Such prayers expressing the desire to be saved are important for human beings. They should not be disavowed. (Risshō Kōseikai: NIWANO 2008, 160–61)

The fact that one should not disavow "beneficial worldly merit" is of note here. We turn next to a statement from Seichō no Ie about the relationship between human happiness and "desire":

Having been born as human beings, we want to live in happiness. We as humans instinctively have this desire. However, life is not filled solely with such happy people. Why is this so? One reason is because they do not know the "laws of the mind," and another is because they do not know what happiness is. (Seichō no Ie: TANIGUCHI 1967, 3)

The fact that human beings have desire is undeniable. They explain that it first becomes possible to enjoy happiness by learning the laws of the mind and coming to know what true happiness is. Worldmate, a group categorized as one of the so-called new new religions, also uses similar logic about happiness and desire:

> What is happiness to you? . . . It is regularly praying for people to be able to relieve the dissatisfactions in their daily lives, or to be able to satisfy their own desires. Because human beings are born into this world in the flesh, it is natural for them to try to give that flesh satisfaction; since they have minds desiring pleasant conditions, this is also understandable. However, there is no end to human desires. If you can get satisfaction for one, another dissatisfaction is created. Satisfy that and yet another new desire arises. You eventually surrender yourself to the nonstop flow of desires. . . . One might just think that human beings hoping for happiness might be the source of their ruin, but that is not the case. That's because ruin is invited by errors in the method for seeking happiness.
> (Worldmate: FUKAMI 1987, 16–17)[6]

While new religions affirm worldly benefits, they do not preach that you cannot obtain "blessings," "results," or "actual proof" if you do not fully understand the content of their teachings. Let us return to Sōka Gakkai:

> The creation of the values [of gain, good, and beauty] lays a foundation in the life force of each person. So long as a person's life force is as strong as it can be, that person can obtain happiness. This life force absolutely cannot be obtained through ascetic practices or false religions. A strong and pure life force will be drawn up precisely through the one ultimate religion.
> (Sōka Gakkai: TODA 1963, 113)

> Question: If you worship the Gohonzon, why are illnesses healed and why do you make money? Answer: The reason why there is merit is not something to be understood through theory. You will understand it only by having faith and experiencing it. Life is not truly understood by only learning through theory, by only imagining and surmising. You understand quickly only if you experience it.
> (Sōka Gakkai: KODAIRA 1962, 117)

The enjoyment of worldly benefits through recitations of this sort is broadly apparent in *Lotus Sutra*-worshipping new religions. The earliest appearance of the discourse is in the homilies of Honmon Butsuryūshū. It is through worldly benefits that people are first instructed in the teachings:

> If the actual proof has benefits, naturally it is from the five characters of wondrous law that people believe.
> (Nagamatsu Nissen 長松日扇, HONMON BUTSURYŪSHŪ KYŌIKUIN 1973, 115)

Theodicies of Suffering in New Religions

How do new religions deal with theodicies of suffering, that is, the issues related to "the imperfectness of the world"? Why are people confronted with need, ill-

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6. The name of the group at that time was Cosmomate.

ness, and disputes? Or being beset from all sides, or the loss of purpose in life, or unease, anxiety, and torment? Let us return to Seichō no Ie:

> The human sufferings given to us have within them some aspect that is not natural to our lives—that is to say, not on the true path of growth. They appear in order to make us aware of those aspects that are not natural.
>
> <div align="right">(Seichō no Ie: Taniguchi 1962, 25)</div>

The theory on the causes of suffering being argued here is that the "Great Life of the Universe" (the Oyasama) is making human beings take notice since they have forgotten "the true path of growth," that is, the fact they are the children of god, and that they have strayed from correct ways of living and of how they frame their minds. The Great Life is providing them with the opportunity to polish their souls. "The Oyasama does not take pleasure in the suffering of we children," the group believes. "We are given suffering and illness of necessity when we will not grow if we are not made to suffer" (Taniguchi 1962, 13). The sense that there is a loving god in the background is noticeable here. The rhetoric used to explain that such misfortunes and suffering are messages from the gods or buddhas takes such forms as *o-tameshi* (trials) (Konkōkyō), *kami no michi-oshie* (the path-teaching of the kami) or *michi-ose* (road signs) (Tenrikyō), *mishirase* (divine warning) (PL Kyōdan), *osatoshi* (admonition) (Risshō Kōseikai), *kaikoku* (warning) (Mahikari-derived groups), and *riburai* (reminders) (Shinnyo-en).

Seichō no Ie teaches that "misfortune" and "doubt" will "disintegrate" by opening one's eyes to the "truth" and cleansing the "mind" and the "environment." However, it also teaches that "during certain periods suffering is needed for our souls to grow" and "sufferings and sadnesses of any sort are disciplines we are all thankful for having gotten as materials for the limitless growth of the self" (Taniguchi 1962, 10–11). Comments about "disciplines" and "tests" to improve the soul can be seen in many religious groups.

Such theories on the causes of suffering are shared by many groups. Zenrinkyō's theories on the cause of illness provide one of the most interesting examples. Tsukada Hotaka has reported that the group has indicated separate discourses on the cause of suffering (all originating in one's frame of mind) based on the affected part—digestive tract, circulatory system, urinary system, respiration, and so forth—and, in the case of cancer, the specific type: stomach, esophagus, colon, bile passage, bowels, larynx, lungs, skin, bladder, prostate, uterus, and breast (Zenrinkai Kyōmushitsu 1990, cited in Tsukada 2008, 110–11).[7] Zenrinkyō argues that illnesses arise from having a "straying heart."

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7. See *Zenrinkai kyōmushitsu* 善隣会教務室, ed., Shirīzu Zenrinkyō (5), *Byōki konzetsu kenkōhō* シリーズ善隣教（五）病気根絶健康法, 1990, and Shirīzu Zenrinkyō (7), *Gan konzetsu yobōhō* シリーズ善隣教（七）癌根絶予防法, 1991.

The significance assigned to this is that of a "compassionate reminder" from the Goshinzon-*sama* (*Tenchi ōmioya no kami*, or the god of heaven and earth who made all things). Resolution can be achieved by deeply reflecting on one's stance, attitude, and frame of mind toward others, and by improving one's "approach to real human relationships."

For its part, Seichō no Ie pairs the above-mentioned theories on the cause of suffering and its theodicies with respect to the living environment—the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) of home, workplace, and school—that is connected to reality, with the following take on problems that include "the karmic relationship of past lives"—framing the latter as the vertical temporal axis in contrast to the horizontal axis that the former represent:

> Regarding the source of illness, if we observe this vertically in a temporal sense, then if the cause was created by someone's first generation then there is also a karmic relationship that has been handed down by the children and grandchildren across the generations and tens of generations after it was created. . . . There are also many cases in which especially incurable and malignant diseases arise in the flesh in order to nullify the sins through the self-mortification of the soul (*reikon*) of the human being who created the sinful deed in a past generation. Thus, even as the soul does want to try to heal the illness in the spirit of the flesh, it also delights in cleansing the sins from past lives with deformities in the soul itself and incurable malignant diseases to one's power and by gaining strength to cause suffering. . . . The intention of the soul immanent in a person to want to become ill manifests itself . . . and it is difficult to get well. (Seichō no Ie: Taniguchi 1962, 34)

In such cases, "sin is not intrinsic."[8] The method for resolving this is "to make the spirit in the depths of a person self-aware of the truth [that] even without self-mortification this is entirely a full circle (*ensō*) [of the no-mind for contemplation]." In that event, the recommended thing to do is to teach and recite the scripture (*seikyō dokuju*) [meaning to recite *Kanro no hōu* 『甘露の法雨』 to ancestors and aborted children]. Also, the literature on the vitalistic conception of salvation speaks of "selfish and self-centered behavior in the past" of previous lives or those of one's ancestors, but Seichō no Ie teaches that not only past lives or ancestors but also "karmic relationships" and such "lost souls" as aborted children, the souls of relatives, the souls of "earthbound spirits" (*jibaku no rei* 地縛の霊), and the souls of strangers (*mu'en no rei* 無縁の霊) produce misfortunes through notions (*sōnen* 想念) and pulses (*hadō* 波動). This illustrates an aspect of the "spirit world thought" of which Tsushima made note, and is often preached in new religions derived from Ōmotokyō or Sekai Kyuseikyō.

8. *Tsumi* 罪 ("sin") is regarded as coming from *tsumi* 積み ("accumulation") of other things that have piled up upon those that originally were with us and block our original freedom.

"Teaching and reciting" corresponds to an "other-directed esoteric ritual" in Seichō no Ie, while in Sekai Kyūseikyō it is *jōrei* 浄霊 ("cleansing the soul") and in Mahikari-derived groups it is the *mahikari no waza* or *tekazashi* (names for their hand ritual of channeling a purifying "pure light"). However, that is not to say they teach that the workings from the spirit world or past lives absolutely cannot resolve matters if they do not rely on such other-directed esoteric rituals:

> No matter how great the *meguri* (accumulated past offenses of one's family) are, you can get them removed through faith. The *meguri* from your ancestors, divine punishments—Kami (the deity) will lead you to the path.
>
> (Konkōkyō: Konkōkyō Honbu Kyōchō 1989, 45)

The Gohonzon and chanting the Daimoku correspond to other-directed esoteric rituals in Sōka Gakkai. However, the group teaches that you cannot gain other-directed merit (Gohonzon) if you do not autonomously and proactively make a self-directed approach of your own. Furthermore, while many Buddhist-derived new religions teach that the karma and karmic relationships of one's own past lives are the cause of misfortunes, they do not specify that as the only reason:

> If you are sick due to the karma of your own past lives or due to an evil spirit, then you certainly will not get well if you do not rely on the great Gohonzon of *namu myōhō rengekyō*.   (Sōka Gakkai: Kodaira 1962, 113–16)

In new religions, the theory on the cause of suffering they provide for when confronted with suffering or unjustness is that (1) it is a notice from the transcendent being (kami, Buddha) that the person has strayed from the proper way of living or frame of mind; (2) it is an operation of the spirit world, such as a soul or karmic relationship; or (3) it is retribution for an evil or sinful act in a past life. With respect to karma, the pattern is to explain that one aspired to it of one's own accord (a) in order to get rid of a sin committed in a past life or (b) to take on the mission of saving people. Let us examine (a) here:

> Sinful acts such as disparaging Buddhist teachings that have built up as a cause in past lives produce retribution as their effect in our lives in the present generation. For that reason, it is a natural principle that if you accumulate heavy sinful acts then the retribution will likewise be heavy. However, on this point, to "convert retribution into something borne lightly" (*tenjū kyōju* 転重軽受) means you can take the weighty retribution that in essence must be borne not only in the present life but over the future as well into something to be borne lightly in this life so those sinful acts will all be expiated. As to why this is possible, it is because the meritorious power of the protecting law will be stored, and will work in the life of the practitioner through the practitioner's belief in the true law in the current life and assiduousness in their disciplines.
>
> (Sōka Gakkai: Sōka Gakkai Kyōgakubu eds. 2002, 309)

They proclaim a theory on the cause of suffering that is based on sinful acts in past lives. But in a major difference from the fatalism of Indian teachings on *Karman*, the group offers the affirmative and optimistic precept that it can be totally changed depending on how you lead your life in the present:

> Seen from the perspective of an individual's karma (*shukugō* 宿業), suffering presents a splendid opportunity to change one's fate. Through the merit produced by practicing the true law, all of the bad karma etched in one's life can be revealed in this life and eliminated.
>
> (Sōka Gakkai: Sōka Gakkai Kyōgakubu eds. 2002, 293)

Examples of pattern (b) can be found in the Sōka Gakkai concept of *ganken ogō* 願兼於業, or "assuming bad karma of one's own volition," and that of *ganshō* 願生, or "birth by aspiration," in Risshō Kōseikai:

> [St. Nichiren] proclaimed that the great misfortunes that befall the life that one has now are great misfortunes that you ask to receive in order to fulfill your life's mission. One is joyful for the suffering one receives in order to help all living things. . . . While we bear various fates in our actual lives and lead those lives within a web of various interpersonal relationships, it is clear that those lives and existences as is are sites one asks for and brings about by assuming bad karma of one's own volition. . . . The important thing is for those sites themselves to be recognized as the sites of the mission one has prayed for and produced . . . and then fulfilling one's mission.
>
> (Sōka Gakkai: Sōka Gakkai Kyōgakubu eds. 2002, 314)

> Not one single person was born by chance as a human into this life. . . . No one's existence is the outcome of chance. To the last person, we were all born out of our aspirations into these lives with our many sufferings. In short, we are the products of *ganshō*. . . . When we become aware of our *ganshō*—our wishes to be born into these lives, then the fact that we are wholeheartedly working for all people through our work in the places where we now lead our lives will lead us to take pleasure from the bottom of our hearts.
>
> (Risshō Kōseikai: Niwano 1993, 45–47)

If we compare this to the theodicy of Indian *Karman*, we see that even premised by the circle of transmigration world view it still allows room for free will and choice in rebirth. You are born into a current lot in life chosen by yourself. The sinful acts of past lives are expunged by "wholeheartedly working . . . to fulfill your life's mission," and through this you can obtain a happy lot in life. Suffering is something that can be taken and turned into a "splendid opportunity" to change one's fate.

Systems of Instruction in New Religions

The matter of greatest concern with regards to ordinary citizens—who are potential converts to new religions—is simply what the advantages and disadvantages are to their daily lives. Religious groups skillfully explain their worldly benefits when it comes to the interests of ordinary citizens regarding the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the worries and anxieties that arise from them, and draw them in with religious "realities" and "truths." Many of the teachings of new religions treat individual benefits and merit as being on a continuous line with the happiness of others and with the common and universal happiness of society. Nenpō Shinkyō explains matters in the following way:

> Sincerely acting in the bodhisattva way will result in becoming a perfected person. That is, you will lead the happy life of the bodhisattva, your household will be that of a harmonious life of paradise, society will become one of harmoniously connected households of paradise, the nation will be one social paradise of peace, the world will be the ideal one of nations of paradise, and in short the world itself will be paradise.
>
> (Nenpō Shinkyō: *Ogurayama Kongō-ji*, 1984, as cited in KOJIMA 2008, 34)

Kojima labels this *shūshin seika chikoku heitenka* 修身斉家治国平天下 ("regulate the body and the family to govern the nation and pacify the world") world view an "accumulated salvation-type stage theory" (*kyūsai no tsumiage-gata dankairon* 救済の積み上げ型段階論) (KOJIMA 2008, 34). Many new religions place priority on rectifying one's own heart, making teachings a part of everyday life, and before everything else bringing unity to the household. Their world view holds that the spread of happy households will make it possible to diffuse and spread harmony and peace to the workplace, the local community, the nation, and the world. The "new new religion" Kōfuku no Kagaku explains matters as follows:

> I have said that human beings have the disposition to seek out happiness. The kinds of happiness that they seek and pursue are personal happiness and public happiness. Personal happiness refers to the search and pursuit for the happiness of the individual. Public happiness refers to the results of the pursuits for personal happiness: the creation of public happiness—in short, the building of a utopia—by expanding the individual utopia created around each person to encompass everything, that is, the whole of society, the whole of the world, and the whole of humanity.   (Kōfuku no Kagaku: ŌKAWA 1990, 179)

While the "household" was not mentioned and could be seen as distinctive, the accumulative nature of this theory with utopia being spread from the pursuit of personal happiness to that of public happiness is the same. We could say this point stands in contrast with New Age-style world views, which put an emphasis on self-awakening and do not stress the practice of specific ways of life.

The new religions do not promote achieving self-satisfaction with individual worldly benefits. Rather, they try to encourage disseminating to others about having directly experienced the correctness of teachings and feeling grateful-ness (sincerity) for them, and dedicating oneself toward promoting happiness throughout society. Nishiyama has conceptualized this as a "system of instruc-tion" (*kyōdō shisutemu* 教導システム), meaning a "sociocultural system for changing self-interested ordinary persons into altruistic bodhisattva . . . and making such changes possible." Alternatively, he says it can be described as a "skillful method of teaching sentient beings where, having appraised their worldly desires, [the teacher] explains the way of salvation (*Bodhi*) and through the use of expedient means (*hōben*) the listener is led to the truth" (NISHIYAMA 2003, 1). Nishiyama put forth these concepts based on the example of Buddhist-derived new religions, but such connections aside one can generally perceive this in new religions. Some statements here from Sekai Kyūseikyō are relevant:

> Healing illness is a means and not an end. That's why at the start you will be healed even without believing. The Gods permit this as expedient means as a special measure such that they assign roles to human beings who know noth-ing. However, they cannot be like that forever.
>
> (Sekai Kyuseikyō: *Sekai kyūseikyō Izunome kyōdan kyōten hensaniinkai*, eds.,
> 1963, as cited in KUMAMOTO 2008, 97)[9]

While this affirms worldly benefits (expedient means), they teach that one should not be satisfied forever with the healing of individual illnesses. Consider next a unique metaphor from Hōonji:

> What are expedient means? For example, when a child is born he or she is first given milk to drink. The parents did not have their child in order to have it drink milk. (Hōonji: SUZUKI 1962, 260)

The Buddha provides ordinary people with expedient means (benefits) the same way that an infant is given milk. However, to provide expedient means is not the original purpose or role of the Buddha. Human beings likewise were not created in order to be provided with expedient means. Hōonji teaches that while we have "the mysteries of outside help," including "the provision of divine power" (*jintsū gake* 神通がけ), the most important thing of all is to preserve the "three virtues" (benevolence, sincerity, and patience) and put the teachings into practice at home and in the community.

However, while the new religions reject fixating on enjoying worldly ben-efits and egotistically satisfying one's needs, they also do not deny or reject

9. See Sekai Kyūseikyō Izunome kyōdan kyōten hensaniinkai 世界救世教いづのめ教団教典編纂委員会, eds., *Tamanoizumi* (*Inori to jōrei*) たまのいずみ(祈りと浄霊), Sekai Kyūseikyō Izunome Kyōdan Shuppanbu 世界救世教いづのめ教団出版部, 1963.

them as being of a lower order. Whatever the event or desire, they see it as an opportunity to direct a person's gaze toward faith and inspire their interest in the group's teachings, and use the leverage to create a higher order of religious self-understanding as well as that of the world. Let us examine here some remarks from Risshō Kōseikai and Sōka Gakkai:

> The prayer "I want to be happy" may appear to be self-centered, but in fact it is linked at the bottom of one's heart to the prayer "make everyone happy." You do not solve a problem through your own efforts, but you still want to solve it somehow. At the moment you think this, your heart turns toward the religion that previously you had not relied upon and you recognize that religion somehow is important. You notice that you were not living through your own efforts but rather had been birthed by the kami and buddhas, and you change from a self-centered lifestyle to an altruistic one.
>
> (Risshō Kōseikai: Niwano 2008, 160–63)

> *Shakubuku* 折伏 ("convincing the counterpart of one's own interpretation of Buddhism") is not something you do because you want yourself to be happy. Rather, the attitude of someone who is doing true *shakubuku* is that of someone who is overjoyed by the merits of the Gohonzon, feels compassion for the other person's lot in life, and has a charitable soul. Doing *shakubuku* for selfish motivations will have no effect. (Sōka Gakkai: Kodaira 1962, 125)

While individual worldly benefits produce momentary fulfillment (satisfaction), they do not result in durable happiness. It is possible to acquire "true happiness" within the environment and time allotted you by continuing to long for progress and growth, by making approaches to others and society at large, and by treating that as pleasure.

Nishiyama has described this as follows: "Providing and receiving worldly benefits is not regarded as the ultimate objective for new religions. The favor with which they are viewed in the new religions rises to the extent that they deepen faith and encourage moving beyond to being altruistic." Nishiyama labels this cultural apparatus wherein people are guided into "religious beliefs that tie self-interest to altruism and see self-interest as something attainable through the very act of altruism" as an apparatus for joining and transforming self-interest and altruism (*jiri rita renketsu tenkan sōchi* 自利利他連結転換装置) (Nishiyama 2012, 49–51). Some discourse from Risshō Kōseikai will illustrate this:

> To be aware of transience and self-conscious about the value of life is the starting point for having something to live for. It is the road to happiness. If you do not understand the value and preciousness of life, then no matter how blessed you may be with health or with money and status you cannot savor true joy. . . . When we sort out those things that make us happy, two items come up. The first is to be a human being capable of being thankful. . . . The

other thing that results in happiness is bringing joy to others. It is the pursuit of the bodhisattva way. . . . Achieve benefits for yourself and benefit others, too . . . . Human beings achieve their purpose in life when self-interest and altruism are one and the same and they put all their heart into being devoted to others. It is at such moments that we can savor true joy and a true sense of satisfaction. (Risshō Kōseikai: NIWANO 2008, 261–71)

Conclusion

Using the vitalistic conception of salvation as my central point of reference, I have examined views on happiness in the new religions as well as their approaches in the pursuit of happiness. While my reexamination has unavoidably been a fragmentary one, it did confirm that they share views of the world and salvation that are rationally structured as well as practically-oriented teachings.

From a theodicean perspective, they see human beings as sharing in the ownership of the life of a transcendent being (kami, or buddhas, or the great life of the universe). They are the children of gods, and were originally created in happiness. Human beings are confronted with the unavoidable results of suffering, unjustness, and misfortune because these are (1) notifications from transcendent beings that they have strayed from proper ways of living or frames of mind; (2) some operation of the spirit world such as a soul working or a karmic relationship; or (3) retributions for evil or sinful acts in past lives. However, all forms of suffering or past karma (shukugō) can be expunged or transformed through belief and faith. The transcendent being provides the suffering without which human beings will not grow if they do not experience it, but that entity most certainly does not abandon them. There is a shared loving image of that entity watching over how human beings live their lives like a parent watches over a child. Furthermore, suffering in the new religions is seen as a message the transcendent being delivers to make people aware of the correct teachings and the truth. At the same time, they also see its significance as presenting a good opportunity for people to change their fortune and fate, for carrying out discipline to encourage the growth of their soul, and for accomplishing the mission assigned to them. In short, suffering and distress have a positive value in that in and of themselves they provide indispensable springboards for causing the ego to grow and change one's fortune. They function as stimuli for promoting self-cultivation and self-actualization (self-disciplining).

While the wording and rhetoric may differ from group to group, they share views of the world and salvation that hold that (1) members are to "polish their hearts" and strive toward living the right away so as to return to the true nature of pure and unspoiled human beings (that is, the children of gods); and then (2) through this process of putting the teachings into practice in their everyday lives, reaching out proactively to other people, disseminating the truth and true

law, and repeatedly engaging in deeds and conduct that are useful to the world they will earn the (3) "blessings," "help," "merit," and "actual proof" from a transcendent being or beings that will (4) make it possible to enjoy a happy life. One does not merely depend on "blessings" and "help" (other-directed salvation and magic) from the transcendent being; correcting one's mind and behavior and making approaches toward others and society are also prerequisites for receiving happiness.[10]

The theodicies of the new religions differ from the predeterminism, the Indian teachings of *Karman*, Zoroastrian dualism, and Confucian concepts that Weber suggested.

The transcendent beings of the new religions did not create human beings as entities who cannot reform themselves on their own like the Calvinist god did, or apportion to certain creatures eternal death. They do not imagine that the deity intends to be immeasurable by human standards (to be an absent god, that is, *Deus Absconditus*); rather, the deity wishes for human beings to lead happy lives. In the new religions the possibility of changing one's fate in the world opens up in ways that are not apparent in the fatalist Indian notion of *Karman*, a universal mechanism for retribution that does not allow for a transcendent being to intervene.

While the Zoroastrian supposition of a "shadow power" that produces iniquity and injustice and its regard of corporal desires as evil may resemble the "spirit world thought" of the new religions, they see the authority of transcendent beings as limited. One also does not widely see in the new religions any orientation (eschatological pathos) toward craving salvation in the future.[11] Impurity and evil can be wiped away in the new religions through self-help efforts in this world; they do not imagine the existence of some powerful evil or blackness that is a match for the transcendent being.

Though at a glance seeing misfortune as retribution for unworthiness as the result of desiring worldly benefits (happiness, wealth, and long life) and engaging in virtuous conduct for happiness may resemble Confucianism, there is a tremendous difference with the way of seeing the world. This is apparent where the observance of attitudes toward living and ceremonies in which virtuous conduct is matched to one's standing is seen in the same light as deficiencies in

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10. The new religions teach that the more the heart is polished the more that dust and shadows catch one's eye, and the more that one understands the appropriateness and correctness of teachings the more that one can become self-aware of the greatness (importance) of the duty incumbent on oneself (to practice altruism). In other words, the teachings of the new religions come with a mechanism that alternately cultivates and disciplines (gives subjecthood to) one's inner heart and external attitude toward living.

11. With regard to eschatology, there are also exceptions such as early Ōmotokyo, Honmichi, Tenshō Kōtai Jingūkyō, Kenshōkai, and the various Mahikari-related groups.

someone's education and livelihood. Weber viewed Confucianism as an ideology drawn toward the unconditional affirmation of the world—an adherence to traditionalist attitudes toward life—and in which humans did not regulate themselves from within. The new religions, however, emphasize internal self-control and rearranging lifestyles.

A unique aspect of Japan's new religions is that while they retain the Indian *Karman* world view, their fatalism is abstract and they do not reject this world. They actively and autonomously approach the self and the world in ways akin to predeterminism. Also, blessings and merit are viewed in the new religions within specific linkages of meanings. They are not seen as being synonymous with irrational, chaotic "magic." The new religions have developed ideas that can produce ethical transformations in humans, as the foregoing discussion has made clear.

Through his concepts of "systems of instruction" and the "apparatus for joining and transforming self-interest and altruism," Nishiyama has attempted to grasp the mechanisms by which the new religions instruct people and make them self-actualizing (self-disciplining). With regard to the systems of belief, practice, and organization related to these two concepts that Nishiyama has introduced, the present article has focused its discussions on the new religions' systems of belief. Further research will be required to draw attention to the systems of practice and organization.[12] This article constitutes an attempt to present an overall outline; it is hoped that future researchers will reexamine the subject with more empirical data and refine the concepts presented herein.

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12. Considerable research has already been done regarding the practical and organizational frameworks of instruction systems; see, for example, TAKAGI (1959), MIURA (1959), and SUZUKI (1970). With regard to work that has come out since the publication of the *Shinshūkyō jiten*, special note should be made of WATANABE (2001), HAGA and KIKUCHI (2006), and SAKURAI and NAKANISHI (2010). For Seichō no Ie, refer to TERADA (2008).

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Translated by Carl Freire

REVIEW ARTICLE

Jeff SCHROEDER

Historical Blind Spots

The Overlooked Figure of Chikazumi Jōkan

Iwata Fumiaki 岩田文昭, *Kindai Bukkyō to seinen: Chikazumi Jōkan to sono jidai* 近代
仏教と青年—近角常観とその時代 (Modern Buddhism and youth: Chikazumi Jōkan and
his age). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2014.

Ōmi Toshihiro 碧海寿広, *Kindai Bukkyō no naka no Shinshū: Chikazumi Jōkan to
kyūdōsha tachi* 近代仏教の中の真宗—近角常観と求道者たち (Shin in the midst of mod-
ern Buddhism: Chikazumi Jōkan and seekers of the way). Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 2014.

REGARDING the genesis of *Kindai Bukkyō to seinen*, Iwata Fumiaki explains
that at a 1999 conference on religion and psychology, scholars raised the
question of the origins of the Ajase Complex theory. First advanced by
psychoanalyst Kosawa Heisaku 古澤平作 (1897–1968) in a 1931 essay, the Ajase
Complex theory posited an inherent antagonism and guilt within mother-child
relationships. Just as Freud explained his Oedipal Complex theory in relation
to the myth of Oedipus, Kosawa explained his theory in relation to the story
of the ancient Indian prince Ajase (Sk. Ajātaśatru) described in Buddhist scrip-
tures. Yet it was not clear to scholars why Kosawa became interested in the Ajase
tale or how he arrived at his unique interpretation. After much searching, one
day Iwata was rereading a popular book by Chikazumi Jōkan 近角常観 (1870–
1941) and realized that main sections of Kosawa's essay were copied directly from
Jōkan's book. Rather than elation, Iwata was struck with a sense of shame that such
a simple fact had escaped the attention of scholars. One discovery led to another,
and soon Iwata had obtained grant money to fund a team of researchers—

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including Ōmi Toshihiro—to study a mass of letters and other documents still housed at Jōkan's Buddhist meeting hall.

Iwata and Ōmi's books on Chikazumi Jōkan draw attention to blind spots in scholarship on Japanese intellectual history and Buddhist history. Following an extensive biography, Iwata examines Jōkan's influence on psychoanalysist Kosawa Heisaku, writers Kamura Isota 嘉村礒多 (1897–1933) and Miyazawa Kenji 宮澤賢治 (1896–1933), and philosopher Miki Kiyoshi 三木 清 (1897–1945). He argues that the critical influence of Jōkan's Buddhist teachings on these figures has been overlooked due to disciplinary specialization, emphasis on texts over biographical details, and an inability to recognize the "traces" of religion that persist in nonreligious fields. Ōmi examines Jōkan's role in the modernization of Japanese Buddhism, specifically in regard to the themes of religious experience, Christian proselytization techniques, personality, gender, and the state. He argues that Jōkan's central significance has been overlooked due to the triumph of a narrative of (Ōtani denomination) Shin history centered around Kiyozawa Manshi 清澤満之 (1863–1903), along with a prejudice against traditionalism. Readers of these two works, in addition to learning the story of a fascinating Buddhist priest, will gain insight into the complexity of modern Japanese Buddhism and its connections to modern Japanese philosophy, literature, psychotherapy, and cultural theory.

Below, I first give an overview of Jōkan's career, largely following Part I (chapters 1–8) of Iwata's work. I then summarize and briefly respond to the arguments presented in Part II (chapters 9–12) of Iwata's work regarding Jōkan's influence on the fields of psychoanalysis, literature, and philosophy, and then discuss the arguments presented in Ōmi's work. In the final section, I reflect upon the intersections between modern Buddhism and psychology revealed by these works and the potential for a renewed study of Buddhists' "religious experiences."

Chikazumi Jōkan's Career

A cursory look at Jōkan's career shows how prolific and pivotal a figure he was: a leading figure in the 1899–1900 Buddhist movement against the Religions Bill (Shūkyō Hōan), one of two Japanese presenters at the First International Congress for the History of Religions in Paris in 1900, founder of the Kyūdō 求道 faith movement, pioneer in the Buddhist use of Christian-style meeting halls and student dormitories, popularizer of the *Tannishō*, leader of the 1929 movement to restore priestly status to the former Ōtani chief abbot, and teacher of a long list of famous philosophers (for example, Miki Kiyoshi and Tanikawa Tetsuzō), writers (for example, Itō Sachio and Kamura Isota), scholars, right-wing thinkers (for example, Mitsui Kōshi), and businessmen (for example, Kirishima Shōichi). In the eyes of some, Jōkan was even a "living Buddha" associated with miracu-

lous healings. In summarizing Jōkan's message and its widespread appeal, Iwata points to Jōkan's effective modern reconstruction of premodern Shin traditions, as well as his joining of inner faith with social connection.

Born in 1870 in a devoutly Shin town on the shores of Lake Biwa, Jōkan was the eldest son of temple priest Chikazumi Jōzui. In addition to instilling in Jōkan a sense of loyalty to the sect and its chief abbots, Jōzui was responsible for introducing Jōkan to the *Tannishō*. Although the *Tannishō* is generally understood to have been a "secret" text that was "rediscovered" and popularized in the modern period, Jōkan reportedly observed his father and members of their congregation intently reading and discussing this text late into the night (25). For Jōkan, the *Tannishō* was not a newly discovered "modern" text but an integral part of the Shin tradition.

Jōkan excelled as a student, eventually entering the philosophy department at Tokyo Imperial University. As a student, he was active in the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Seinenkai, established 1892) and in the Kiyozawa-led Shirakawa Reform Movement (1896–1897). Following the failure of the Shirakawa movement, Jōkan became deeply depressed due to "personal relationship issues." Iwata speculates that he may have had conflicts with reform movement members as the movement unraveled. This depression brought on thoughts of suicide, as well as physical ailments and a two-week-long hospitalization. Returning home from the hospital, he suddenly felt his heart opening up, and simultaneously realized that the "true friend" he had been seeking was none other than Amida Buddha (39). By 1898, Jōkan and his psychology professor Motora Yūjirō 元良勇次郎 (1858–1912) had founded a "Religious Experience Discussion Group" (Shūkyōteki Keiken Danwakai) for Buddhists and Christians to discuss their experiences (33).

After graduating in 1898, Jōkan became actively involved in the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance's (Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmeikai) movement to secure Buddhism a favorable legal status vis-à-vis Christianity. Begun as a reaction to the replacement of Buddhist chaplains by Christians at Sugamo prison in 1898, this movement organized resistance to the first national Religions Bill. Jōkan protested on the grounds that such a law would bring undue interference into the administrative affairs of Buddhist organizations and would incorrectly accord the same treatment to a well-established majority religion as it would to a newcomer minority religion. In regard to Jōkan's activism, Iwata highlights Jōkan's appreciation of Buddhism's need for both individuals with strong inner faith and institutions with strong legal standing (53–56).

Jōkan's activism won him the ire of the government and the praise of the Ōtani organization. The government had him expelled from graduate school while Ōtani authorities gifted him a piece of property west of Tokyo Imperial University and invited him on a two-year trip abroad to inspect the status of

religion in foreign societies. Visiting Vancouver, Chicago, New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, London, Paris, and Berlin, Jōkan was struck by the prevalence of Christian social outreach programs to youth, prisoners, and the poor. Returning to Japan in March 1902, he oversaw the construction of a new dormitory for Buddhist youth that he named the Kyūdō Gakusha 求道学舎. Jōkan lived there together with his pupils, giving public sermons every Sunday. These sermons quickly became overcrowded, and Jōkan developed plans for a larger meeting hall named the Kyūdō Kaikan 求道会館. This two-story red brick building (finally completed in 1915 after fundraising problems) was constructed in the style of a modern Protestant church, yet it incorporated traditional Buddhist motifs.[1] Jōkan's meeting hall and dormitory became the center of a bustling faith community comprised especially of students from the nearby universities and high schools (including many women). Philosopher Tanabe Hajime later recalled: "In those days, almost every week on the high school bulletin board, there were announcements for lectures by top religious leaders like the Christians Uchimura Kanzō and Ebina Danjō or Buddhist Chikazumi Jōkan, so their names became extremely familiar to all of us" (v). Further indicating Jōkan's fame and influence, Ōmi introduces a 1906 newspaper article declaring "the three magnificent sights of the Buddhist world" to be "Chikazumi's personality, Sakaino [Kōyō]'s learning, and Katō [Totsudō]'s eloquence" (118).

In Iwata's analysis, Jōkan's use of the term "kyūdō" (lit. "seeking the way") epitomizes his effective modern reconstruction of traditional Shin teachings. This traditional Buddhist term appears in Shin scriptures only infrequently due to the association of "seeking" with "self-power" (*jiriki* 自力). Jōkan used this and the related term "spiritual cultivation" (*seishin shūyō* 精神修養) to attract young urban intellectuals, but ultimately, he delivered the message that "seeking the way" and "spiritual cultivation" are achieved by the Buddha's powers (59–64). Jōkan invited his followers to "seek the way" by actively participating in "faith conversations" and in the writing of "faith confessions," many of which were published in the *Kyūdō* journal. This practice of having laypeople discuss and read about each other's faith experiences was a new development in the Buddhist world, seemingly inspired by similar Christian practices (for example, records of Mukyōkai members' "experiences" in Uchimura Kanzō's *Seisho no kenkyū* journal; see Ōmi 95–96).

As a preacher, Jōkan delivered a relatively simple message: that people on their own are powerless to act ethically, achieve their goals, or find salvation, and that Amida Buddha—presented not as a philosophical ideal or pantheistic force, but as an anthropomorphic being—compassionately saves people just as they are. It seems it was precisely the anti-intellectualism of Jōkan's message—

1. For images and analysis of the Kyūdō Kaikan building, see Washington (2013).

combined with his enthusiasm, charisma, and effective use of stories—that resonated with young religious seekers, who often found solace in Jōkan's teachings after failing to grasp Buddhist teachings in other academic or devotional settings.

Another important aspect of Jōkan's teachings, according to Iwata, was his views of family, modeled on his own family life. On the one hand, Jōkan's highly-publicized courtship and marriage to his wife, Kiso, exemplified modern ideals of love and personal choice. On the other hand, Jōkan's love for Kiso (as well as his filial devotion to his parents) was connected to his Buddhist faith. According to one account, Jōkan determined to marry Kiso after being shown a copy of the *Kannonkyō* that she owned. Convinced of Kiso's religious faith, Jōkan pursued the consent of her parents by expounding his faith to them. Kiso's parents instead arranged a marriage for her with a wealthy judge, but Kiso broke that off and married Jōkan (88–92). In his writing and preaching, Jōkan frequently discussed family relations, using Shinran and Shōtoku Taishi as models of a faith-based family.

In the late 1920s, Jōkan became involved in sectarian politics. In attempting to address the Ōtani organization's debts, Chief Abbot Ōtani Kōen 大谷光演 (1875–1943), popularly known as Kubutsu 句仏, made a series of failed investments. In 1923, with the Ōtani family (and thus the entire Ōtani organization) in financial jeapordy, the minister of education intervened and saw to Kubutsu's resignation. In the aftermath of this scandal, the new chief abbot—Kubutsu's son—declined to take on Kubutsu's personal debts, and in 1926, Kubutsu filed for personal bankruptcy. In 1929, the new chief abbot and the head of sect affairs (Kubutsu's younger brother) then took the extraordinary step of rescinding Kubutsu's status as priest. Jōkan distributed pamphlets, lectured, published the new journal *Shinkai kengen* 信界建現, and petitioned the Ministry of Education, all in an effort to have Kubutsu's priestly status restored. Ultimately, it was restored in 1935. Jōkan's appeal to family values and the Imperial Rescript on Education in defense of the former chief abbot won him considerable support at the time, but it led postwar sect leaders and scholars to judge him as being out of step with the history of Buddhist modernization.

Chikazumi Jōkan's Influence on Psychoanalysis, Literature, and Philosophy

To my mind, chapter 9 of Iwata's book, "Religion and Psychoanalysis: Kosawa Heisaku's Ajase Complex," contains the most compelling of Iwata's arguments for Jōkan's broad historical significance. As Iwata demonstrates, Kosawa and Jōkan had a close and sustained relationship, and much of Kosawa's psychiatric theory and practice likely derive from Jōkan's influence. In addition to identifying Kosawa's extended quotation from Jōkan's *Zangeroku* 懺悔録 (Notes on

repentence, 1905), Iwata shows that Kosawa's interpretation of the Ajase tale—including his curious focus on Ajase's conflict with his mother rather than Ajase's murder of his father—likely derives from Jōkan's influence. Jōkan frequently likened his own story of familial conflict, realization of his evil nature, and final attainment of faith to that of Ajase, and he drew particular attention to the anger of Ajase's mother toward her son (140–41). Iwata also points out that Kosawa's notion of a mother "melting" (*torokashi* とろかし, 融かし) her son's resentment through loving self-sacrifice, along with his clinical technique of adopting an attitude of maternal love to "melt" a patient's feelings of resentment, likely derive from Jōkan's frequent use of tropes of "melting" and parental love to describe Amida and the process of salvation (143–45).

More significantly, Iwata shows that Kosawa's Ajase Complex theory was originally a theory about "perfected religious psychology" (*kansei saretaru shūkyōteki shinri*), but it was gradually emptied of its religious content as his students deployed it first in the development of psychoanalysis as a scientific discipline, and then in the construction of theories of Japanese uniqueness (*Nihonjinron*). As Iwata shows, Kosawa's groundbreaking essay, "Two Kinds of Guilt Feelings: The Ajase Complex," had originally been published under a different title, "Religion Viewed from the Perspective of the Study of Psychoanalysis," with an introduction expressing opposition to the anti-religion movement's claim that religion is the "opium of the people" (135–36). Kosawa's theory concerned the value of a Buddhist experience of encountering a divine, truly selfless love, becoming conscious of one's evilness, and repenting. Kosawa's student Okonogi Keigo 小此木啓吾 (1930–2003) elided the religious aspects of Kosawa's theory, reworking it into a theory about the growth of individual autonomy through recognition of the *illusion* of the ideal mother figure. Okonogi proceeded to write numerous popular essays and books on how Japanese psychology is uniquely based on this longing for an ideal mother figure.[2] In Iwata's interpretation, this is a displaced longing for a transcendent power. Okonogi's "ideal mother figure" is the remnant of Jōkan's Amida Buddha, and *Nihonjinron* literature's depiction of Japanese children indulgently dependent on their mothers is a remnant of Jōkan's teaching about dependence on Amida Buddha.[3]

Chapter 10 considers Jōkan's influence on novelist Kamura Isota, representative of the "I-novel" (*shishōsetsu* 私小説) genre. Through an examination of two letters written to Jōkan by Isota, Iwata reveals the personal backstory behind two of Isota's novels, *Gōku* 業苦 (Karmic suffering) and *Gake no shita* 崖の下

2. Another of Kosawa's students, Doi Takeo 土居健郎 (1920–2009), relates that he arrived at his famous theory of *amae* (indulgent dependence) as the key to understanding Japanese culture through his relationship of tension and disagreement with Kosawa (Iwata 157).

3. For a recent discussion in English of Kosawa and his Buddhist views, see HARDING (2014).

(Beneath the cliff), in which the character "Master G" (G 師) is based on Jōkan. Isota's letters describe a yearning to have a religious experience of faith like the one Jōkan described in *Zangeroku*. They also discuss Isota's inner anguish over an affair he was then having with a married woman. Although Jōkan viewed human nature as inherently evil, he did not view this as a license to willfully carry out evil. Rather, realization of one's evil nature was, for Jōkan, an essential step on the path to salvation through Amida's compassion, which then provides the basis for an ethical life. Jōkan advised Isota and his partner to separate and introspect on their actions, but Isota instead chose to carry on with what he recognized as an "evil" life and write about it in his novels. In Iwata's view, the act of writing was for Isota a quasi-religious activity that took the place of a religious encounter, enabling him to endure his "karmic suffering."

Chapter 11 examines Jōkan's influence on writer Miyazawa Kenji and his family. Kenji's upbringing in northern Iwate Prefecture was permeated with the modernist Shin faith of his father, who organized a regular summer lecture event involving preachers like Jōkan and Kiyozawa follower Akegarasu Haya 暁烏敏 (1877–1954). Kenji's father and uncle became longterm Jōkan followers. When Kenji's beloved younger sister Toshi トシ (1898–1922) became embroiled in a scandal over an affair with her high school music teacher, she was sent to study at Japan Women's University in Tokyo and directed to Jōkan for spiritual guidance. Toshi wrote two letters to Jōkan (reproduced by Iwata in an appendix) that lay bare her inner pain as well as her failure to find faith through Jōkan's teachings. According to Iwata's analysis, while other youth found in Jōkan's teachings a new, fresh interpretation of Shin, Toshi and Kenji found only the spiritual world of their parents. Iwata follows Kenji's spiritual path from *kok-kurisan* (table-turning) séances, to *seiza* (quiet sitting) meditation practice, to Tendai-inflected study of the *Lotus Sutra*, and to a brief but unproductive encounter with Jōkan. Although Kenji finally found refuge in the Nichirenist Kokuchūkai group, Iwata detects traces of Jōkan's influence in Kenji's terminology and in his call to discover the Absolute in this world in the act (rather than the destination) of "seeking the way" (*kyūdō*, 215–21).

Chapter 12 turns to Jōkan's influence on Miki Kiyoshi, one of a handful of important philosophers who frequented Jōkan's Kyūdō Kaikan. Jōkan's philosophical background and the philosophical views submerged within his preaching seem to have enabled him to connect with young, philosophically-inclined intellectuals. Iwata's tracing of a line of influence between Jōkan and Miki is part of a larger argument about Miki, namely that an interest in religion, especially Shin, runs throughout Miki's work. This is contrary to the general view that Miki's final project—an unfinished study of Shinran—was a surprising turn toward religion by a philosopher otherwise focused on society and ethics. Iwata first traces Miki's upbringing in a Shin family, his interest as a high school

student in the *Tannishō*, and his appreciation for Jōkan's sermons and writings, especially his *Tannishō kōgi*. As a Communist supporter, Miki became a vocal critic of religion's oppressive social function, but he always maintained a belief that religion was a fundamental aspect of human nature enabling creativity and social reform.

Iwata then extensively traces Miki's philosophical career—from his student days under Nishida Kitarō, to his sojourn in Germany and France, to his engagement with Nietzsche, and finally to his writings on Shinran. Iwata draws particular attention to parallels between Miki's 1926 work on Pascal and his unfinished work on Shinran. In both works, Miki provisionally accepts certain religious content (original sin and Jesus's resurrection in the former case, the discovery of Amida's Primary Vow in the latter), and then treats them as "symbols" to be applied in the philosophical analysis of the human condition. Miki viewed philosophy as incomplete so long as it contained itself to "internal analysis" and failed to take account of the transcendent as revealed through historical religion. Yet Miki's approach was not theological, Iwata emphasizes. Even in these works of religious philosophy, Miki kept to philosophical methods and maintained a focus on the human condition.

The major finding of Iwata's chapter is that Miki's unfinished work on Shinran grew out of his reading of Takeuchi Yoshinori's 武内義範 (1913–2002) *Kyōgyōshinshō no tetsugaku* (1941)—a fact proven by Miki's letter to a book publisher requesting Takeuchi's book, along with the extreme similarity in their contents. Takeuchi, even more so than Miki, was an admiring student of Jōkan's. By recognizing this web of influence, Iwata is able to shed light on confusing aspects of Miki's work. As Iwata explains, both Takeuchi and Miki followed Jōkan's lead in reading the *Kyōgyōshinshō* through Hegel (specifically through *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*—in contrast to Kiyozawa Manshi, who analyzed Shin teachings in relation to Hegel's *Science of Logic*), and both inherited Jōkan's concern with the manifestation of Shin faith in history. Takeuchi's work advanced the unique interpretation that Shinran's "three vow conversion" (*sangan tennyū* 三願転入), as described in the last chapter of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*, expresses a logic that permeates the whole of the *Kyōgyōshinshō*, and that the basis for this logic lies in the Buddhist view of historical decline according to three stages (*shōzōmatsu* 正像末). Following Takeuchi, Miki argued that Shinran's faith was not a mere discovery of evil within himself; it was the discovery of historical decline and of a counterhistory of individuals awakening to an understanding of evil as evil. Miki proceeded to seek a way to make Shinran's notion of "no precepts" the basis for a new social formation appropriate to this degenerate age.

Having demonstrated Jōkan's influence in the fields of psychoanalysis, literature, and philosophy, Iwata returns in his conclusion to the question of why

Jōkan's historical significance has been overlooked until now. First, he argues that in each of these fields, there has been a tendency toward the abstract analysis of ideas, as found in texts, to the neglect of these figures' personal lives and social networks. Second, and more controversially, Iwata argues that these fields (philosophy and psychology more so than literature) are characterized by a certain avoidance, even disparagement, of religion due to a loss of religious sensibility: "In contemporary Japanese society, the place of encountering the 'Absolute' of the sort presented by Jōkan is not so near at hand. Due to this, most people have difficulty recognizing the 'traces' of the 'Absolute' developed by these individuals in their various fields following their encounters with Jōkan" (276).

As noted above, I found Iwata's argument regarding Kosawa and psychoanalysis the most convincing. In the other cases, there are reasons to be skeptical that Jōkan had a truly significant impact. Isota rejected Jōkan's advice and distanced himself from religion; Kenji was impacted by Jōkan only indirectly through his family; and the possible impact of Jōkan on Miki's philosophy only really surfaces in Miki's final, unfinished work, the importance of which remains unclear. There is no doubt that Jōkan and his teachings were present in these individuals' worlds, but—except in the case of Kosawa—it is not clear that Jōkan's influence was decisive. Even so, Iwata's broader point remains that a historically important figure has long been overlooked by scholars due to disciplinary specialization and insufficient attention to intellectuals' personal lives and social networks.

Jōkan's Influence on Modern Buddhism

Ōmi's work begins with an introduction concisely analyzing the state of the field of modern Japanese Buddhist studies. Ōmi pays particular attention to the significance of Ōtani Eiichi's recent work (2012) in complicating, but not ultimately transcending, the dominant "reformist paradigm" set in place by Yoshida Kyūichi, Kashiwahara Yūsen, and Ikeda Eishun, and also to the reasons—legitimate and otherwise—for the Shin-centered perspective that characterizes much of the scholarship. In response, Ōmi expresses his intention to reveal the persistence of "tradition" within Buddhist "modernization" and to enrich scholars' understanding of "Shin modernization" by incorporating Jōkan and his movement into the picture.

Chapter 1 looks at how a particular picture of "modern Shin" centered around Kiyozawa Manshi and his followers came to be formed. Although this lengthy review of discourse about Kiyozawa and Seishinshugi thought feels a little out of place, Ōmi does effectively refer to Kiyozawa and his followers throughout the book as a counterpoint for understanding Jōkan. Ōmi first documents the various social and doctrinal critiques that were made of Kiyozawa's Seishinshugi movement at its outset. He then traces three strands of sectarian discourse

about Kiyozawa—as beloved teacher, initiator of modern doctrinal studies, and reformer of the Ōtani institution—that eventually merged and became dominant in the 1970s. Finally, Ōmi reviews the variety of postwar nonsectarian scholarship on Kiyozawa, concluding that a long repetitive pattern of social critique has recently given way to a new search (by Okada Masahiko, Moriya Tomoe, Shigeta Shinji, and others) for positive social significance in Kiyozawa. Ultimately, Ōmi seeks to draw attention to how this discourse has crowded out attention to other streams of "Shin modernization" and how its extreme focus on "modernization" has entailed a failure to perceive how "tradition" undergirds modern Shin.

Chapter 2 uses Jōkan's early career to illustrate the transition in mid-Meiji Buddhism from "Buddhism as philosophy" to "Buddhism as experience." For Jōkan, this transition was above all a strategic choice. After his dramatic experience of attaining faith, Jōkan continued to pursue philosophy, believing that philosophical argument was necessary to promote Buddhism on a national and global stage. Years later, Jōkan described his earlier religious experiences in *Seikan roku* (Notes on quiet contemplation, 1899), arguing that true, unbreakable faith can only be established through a direct encounter with the Buddha. The extremely positive reception of this work showed Jōkan that others were hungry for an anti-rationalist, experience-based approach to Buddhism. By 1902, when he opened the Kyūdō Kaikan, Jōkan's anti-rationalist position had intensified, as seen in essays like "The Poisonous Effect of Philosophical Research on Buddhist Faith" (66). In his popular 1905 *Zangeroku*, Jōkan conveyed the message that a universal pattern ran through the far-flung religious experiences of Prince Ajase, Queen Idaike (Skt. Vaidehī), Shinran, and Jōkan and his contemporaries. According to Ōmi's interpretation, Jōkan had shifted from a Hegelian belief in a universal *logos* running through history to a belief in a universal experience running through history. Based on this view, Jōkan developed a new practice of confessing one's religious experience, comparing it to others described in scripture or reported by others, and continually discovering in (or imposing upon) those experiences a unifying pattern, reinforcing the belief in the authenticity of one's own experience.

Following chapter 2, Ōmi presents the first of a series of five short interludes in which are paraphrased the personal accounts of Kyūdō Kaikan members coming to attain faith. In the first account, a young man comes to realize that his grudge against his deceased father is baseless. In the second, a middle-aged man realizes that his ongoing failure to understand Buddhist teachings is proof of his ignorance. In the third, a longtime student of Buddhism assigned to prison chaplaincy realizes he has nothing sincere to teach. In each case, a sudden discovery of one's ignorance or evilness (which indicates one's need of salvation) triggers an acceptance of Shin teachings and a feeling of being saved.

Chapter 3 examines Jōkan's complicated engagement with Christianity. Consistently antagonistic toward Christianity, Jōkan nonetheless saw much in Chris-

tianity worthy of emulation. Whereas Shimaji Mokurai 島地黙雷 (1838–1911) had previously introduced foreign ideas about the proper legal standing of religion (freedom of religious faith, separation of religion and state), Jōkan's travels in the United States and Europe led him to introduce Christian models of proselytization. Ōmi characterizes Jōkan's preaching activities as combining innovative practices modeled on Christianity (for example, youth dormitories, a large meeting hall for sermons, lay participation in faith discussions, a journal column for congregant testimonials, and a discourse of personal "cultivation" [shūyō 修養]) with a traditional myōkōnin-style Shin faith that denies the efficacy of learning or personal cultivation. Whereas previous scholars have defined Shin modernism in terms of introspection and the related reinterpretation of Shin doctrines, Ōmi argues that Jōkan's Shin modernism was primarily a matter of new forms of proselytization that could skillfully guide modern youths back to traditional Shin faith. In Jōkan's case, this involved adapting Buddhism to a social space dominated by Christian concepts and practices; in later periods, other ideologies and institutions (for example, State Shinto) became dominant, demanding adaptive responses by Buddhist modernizers.

Chapter 4 presents a fascinating study of the evolution of the discourse of "personality" (jinkaku 人格) in modern Japan. The term was originally introduced in the Meiji 20s (1887–1896) as a translation of the English word "personality" in connection with philosophical discussions of morality. Inoue Tetsujirō 井上哲次郎 (1856–1944) spoke of personality in terms of self-improvement: "elevating one's personality" by reflecting on one's improprieties and strengthening one's "power of self-mastery" (121–22). Nakajima Rikizō 中島力造 (1858–1918), by contrast, defined "personality" in social terms as the humanity present in each individual deserving of others' respect. These philosophers' attempts to articulate a basis for patriotism and social ethics separate from religion produced a chain of responses from the religious world. Preeminent religious studies scholar Anesaki Masaharu 姉崎正治 (1873–1949) defined religious awareness as the integration of one's knowledge, emotion, and will into a unified personality, enabling an encounter with the divine. In An Inquiry into the Good (1911), Nishida Kitarō defined personality in extremely similar terms. Ōmi proceeds to show how "personality" was further developed as a concept about the existence of the transcendent (or access to the transcendent) within the individual by Tsunashima Ryōsen, Murakami Senshō, Sakaino Kōyō, Katō Totsudō, and finally, Chikazumi Jōkan. Although this common discourse appears to indicate an abstract notion of religion shared across sectarian boundaries, Ōmi argues that Jōkan skillfully used this common concept to relay traditional Shin views. Specifically, Jōkan defended Amida Buddha's "objective existence" (kyakkanteki no jitsuzai) against other modernist thinkers' abstract, pantheistic interpretations by arguing that humans, as "personalities" receptive to form and sound,

can only be saved by a transcendent power that likewise possesses "personality." In conclusion, Ōmi describes how the discourse of "personality" reached new heights in the Taishō period (1912–1926), with intellectuals and politicians increasingly turning away from hollow state morality programs to religion for assistance in cultivating the people's "personality." In this way, the exclusion of religion from the realm of public morality was overcome by religious thinkers' strategic co-opting of the discourse of "personality." Meanwhile, Jōkan's popularity boomed, as he continued to make use of this popular concept for his own traditional Shin agenda.

Chapter 5 focuses on the writings of two of Jōkan's female students to explore the place of women in the history of modern Japanese Buddhism. Ōmi first considers the case of Sugase Tadako 菅瀬忠子 (1886–1909), the wife of an influential Honganji denomination priest. Tadako was an ardent follower of Jōkan for a few years prior to her death. Her diary, discovered and published after her death, relates how she endured the difficulties of her role as wife, daughter, and temple worker, accepting the view that her troubles were due to her sinfulness as a woman. At the same time, she found through Jōkan's teachings a sense of belonging to a "faith family" transcendent of her mundane family. Miyazawa Kenji's sister Toshi is the next example discussed by Ōmi. According to Ōmi, although Toshi failed to find faith through Jōkan's teachings, Jōkan and the Kyūdō Kaikan nonetheless played a role in facilitating Toshi's personal religious seeking, which ultimately led her to develop greater autonomy and to break from her family and their traditions. Ōmi places Toshi and Tadako into a group with poet Hiratsuka Raichō 平塚らいてう (1886–1971) as elite women who developed new senses of selfhood and independence through Buddhist practice.

Chapter 6 considers Jōkan's views of the state in the context of his movement to restore the priestly status of the former chief abbot. In the postwar period, the system of locating total administrative and doctrinal authority in the chief abbot was dismantled, so from today's perspective, Jōkan's efforts to maintain that system seem misguided. Yet Jōkan succeeded in winning much support for his cause. According to Ōmi's analysis, a key reason for this was his evocation of national morality. Jōkan presented the chief abbot system as a bastion of Japan's traditional "family system" (*ie seido*), in which personal identity, legal standing, and morality are tied to family. Just as the nation constituted a family headed by the emperor, the Shin community constituted a family headed by the chief abbot. The former chief abbot's punishment at the hands of his son and younger brother was an affront to the family values at the core of the Japanese nation. As Ōmi argues, the case of Jōkan's dual support for the chief abbot system and the imperial system adds a new wrinkle to scholars' understanding of modern Shin ethics. Kiyozawa Manshi and his followers' generally conservative social ethic has been explained with reference to their focus on introspection. Focused on

inner subjectivity, this group of Shin modernists tended either to ignore social and political problems or to view them as outer reflections of inner mental states. By contrast, Jōkan and his followers' conservative social ethic was a natural product of certain features of traditional Shin faith, particularly the need for absolute trust in one's teachers (epitomized by Shinran's trust in Hōnen).

In the conclusion, Ōmi further discusses the differences between Kiyozawa and Jōkan. In Ōmi's synopsis, Kiyozawa was an intellectual who expended great efforts (that is, self power) to arrive at Other Power faith, while Jōkan was a person of Other Power faith who expended great efforts to connect with intellectuals and usher them to Other Power faith. In contrast to Kiyozawa, Jōkan was a Buddhist reformer thoroughly grounded in traditional Shin faith. Responding to a model proposed by scholar Sueki Fumihiko, Ōmi argues that "modern Buddhism" and "folk Buddhism" were in a more interactive, dynamic relationship than has formerly been recognized. In Jōkan's case, the "modernization" of Buddhism was not a matter of denying or transcending tradition; it was a matter of remaking tradition to better accord with the times.

Ōmi has made a strong case that Chikazumi Jōkan played a central role in modern Buddhist history—especially in the transition to "Buddhism as experience," the introduction of Christian proselytization techniques, and the development of a discourse of religious "personality." In the case of Shin sectarian scholarship, the wealth of attention paid to Kiyozawa and the Seishinshugi movement compared to the general neglect of Jōkan and his Kyūdō faith movement undoubtedly reflects an institutional allegiance to Kiyozawa and his line rather than a true measure of their respective historical significance.

Although Ōmi's introduction and conclusion take up the broader field of modern Japanese Buddhism, the book's chapters have a strong Shin focus, with particular attention to Kiyozawa and his followers as the main point of comparison. Some readers will wish Ōmi had better situated Jōkan in relation to Buddhist reformers of other sects. Another minor shortcoming of Ōmi's book (and Iwata's), in my opinion, is the lack of specificity surrounding the term "Shin tradition." Ōmi's introduction includes several pages discussing the term "tradition," noting scholarship on "invented traditions" and the tendency of scholars to approach the term "tradition" skeptically. In response, Ōmi presents Buddhist funerary practices as an example of a tradition that has persisted since at least the early modern period. Yet when it comes to "Shin tradition," the examples he gives are few and far between. In chapter 3, he argues that Jōkan's innovative proselytization techniques signaled "discontinuity of practice" but "continuity of faith" with that of prior eras, but the claim that the faith of Jōkan's followers and that of early modern *myōkōnin* was continuous is not substantiated by almost any discussion of *myōkōnin* (97–105). Likewise, in chapter 4, Ōmi argues that Jōkan skillfully used the modern discourse of "personality" to convey a traditional Shin view of salvation, but there is little discussion of what that

"traditional" view consists of (136–41). This vagueness, in my opinion, renders Ōmi's argument about tradition undergirding Buddhist modernization somewhat imprecise.

Reflections on Modern Buddhism, Psychology, and "Religious Experience"

The assertion that the origin and goal of all Buddhist teachings lie in a certain "experience" is at once a central feature of the age-old Buddhist tradition and a modern innovation. Śākyamuni's experience of awakening under the bodhi tree set the Buddhist tradition in motion, and the goal of attaining a similar awakening—in this life or the next—has been one core motivation for many Buddhist practitioners ever since. The modern innovation lies in the strong emphasis on an *ineffable*, *unmediated* experience to the exclusion or de-emphasis of texts, rituals, images, practices, institutions, and so forth. It also lies in the very deployment of the term "experience" (Jp. *keiken* 経験; *jikken* 実験; *taiken* 体験) that is used to suggest that Buddhism has an "empirical" (*keiken-teki*, *jikken-teki*) basis and connection with the "experiences" attainable through other religious paths.

Psychologist William James's 1901–1902 Gifford Lectures on "The Varieties of Religious Experience" were of paramount importance in the spread of a discourse of "religious experience" in the US and Europe. As Sharf has shown, James's writings also influenced D. T. Suzuki and Nishida Kitarō in their thinking on "religious experience" and "pure experience" (Sharf 1993, 22–23). Yet years earlier in 1898, Chikazumi Jōkan and his psychology professor had organized an interreligious "Religious Experience Discussion Group." By 1901, Kiyozawa Manshi—who had studied and lectured on Western psychology—and his followers were also writing about "religious experience" as the core element of the Buddhist tradition.[4] And decades earlier in 1869, Buddhist scholar-priest Hara Tanzan had introduced his method of "Buddhist experience/experiment studies" (*Bukkyō jikken gaku*; Furuta 1980, 150).

In Iwata and Ōmi's accounts, we see glimpses of how this new discourse of "religious experience" altered the Buddhist landscape. Within the Kyūdō Kaikan community, Jōkan made discussion of personal religious experiences the basis for his sermons and his congregants' practice. A new discourse of "personality," first developed by philosophers in relation to morality, was transformed by Buddhist writers into one about a psychological state in which communion with the transcendent is achieved. And the development of the field of psychoanalysis was inspired by a Jōkan follower's aspiration to enable his patients to achieve a certain religious state of mind.

4. For example, see Sasaki Gesshō's *Jikken no shūkyō* (Religion of experience, 1926; originally published 1903), comprised of essays published previously in the journal *Seishinkai*.

For a long time now, the study of religious experience has been out of fashion. Wayne PROUDFOOT revealed theories of religious experience to be strategies to protect religion against rationalistic "reductive explanations" (1985). In regard to Buddhism, SHARF has argued that meditative experiences were historically never the primary goal of practice nor the basis for doctrinal understanding (1998, 99). Yet with the advent of modernity, religious experience has increasingly become these. For scholars of religion in the modern period, it seems perfectly appropriate for "religious experience" to serve as an object of study, even as a basis for theory.[5] What role have religious experiences played in the lives of modern Buddhists? What sorts of experiences are they? How do they come about? How has the appeal to religious experience led to the reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrine? How have Buddhist institutions and practices been adapted to accommodate such experiences? The development of experience-based approaches to modern Buddhist studies—employing the disciplines of history, anthropology, psychology, and/or philosophy—would have to be mindful of critiques of the concept and rhetoric of "religious experience." But if scholars fail to investigate the significance of religious experiences in the lives of modern Buddhists, a major historical blind spot will remain.

5. For a recent attempt to resuscitate the category of religious experience, see ORSI (2011, 90): "To insist that this experience is not *sui generis* (and I agree that it is not) is not to have said very much about it. To explain it as a function of cultural formation (which it is) does not adequately take into account how the people having the experience of the holy described it or how it acted upon them. Contemporary religious studies wants to stop with the sociological formation of the holy, but this is really only the beginning of understanding this human experience that earlier generations of religious theorists named 'holy.'"

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REVIEW

John K. Nelson, *Experimental Buddhism: Innovation and Activism in Contemporary Japan*

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013. xxiv+292 pages. Cloth, $60.00; paperback, $32.00. ISBN 978-0-8248-3833-1 (cloth); 978-0-8248-3898-0 (paperback).

CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE Buddhism is sometimes criticized in Buddhist Studies, as well as in other disciplines, as "corrupt." With the establishment of the family *danka* system—"Community temples of all sizes were structured around households (*danka*) that supported the temple and its priest in material ways. Individuals in these households became members of the temple, eligible for memorial rituals for themselves and their ancestors" (35)—in the Edo period, Japanese Buddhism became subordinate to the government and bowed to their authority. In postwar Japan, with the drastic social changes caused by industrialization, urbanization, and an ageing population, some scholars have argued that Japanese Buddhism is losing its original vitality. However, what exactly is Japanese Buddhism facing nowadays? Is it really losing its connections with society? How have Buddhist monks been searching for new ways to adapt themselves to a rapidly changing Japanese society? Contrary to the large number of criticisms of Japanese Buddhism, there is a lack of empirical studies on its current state and development.

John NELSON is a cultural anthropologist and expert on East Asian religion who has published two books on Shinto (1996; 2000) and coedited the *Handbook of Contemporary Japanese Religions* (Brill, 2012). In *Experimental Buddhism* he argues for the "experimentality" (experimental Buddhism) of contemporary Japanese Buddhism based on extensive field studies. The introduction and chapter two explain the background of this book. Chapters three to five present different case studies, followed by a conclusion in chapter six.

In the introduction, the author highlights the overwhelming lack of empirical studies on contemporary Japanese Buddhism. He then proposes—using the concept of "experimental Buddhism"—that case studies of contemporary Japanese Buddhism be based on anthropological fieldwork, which is also the objective of this book.

Chapter one argues that Buddhism in contemporary Japan has been affected by various social changes such as urbanization, individualization, and an ageing population, and is gradually transforming itself to adapt to these changes. The author then discusses the key concept, "experimental Buddhism," which contains the following five characteristics: 1. the historicity and social transitions of Japanese society can be understood through observing and analyzing this concept; 2. the formation of a religious/spiritual life course based on personal choices becomes possible; 3. one can choose to practice Buddhism before engaging in specific Buddhist traditions; 4. daily life determines the choice of Buddhist values; and 5. this concept fits not only Buddhism but also other religions (22–27).

In chapter two, Nelson reviews the social history of Japanese Buddhism in pre-modern Japan, and then discusses the historical and social features of contemporary Japanese Buddhism within its historical context. While the first part gives an overview of the history of Buddhism before the Second World War, the second part offers important depictions of the characteristics of contemporary Japanese Buddhism (43–69). Some examples include the transformation of the relationships between temples and *danka* along with urbanization and an ageing society, funeral Buddhism, the distress of Buddhist monks expressed in magazines targeted at monks such as *Jimon Koryu*, case studies of the organizational structures of the Rinzai, Tendai, and Pure Land sects, and so forth. These cases allow readers to understand the current situation facing contemporary Japanese Buddhism that are little studied by scholars. Instead of arguing that Japanese Buddhism has deviated from its original teachings, the author suggests that we should put more focus on how Buddhism has been applied to contemporary society and how Buddhist monks have dealt with problems associated with contemporary Buddhism.

In chapter three, Nelson introduces the various social welfare activities conducted by Buddhist priests. He first reviews the history of Buddhism in Japan when it played an important role in welfare activities (as illustrated by Kūya), followed by case studies including NGOs such as the Sōtō Volunteer Association, anti-suicide campaigns led by Buddhist monks, various disaster relief support, and active-listening volunteering.

The stories of four Buddhist monks are presented in chapter four; these monks have also been reported in the local media for their outstanding social activities. They are Rev. Akita Mitsuhiko (Ōten'in in Osaka), Rev. Takahashi Takushi (Jingūji in Nagano), Rev. Hashimoto Junshin (Minna no otera [Everyone's Temple] in Nara), and Rev. Kiyoshi Fumihiko (Zuikōji in Osaka). The activities they offer are various and differ across denominations; for instance, Rev. Akita has cooperated with NGOs to promote community activities, whereas Rev. Kiyoshi has operated the Vows Bar ("vows" is a pun for *bōzu*). They are also engaged in various social activities. Despite the many differences in their backgrounds, the four monks have achieved something more than an expertise in annual events and funerals can accomplish. Therefore, the author argues, "the activities of progressive Buddhist priests in Japan

are pioneering some of the key concepts, organizations, and programs that can, with perseverance and support, create positive results in society and in the religion itself" (140).

Chapter five evaluates the transformation of Buddhism in a technologically advancing and globalizing world. The author discusses some examples of the commercialization of Buddhism, which include private business operators commercializing funeral services and mortuary tablets, and civic movements seeking a form of funeral ceremony without the presence of traditional Buddhist temples or monks. The popularization of pet memorials is also presented as an example of the privatization of Buddhism. The use of temples for music festivals is also discussed as an example of the modernization of Buddhism, monks, and temples. While social transformations have inevitably undermined the resources that hitherto have nurtured the growth of traditional Buddhism, the author argues that "in many cases, outreach efforts can be compared to the scattering of seeds in the community" (187).

Chapter six concludes the findings of previous chapters, and offers directions for future studies on contemporary Japanese Buddhism. The author suggests that more studies on temples and active-listening volunteering run by Buddhist nuns or female believers are required. And he ends with optimism towards Buddhism by saying, "we do know, however, that despite a shrinking institutional presence for Buddhism in Japan, we can look forward to new types of practices and beliefs that engage rather than withdraw from the expansive complexities of the twenty-first century and beyond" (216).

The Significance of This Book and Further Studies

A significant contribution of this book is that it presents various dimensions of contemporary Japanese Buddhism based on detailed field studies and analysis. In the sociology of religion in Japan, although there is a strong tradition of qualitative studies of religion, the majority of these works are focused on new religions. Even in the studies of contemporary Buddhism, the prewar history of Buddhism and priests are the main topic of interest for scholars. As also argued by the author throughout this book, there are no empirical studies (or the ones that do exist are inadequate) on contemporary Japanese Buddhism. Consequently, this reviewer has also shifted his interest from Buddhism to new religious movements.

The decline of *danka* and the commercialization of funeral services are problems facing many Buddhist priests and temples. These problems are also deeply connected to various social issues challenging contemporary Japan as a whole, such as an ageing society, globalization, and the decline of community. Having engaged in the sociology of religion for just a short period, the reviewer, after reading this book, has the feeling that empirical studies on contemporary Japanese Buddhism are actually developing continuously. In this sense, focusing on Buddhism has great significance in the studies of the dynamics of Japanese society.

There are a few points that could add further value to this research topic. First, while the book provides detailed case studies of Buddhist monks, the family *danka* system (which is an important component of Japanese Buddhism) is only discussed from a historical perspective in chapter two, and the inclusion of some representative cases of *danka* could offer a more comprehensive picture. For instance, how is the *danka* system related to the social activities carried out by the monks mentioned in chapters three and four? If we look at the "experimentality" of Buddhism through the social activities organized by *danka*, will we observe something different from the arguments in this book? In fact, analyzing recent national surveys (the Japanese General Social Survey), and after controlling important demographic covariates, people answering "Buddhism is my family religion" have a significantly higher tendency to participate in social activities than those who "have no faith," (TERAZAWA 2012). What kind of "experimental Buddhism" will we observe if we also take into account the studies of *danka* (often regarded as one of the peculiarities of Japanese Buddhism) and the relationships among priests, temples, and *danka*?

The second point is related to the orientation of the case studies. In general, the examples discussed in this book are relatively successful, but it is also necessary to include examples that are somewhat less successful. This can be done by a comparison of the characteristics of the four monks highlighted here. It would also be helpful to highlight specific regions and conduct comprehensive studies of temples in these regions to further understand their activities and the challenges they face (SAKURAI 2008).

Third, and also related to the previous point, is the representation of the social activities organized by Buddhist monks. On some occasions, Buddhist temples may have strong ties with local communities and cooperate closely with other religious groups. Community activities may sometimes involve more than one religion. Moreover, according to my own research, when comparing temples with small shrines and new religious branches, the smaller the temple, the fewer the differences can be observed in terms of their variety and types of activities (YOSHINO and TERAZAWA 2009). Also, as mentioned by the author, the concept of "experimental Buddhism" may also be applied to religions other than Buddhism, and therefore comparative studies with other religions are important issues for further study.

The above-mentioned issues do not affect the significance of this book. As suggested at the beginning of this review, this book is a detailed ethnography of contemporary Japanese Buddhism based on in-depth fieldwork that extracts and analyzes important case studies that are almost ignored by the public. This book should be regarded as mandatory reading on the sociology and anthropology of religion in Japan. I hope that more people will have the opportunity to read this book and continue to explore contemporary Japanese Buddhism.

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REVIEW

Emily Anderson, *Christianity and Imperialism in Modern Japan: Empire for God*

London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014. 314 pages. Hardcover, £58.50/$112.00. ISBN 9781472508560.

IN THE AREA of the historical studies of Christianity in Japan, much research has been done on the Japanese churches' relation to the emperor system and colonialism, but Emily Anderson's *Christianity and Imperialism in Modern Japan* stands out for its comprehensive outline of the issues and problems posed by Japanese imperialism and the responses of Japanese Christian leaders. As Anderson mentions in the introduction, in the English-language literature, Christians were "largely hidden from historical view in the recent explosion of works on Japanese imperialism" (12). Yet in unravelling the manifold process of modern nation-building in Japan, Christians' voices in discussions regarding the problem of "religion and the state" should not be overlooked. Anderson's work has filled this conspicuous gap in the map of historical studies of modern Japan. As far as I know, this is the first historical overview in English of the relationship between Japanese colonial policies and some prominent Japanese Christian leaders' statements and actions.

The book tells a carefully woven story of a socially distinguished group of Japanese Protestants striving to be recognized as useful in the growing Japanese empire. Benefiting from recent studies on modern Japanese history, historical anthropology, colonialism, and immigration, the author retraces the path of Japanese Christians through major historical events and incidents: the distribution of the Imperial Rescript on Education to schools (chapter 1), the Russo-Japanese War (chapter 2), the colonization of Korea (chapter 4), the March First Independent Movement in Korea (chapter 5), the Great Kanto Earthquake and the massacre of Koreans living in Japan (chapter 5), and the Manchurian incident and establishment of the Manchukuo (chapter 7). This historical narrative is not limited to the national border or the metropolitan center; it takes the reader to the communities of Japanese immigrants on the west coast of the United States (chapter 3) and the countryside of Gunma prefecture (chapter 6). As the reader follows the story, the borders and

terrain of the "Christian Empire" emerge as imagined by those Japanese ministers, in many parts overlapping with that of Imperial Japan, from the west coast, Korea, and Manchuria to the home islands. The author successfully outlines how some Christian leaders, such as Ebina Danjō and Watase Tsuneyoshi, had drawn and redrawn the border according to their own images of the Christian Empire, concomitantly with Japan's imperial expansion.

Chapter 1 begins with the implications of the Imperial Rescript on Education for religious belief and practice. Most previous accounts have tended to focus on Uchimura's famous lèse-majesté incident, in which Uchimura hesitated to bow during the ceremony for the promulgation of the Rescript. Anderson places this incident among other similar incidents mentioned in Inoue Tetsujirō's *Kyōiku to shukyō no shōtotsu* 教育と宗教の衝突 (1893) and related writings. In particular, Ōkuma Teijirō's statement about the purpose of the Kumamoto *eigakkō*, where he taught, narrated in the opening of the chapter, is a reminder that "international humanitarianism" was arising from the influence of Christianity before the enactment of the Meiji Constitution and promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education. As Anderson rightly points out, Inoue promoted the secular formation of a state drawing on Western thought instead of embodying a religious and hence superstitious world view. The conflict, then, was not between what is national and what is foreign, but between the secular values and the religious ones. The author thus interprets the nature of the debate as questioning whether "religious" adherence in general was suitable for a new, modern nation-state. Her introduction of arguments by modern Buddhist intellectuals on this issue of "The Collision between Education and Religion" is also helpful in illustrating the nature of the argument on the issue of religion and the state in the Meiji period. The public debate on this issue was a determining point that forced Christian respondents to "commit to specific understandings of how they should relate to the state and emperor, leading to dramatic fissures among them along both political and theological lines" (21). This debate paved the way for the formation of the argument and practices and thereby for the Christian intellectuals' attitudes toward the evolving Japanese imperialism.

The original contribution of this study is the variety of sources used, mostly from the periodicals and journals self-published by the ministers and churches of Nihon Kumiai Kirisuto Kyōkai (The Congregational Church in Japan), but also newspaper articles, diaries of individuals, and official documents of the colonial government-general are skilfully mined for details and fuller pictures of the incidents considered. Chapter 2 is a thorough compilation and analysis of Christian responses to the Russo-Japanese War. The discourse on the Russo-Japanese War by Christian leaders, such as Ebina, Uchimura, and Uemura Masahisa is well known, but here the author also scrutinizes the soldiers' reports from the battlefront published in *Kirisutokyō sekai*, the journal of the Kumiai Kyōkai.

These reports, presented as letters from the front by or about Japanese Christian soldiers who risked death for God and country, followed similar themes: their fealty to the nation, their upright and ethical conduct in battle as becoming faithful Christian soldiers, and the honorable last moments of Christian soldiers who praised God and expressed gratitude for the opportunity to give their lives for their nation as they anticipated entering heaven (76).

Unlike the theologically liberal tendency of the Kumiai Kyōkai ministers, these stories "emphasized basic conversion narratives and Christian qualities" (76). In their stories, the soldiers' deaths were "offerings to God" in the war against what they perceived as the "despotic barbarism of the Russian empire" (64). These simple stories promoted support for the soldiers and accentuated the urgency of evangelism at home in the face of "the beautiful death of a Japanese Christian soldier" on the battlefield (77). In other words, the Christian soldiers were made martyrs for the vision of Japan and the vision of Japanese Christians, and became an instrument for uniting the churches under one nation. As most of the sources drawn on throughout the book represent the voice of Christian leaders, this chapter presents the rarely-heard voices of lay people, though effectively framed within an ideology of the empire.

Kashiwagi Gien's self-published journal, *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, is also an excellent source, not simply to reconstruct Kashiwagi's thought, but to grasp the situation of local churches in the countryside. One of the most memorable episodes Anderson relates is the funeral of a Christian soldier named Nakajima. As reported in *Jōmō kyōkai geppō*, Nakajima's funeral was sponsored by the administrators of his village, along with those of three other soldiers. A problem arose when Nakajima's family requested a Christian funeral for their son. "While it had initially been agreed that the village would sponsor a joint Buddhist-Christian service, when the Buddhist ceremony for the other three was completed, not only the Buddhist priests, but also all of the village and county officials promptly left before Nakajima's Christian funeral began" (88). Kashiwagi, the local minister, later learned that it happened because of the disagreement between Christian ministers and the Buddhist priests over when the local officials should read the formal condolence. Kashiwagi's ultimate question, according to Anderson, was: "Were Christian soldiers not considered the equal of their Buddhist comrades?" The fact is that a person was killed by the nation, and his funeral, which was the final occasion for him to be mourned as an individual, was marred as different communities with their own agenda tried to lay claim to his soul. The episode is well chosen to illustrate how the death of an individual became an arena for a political power struggle.

In the following three chapters, the author considers the history of Japanese Christians beyond the national borders by following the speaking tours or mission journeys of Ebina Danjō, Watase Tsuneyoshi, and other missionaries from Japan. In these chapters, the English sources on Christian missionary activities in Korea and

recent studies on colonial Korea are integrated to draw a clearer picture of Christianity in the shadow of the Japanese empire. Although the work is not intended to be a denominational history, the Kumiai Kyōkai and the ministers who belong to the church were chosen as the subject for particular reasons (8). In this regard, Kozaki Hiromichi, who is also a prominent figure in Kumiai Kyōkai, and the project he directed to send missionaries to former German territories in the South Pacific could have been discussed in depth rather than mentioned in passing (179).

Chapter 3 reveals that Ebina Danjō's American west coast speaking tour from 1908 to 1909 was prompted by a much greater vision than simply to visit and encourage migrant Japanese Christian communities. His motives were not just evangelistic; Ebina and other Protestant leaders, who as elites and intellectuals were concerned that, as representatives of Japan, the settlers' and immigrants' morality and behavior might seem too uncouth in the eyes of the white Americans. This attitude is very similar to that of Christian intellectuals toward the colonized people. Their view of the people on the fringes of the empire was patronizing and hierarchical: the Japanese immigrants and colonial population needed to be educated by the proper Japanese in the metropolitan center if they were to be "civilized." In particular, the Japanese immigrants, who were "lower class compatriots" in the eyes of the Christian elites, were considered as "proxies for how Japan itself was perceived" and "even the government adjusted its policies regarding issuing visas based on a similar understanding that individual immigrants represented their nation" (97).

In the case of the mission to the Korean people, which is treated in chapters 4 and 5, similar language was used but the aim was to make the Korean people "Japanese" by converting them to a kind of Christianity with a specifically Japanese interpretation promoted by the Kumiai Kyōkai. Either way, Christian representations and messages were used as rhetoric to promote the empire, both Japanese and Christian, at the same time. Ebina is reported to have asked the Japanese settlers, "Isn't any land under our heavenly father's dominion your homeland?" (104). The mission in Korea was based on the idea that "Christianity was something that transcended ethnicity, culture, and language. In other words, all people under Christ were compatriots, and this union of different peoples would bring about world peace and happiness" (145). According to this rhetoric of "peace and happiness," Korean people are to follow the model of the selfless love of Christ for humanity and to accept Japanese rule. As Anderson notes in the introduction, throughout history, there are many cases in which the Christian belief system and its representations provided supportive language for the oppressor, and this is one more example. What is astonishing is that they used the very same ideas that Inoue Tetsujirō had accused them of holding decades ago—ideas like internationalism, universal love, and individualism—to the advantage of Japanese colonial policies. Furthermore, these efforts to serve the purpose of the state were spontaneous on the part of the Christians. As is often the case for colonial powers, the government used the religious organizations. The colonial government-general took advantage of the

Christians and funded the mission in the pursuit of its assimilation policy. Yet from the narrative Anderson presents to the reader, it becomes clear that Christian institutions such as the Kumiai Kyōkai or National Christian Church Council were also eager to use any political decisions of the state for their own benefit. On this point, Anderson explains:

> Not simply a pathetic effort to appeal to the state's demands that they prove their loyalty and dispel fears of their forgiveness, these Christians engaged with these ideas and developed ministries that either aligned with state and colonial policy or strenuously critiqued it, out of their pursuit of Christian theology, ecclesiology, and community that made the most sense to them (14).

They strived to make the best of any situation for their ambition of unity or expansion of power, such as war, immigration on the American west coast, the colonization of Korea, or settlement in Manchukuo, which is described in detail in chapter 7. The views and actions of the Christian leaders regarding Japanese colonial expansion were not simply reactions to the policies made by the government, as is often thought to have been the case. Those Christians were close to government officials and thus to the center of the decision-making. They already had their own vision of the Japanese empire, and it was as if the church had been the institutional base for them to participate in politics.

In chapter 6, the scene shifts to rural Christian communities in Gunma Prefecture. Here, Kashiwagi Gien, who opposed imperialism and argued for becoming a "small country," is introduced at some length, including his reception of the thought of Tolstoy. Kashiwagi's agrarian evangelism is juxtaposed with that of Kurihara Yōtarō, who supported the idea of Japanese imperialism and expansionism. The reception of the folk high school—the educational system founded in Denmark— among Japanese intellectuals has been overlooked and not discussed in depth by other authors, and Anderson sheds light on this largely unexplored yet highly important research area.

Having followed this historical narrative up to this point, however, the reader may have an inkling of Anderson's disapproval of Japanese imperialism and the consequential approval of those Christians who opposed to it. The word *imperialism* today has mostly negative connotations, and the author's attitude is understandable. (In fact, it is a pity that the author does not define her meaning of those terms such as "empire," "imperialism," or "holy war," which are historically constructed terms and not value-free.) This negative evaluation of Japanese imperialism is also to be found in previous works of Japanese Christian scholars. Anderson evaluates current Japanese scholarship on the subject of Christianity and empire by saying that they tend to "express their ethical stance toward the relationship between Christianity and empire" assuming "the two are irreconcilable" (10). The author continues:

> Conversely, the scholars who focus on Christians categorized as pacifists or those opposed to imperial ideology characterize their subjects as exemplars of

Christian living. Since these scholars are concerned with evaluating the beliefs and practices of these Christians according to a predetermined ideal of Christianity, they often do not critically examine how these Christians developed their beliefs and practices in relation to the state and the empire. Therefore, while these scholars have contributed an extensive amount of research on this period and have culled through a remarkable amount of archival material, their ideological commitment limits the range and extent of their inquiry (10).

Here, the author's argument seems to be three-fold. First, she seems to be against the scholars' tendency to take sides with the pacifist Christians in history, and "characterize their subject as exemplars of Christian living." In other words, those scholars turn a person into a representation of a political stance. For example, someone like Ebina, the imperialist, was a failed Christian, and Kashiwagi, the socialist (or pacifist, if one prefers the term), was a good one. Second, these personified political stances are made under judgment that is based on preconception informed by the scholars' religious commitment, without supporting argumentation. Third, therefore, for this type of Japanese scholar, "the range and extent of their inquiry" is somehow limited.

Anderson's criticisms would be valid if she could explain what "limits" this type of research and how she could overcome this shortcoming. She does not elaborate her criticisms further, and moreover, it is doubtful if a reader could see any difference in her historiography from what she criticizes. For instance, consider her treatment of Ebina and Kashiwagi. In Anderson's narrative, reasons for the opposite views held by these men are not explained beyond indicating that Ebina was a pastor of an urban church full of the leading intellectuals of the time and many students of Tokyo Imperial University, while Kashiwagi's mission was with the farmers in Gunma prefecture. Since the two men are not contextualized in their social structure, her argument does not explain the intellectual formation of these men, and how they "developed their beliefs and practices in relation to the state and the empire," and it is not clear what they shared as contemporary Christian intellectuals. For instance, the context of the history of socialist movements in Japan, which is a growing research area today, could have shed light on the development of Kashiwagi's thought. As a result, in parallel with the Japanese Christian scholars she discusses, Anderson also presents Kashiwagi and Ebina as fixed representations of political stances.

Also, the author's negative judgment of Japanese imperialism and positive evaluation of Kashiwagi's opposition to it is plain. In the section on the mission by Kumiai Kyōkai in Korea, Anderson argues "the limitations of a mission rooted in an attempt to legitimate colonial rule, and the inevitable failure of this mission to take root" (23). Allowing that Watase and Kumiai Kyōkai's attempt to evangelize Korean people was a failure, Anderson offers nothing to support the assertion that this failure was "inevitable." Anderson also makes a similar judgment about the

settlement in Manchuria, saying that because the settlers were betrayed by the agency and the state as well as the Soviet Union's entry into the Pacific War, it "ultimately epitomizes the folly of seeking a means to build God's kingdom on earth through the Japanese empire" (222). The settlement in Manchuria caused suffering to both the previous inhabitants and the settlers, but again, there is no argument to support her evaluation of it as "folly." Anderson does not express any religious commitment, but her framework and preconceived judgment are similar to that of the Japanese scholars whom she critiques.

These concerns aside, the book is a careful and novel historical study of Japanese Christianity in the modern period. As the book describes, being a minority group, the Japanese Christians made a great amount of effort, which is almost painful, to show that they were relevant and useful in society. The Christians made every effort to be a tool of God's kingdom, which in reality was the instrument of imperial Japan. The voices of dissidents were drowned out in the face of total war. The image of their utopia was always bound to the reality they experienced on earth, no matter how it was constructed with religious language and representations. Around the time when Christianity took root in Palestine, the Kingdom of God was imagined as an earthly reign. Ever since, because of the imagery of Christ's kingdom and the notion of one God who is universal, Judeo-Christian tradition has been amenable to the idea of an earthly empire. The book vividly illustrates a historical example of a religious group earnestly trying to serve the needs of the nation, and the consequences it faced.

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